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In this thesis, I argue that the idea of ethical responsibility in the thought of Emmanuel 
Levinas is coextensive with his vision of political responsibility. I reject two well-known 
claims: 1) that there is a hiatus between ethics and politics in Levinas, and 2) that ethics and 
politics are inseparable in Levinas. These claims are premised on a problematic description of 
Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. Levinas describes ethical responsibility as a 
movement towards the absolutely Other – a movement that is contrary to one’s perseverance 
in being (Robbins 2001:101, Levinas 1991:42-52). It is the movement to welcome the Other. 
Hence, I argue that the event of the welcome, followed by the embrace of the Other, which 
takes place at the door (la porte) of the at-home, constitute the substance of what Levinas 
means by ethical responsibility. I draw attention to three specific events that, in my view, 
structure ethical responsibility: 1) the approach of the face of the Other onto the site of the 
self; 2) separation of the self from its site and self-interestedness, and 3) the welcome, which 
is the repositioning of the self as being-for-the-Other. I split the event of the welcome further 
into three moments: 1) the pre-ethical welcome, 2) the ethical welcome, and 3) the political 
welcome. As the ethical subject embraces the Other, she becomes aware of a multitude of 
Others, the third party, who logically cannot place an ethical demand on her. This awareness 







1.0 INTRODUCTION: ETHICS AND POLITICS IN EMMANUEL LEVINAS  
 
“…the relation to the Other, as a relation of responsibility, cannot be totally suppressed, even 
when it takes the form of politics or warfare. “…it is impossible to free myself by saying, 
‘It’s not my concern.’ There is no choice, for it is always and inescapably my concern. 
–Levinas in Hand (1988:247, my emphasis) 
 
1.1 Research Question 
The question of political responsibility is, to my mind, the most urgent of all questions that 
have emerged from the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. But, despite its significance, there are 
no sustained attempts, as far as I know,1 to define political responsibility, or at least to 
describe what it means to be politically responsible on Levinas’s terms.2 It is in this regard 
that I research the question: Is there any viable theory of political responsibility that logically 
follows from Levinas’s ethics? What does it mean to be politically responsible in Levinas’s 
sense? 
 
                                                          
1 I have mentioned in the ‘Limitations of this Study’ the challenge of language, that some works on Levinas 
have not yet been translated to English from French. It could be the case that some Francophone authors have 
discussed the question of political responsibility. 
2 The only exception, to my knowledge, is Ernst Wolff’s Political Responsibility for a Globalised World (2011).  
Wolff accords a central position to Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility, but he argues that the practicality 
(that is, the span, the means, the conditions, and the beneficiaries) of this responsibility should be thought of in a 
different way to that of Levinas (2012:12). Wolff achieves his aim to think political responsibility otherwise 




Emmanuel Levinas is well known for his proposition that concern for the Other person is 
prior to concern for self; and that one is never absolved from responsibility for the Other.3 
According to him, responsibility is both limitless and excessive: one is never done with their 
responsibility [for] the Other (Robbins 2001: 1). To be responsible is, as it were, synonymous 
with ceding one’s place to the Other (ibid: 1) – what I call a repositioning of the self, from 
being-in-itself and for-itself to being-for-the-Other. 
 
Some authors, such as Clements 2000 and Tangyin 2008, have argued that Levinas’s ethics of 
limitless responsibility for the Other has no place in the violent world of politics); but more 
recent discussions have been analytic in their approach, and have questioned: 1) whether 
Levinas’s idea of ethics is possible (Derrida 1997, 1999; Fagan 2009; Morgan 2016); 2) 
whether Levinas’s ethics can found a politics, and what sort of politics or political theory can 
be derived from this ethics (Derrida 1997, 1999; Perpich 1998; Bernasconi 1999; Simmons 
1999; Drabinski 2000; Critchley 2004; Fagan 2009; Morgan 2016); and lastly 3) Levinas’s 
permission of violence and killing in the name of the Other (Caygill 2002; Atterton 2002; 
Hanley 2006; Altez 2007; Schiff 2008; Wolff 2011; Morgan 2016). The latter question 
follows Levinas’s admission that politics is necessary as a place of defence, ‘for it is not 
always a question of me but of those close to me, who are also my neighbours,’ (Levinas in 
Hand 1989:291). Elsewhere, he is concerned that ethics is a fragile response to political 
horror4 (Levinas in Caygill 2002: 2), to the extent that ‘it is irresponsible to speak of peace 
without war, or to imagine peace as cessation of war (Levinas in Caygill 2002: 3). 
                                                          
3 This is Levinas’s key proposition on which rests the validity and significance of his ethics. Critics of his ethics 
demand a justification of this excessive devotion to the Other. In his book, Ethics: An Essay on the 
Understanding of Evil (1998, 2001), Alain Badiou, questions the originality of this devotion to the Other (p. 21). 
Badiou even casts doubt of the category of the Other, if there is such a thing as the other at all, or if it is not 
just a mimetic recognition, or a reflection, of myself (p. 22). Apart from asserting that differences should be 
respected, Badiou thinks that Levinas’s ethics does not bring anything new to the field of humanity.  
4 It was during the Second World War, and especially during his captivity as a prisoner of war that Levinas 





1.2 Thesis Statement 
In this thesis, I argue that the idea of ethical responsibility in the thought of Emmanuel 
Levinas is coextensive with his vision of political responsibility. I reject two well-known 
claims to that effect: 1) that there is a hiatus between ethics and politics in Levinas, and 2) 
that ethics and politics are inseparable in Levinas. I show that both these claims are premised 
on a problematic description of Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. 
 
Levinas describes ethical responsibility as a movement, or a turning, towards the absolutely 
Other – a movement that is contrary to one’s perseverance in being (Levinas’s Interview with 
Shlomo Malka in Robbins 2001:101, Levinas 1991:42-52). The movement is from the 
familiar world, the at-home, towards the unfamiliar absolutely other, outside of oneself 
(Levinas 1991: 33). It is, as it were, a movement to welcome the Other. 
 
I argue that the event of the welcome, followed by the embrace of the Other, which takes 
place at the door (la porte) of the at-home constitute the substance of what Levinas means by 
ethical responsibility. I draw attention to three specific events that, in my view, structure 
ethical responsibility: 1) the approach of the face of the Other onto the ‘site’ of the self; 2) 
separation of the self from its site and self-interestedness, and culminating into 3) the 
welcome, which is the taking up, by the self, of a new position as a being-for-the-Other. The 
event of the welcome can be split further into three moments: 1) pre-ethical welcome, (the 
welcome of the home of the self); 2) the ethical welcome, (the welcome of the Other); and 3) 





The ethical welcome, which is, as it were, ethical responsibility, does not originate in the self. 
What is important to note is that, for Levinas, the self is separated, and set apart, as a self for 
itself – that is, it has ‘an unconditional position in being.’ But ethical subjectivity and 
responsibility is not the result of a work of the self itself, but it begins with its being called by 
the Other in need. This event is very decisive for Levinas because it necessitates the 
assumption of a new position in being, which is ethical subjectivity. The response to the 
Other, or the turning away from oneself towards the Other, is enacted in ‘conversation’ with 
the other – the self leaves itself to receive, or to welcome, what the Other’s face is saying.  
 
Accordingly, the definition of political responsibility that I argue for in this thesis is 
necessarily tied to the event of the welcome and the fecundity of the embrace. I take a hint 
from Levinas’s statement that the third party ‘temporarily suspends the ethical relation with 
the Other,’ (Levinas 1961: 212ff) and I locate the ‘moment’ of the suspension at the door (la 
porte) that opens the at-home, where the ethical welcome takes place. As the ethical subject 
turns towards, and embraces, the Other, she becomes aware of a multitude of Others, who are 
equally destitute yet they do not, and cannot, place a demand on her.  
 
To my mind, the event of the ethical welcome defines the political welcome. I suggest that it 
is at the door that the ethical subject becomes a political subject and assumes (political) 
responsibility to all Others. It is at the door where ethical responsibility is temporarily 
suspended because it is no longer sufficient to address the needs of the multitude of Others 
along with those of the Other. It is here also where a new and sufficient ‘law’ is promulgated 
as necessitated by (the insufficiency of) ethical responsibility. This awakening of 
consciousness is a cognitive fact on which I found my definition of political responsibility as 




the ethical relation to one’s Other, and design and embrace new ‘laws’ that suffice the 
interrelationships of the human community. The sequence of events in this definition is 
crucial: when to suspend the ethical relation, what to do during the suspension, and lastly 
what to do after the suspension.  
1.3 Literature Review, Thesis Contribution and Originality  
Summarising the work of previous commentators who have interrogated the question of 
politics in Levinas’s philosophy is not an easy task; for the reason that, for the most part, 
these authors regard Levinas’s ethics as having nothing to do with politics (see Kajornpat 
Tangyin’s Reading Levinas on Ethical Responsibility, Online article) or that it cannot yield a 
politics. And the few that discuss politics in Levinas, such as Caygill (2002) and (Wolff 
2011), think that his politics is extreme and exclusivist, almost at the same level as 
fundamentalism (also see Critchley’s 2004 analysis of the Five Problems in Levinas’s view 
of Politics and the Sketch of a Solution to them). It is claimed that Levinas’s politics (as 
necessitated by his ethics) would encourage violence and killing in the name of the Other. 
Very few texts discuss the richness of Levinas’s ethics for politics and justice (see Caygill’s 
Levinas and the Political 2002, Bergo’s Levinas Between Ethics and Politics 1999, Morgan’s 
Levinas’s Ethical Politics 2016, Katz’s Emmanuel Levinas’s Critical Assessments Vol. iv 
2005). Moreover, the comparisons of Levinas’s ethics (and politics) to those of Nancy and 
Derrida, for instance, obscure the appreciation of Levinas’s ethics in itself and its potential 
for politics (see Fagan’s Ethics and Politics After Post-Structuralism 2013).  
 
This literature review is brief and selective, it does not include all of the texts used in the 
chapters to follow. My re-reading of Levinas’s ethics is continuationist in its approach: in the 
sense that it interprets and stretches further the ethical relation of responsibility into a kind of 





My objective in this study is not to override important contributions that scholars have made 
to the debate about ethics and politics in Levinas, but to complement them by drawing 
attention to two or three significant areas that, to my knowledge, have not been given due 
attention in the literature to date. First, is the question of political responsibility in Levinas 
has not been thoroughly debated by most scholars. So far, no study has explored the question 
of political responsibility in Levinas from the perspective of the event of the welcome. 
Levinas describes the event of the welcome in relation to the at home and the door of the at 
home, and never apart from the two, yet most scholarship on his ethics and politics hardly 
mentions the significance of the home nor the door.  
 
Second, is the question of the moral authority of the third party. Most scholars have 
underscored the importance of the third party for politics, for the reason that it interrupts the 
face to face relation. By reason of this interruption, some scholars have argued that there can 
never be pure or uncontaminated ethics in Levinas because the third party is present in the 
face to face from the very beginning (See Fagan 2009). Yet again, some have argued that 
ethics and politics are therefore inexplicably intertwined, hence we can only talk of an ethico-
politics in Levinas, or that we cannot deduce politics from it. But my concern is that no one 
has questioned the moral authority of the third party to interrupt the movement of the ethical 
intention. In other words, what does the third-party interrupt? Is it the movement of 
responsibility to the Good (or Justice), or does it interrupt the route that the self takes – its 
dedication to only the Other? This is an important question to ask because it has implications 
for the possibility and impossibility of ethical responsibility. If ethical responsibility is 




politics. Third, and last, is the significance of la porte for the discussion of political 
responsibility and what it entails. 
 
In Political Responsibility for a Globalised World: After Levinas’ Humanism, Wolff (2011) 
underscores the idea that responsibility in Levinas is political in nature, for the reason that the 
political (or the plurality of others) is not subsequent to the ethical relation but has always 
been there from the beginning. What is particularly interesting for the present study is 
Wolff’s definition of political responsibility as ‘responsibility as it is integrated into the 
political, and thus has consequences for issues like power, strategy, and institutions of 
politics, but also elsewhere’ (Wolff 2011:13). It is important to note, as I show later on, that 
although political responsibility is implicit in ethical responsibility, yet it is not a guaranteed 
outcome of ethical responsibility (there is a lot of calculation that goes on at the door where 
the welcome takes place). The failure to recognise, and take up, political responsibility that 
the ethical signifies is, as I will call it later on, ethical injustice, which is not uncommon in 
contemporary society. Related to the theme of political responsibility is the theme of political 
judgement, which has been undertaken by Caygill (2002) and (Loidolt 2006). The latter 
engages the problem of judgement in Levinas in comparison to Hannah Arendt’s views on 
judgement (specifically, the judgement of history in view of the atrocities of the past). In 
Levinas and the Political, Caygill (2002) proposes that ‘the question of the political 
consistently troubled Levinas’ (p. 4). This is contrary to earlier scholarship that regarded 
Levinas only as a thinker of alterity. However, Caygill is quick to point out that the political 
that Levinas is troubled with is not the political present, but ‘an unassimilable past of political 
horror and an unforeseeable future of political promise (ibid: 3). Caygill’s analysis of the 
political in Levinas is significant in unpacking the theme of political responsibility, 




the third party and the question of violence. Besides, regardless of the fact that ‘the political 
present is largely absent in Levinas,’ is it not because of the face of the other of the twenty 
first century that the question of political responsibility arises in the present day?  
 
It is Derrida (1999) who has brought out the full extent of Levinas’s concern with ‘present 
day politics. By expanding the meaning of Sinai at which the Torah was given, to include 
‘modernity’, Derrida shows that today Sinai represents ‘a front and a frontier between war 
and peace, a provocation to think the passage between the ethical and the political, at a 
moment when [the innocent] are open to a cruelty without precedent (p. 64). Derrida shows 
how Levinas ‘never turned away his eyes from the violence and distress experienced by the 
foreigner, the immigrant (with or without papers), the exile, the refugee, those without a 
country, or a state, the displaced person or population (Gauthier 2004: 189). It is for this 
reason (probably one of the reasons) that Derrida engages with the thought of Levinas from 
the point of view of ethics or the welcome as hospitality and how it is related politics or law 
as hospitality. Derrida begins his analysis with a forceful assumption: that there is no assured 
passage between an ethics of hospitality and a politics of hospitality; that one cannot deduce 
from Levinas’s ethics a law and a politics. Nevertheless, he insists that this lack of passage 
does not signal a failure of politics but that we should think politics otherwise. What is 
crucial for the present study is the validity of this assumption. If there is no assured passage 
between ethics and politics in Levinas, what becomes of the third party? Besides, what is the 
role of the door in Derrida’s analysis of ethics and politics?  
 
Following Derrida’s analysis of the possibility and impossibility of responsibility, Fagan 
(1999) focuses on the presence of the third party in the face to face encounter to underscore 




impossible to deduce politics from Levinas’s ethics. This impossibility rests on Fagan’s 
assumptions that 1) politics is always already concerned with the ethical, and 2) that ethics is 
always already concerned with the political. Also, important to note is Fagan’s equation of 
the face to the third party (1999:7) based on Levinas’s claim that ‘the presence of the face ... 
is the presence of the third party’ (Levinas 2005:213). But, does this mean that the face is the 
third party? What is obvious from Levinas’s statement is that the presence of the face as a 
destituteness points to the destituteness of the third party. Fagan’s problematising of the third 
party is important for the present study. It raises an entirely different but equally important 
question, which she does not ask –the question of the moral authority of the third party – the 
fact that the ethical subject does not speak to the third party, and hence cannot be summoned 
to ethical responsibility by the third party.  
 
There is hardly any literature that has questioned the moral authority of the third party, yet, to 
my mind, the possibility of political responsibility is ironically founded on this lack of moral 
authority. The exigency of political responsibility would not arise were the third party as 
morally authoritative as the singular Other. In addition to the absence of the question of the 
moral authority of the third, is the absence of the question of the third party as witness. This 
is despite Levinas’s insistence that the third ‘looks at us’ in the eyes of the other. What is this 
‘looks at us’ and what does it entail for politics? I propose that the third party witnesses the 
‘commitment’ to suspend the ethical relation, it witnesses what happens during the 
suspension, to whom and why – is it a just punishment? When is the punishment enough? 
The third party also witness what happens after the suspension – is there a commitment to 





In contrast to these discussions, my claim is that the so-called gap, and incompatibility, 
between ethics and politics in Levinas, which renders political responsibility undecided, is 
flawed. In agreement with Levinas’s conception of goodness and desire, this study will show 
that a singular intentionality towards the good is the trajectory of responsibility. Thus, there 
cannot be conflict of ‘responsibilities’ as if they were many – ‘my’ responsibility for the 
Other who faces ‘me’ in his particularity is concurrently a responsible response to all the 
Others. As it emanates from the infinity of the Other and affects my entire being, 
responsibility can neither be contradictory in its ethical purpose nor in its political purpose. 
Moreover, the good is not self-contradictory. The good that is intended for my neighbour may 
not necessarily be good for the stranger, but it is also not a negation of what is good for all 
either. Similarly, what is good for all can encompass what is good for individuals. 
 
Much of the literature surveyed have relied heavily on Levinas’s books, Totality and Infinity: 
An Essay on Exteriority (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974), which are usually seen as 
the reference points for his ethics and politics. In these texts, Levinas addresses his criticism 
of traditional Western philosophy as a philosophical totalitarianism and suggests ways to 
overcome it (Peperzak 1993:211, 217). While Totality and Infinity makes way for the 
possibility of transcendence by focusing on the Other’s face, Otherwise Than Being focuses 
on the Self, which has a special relation with the Other (Peperzak 1993:211, 217). By 
implication, ethics as the expression of transcendence (or infinity) is opposed to politics, war, 
and violence, which is an expression of totalitarianism. In this thesis, I locate the origins of 
Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility back to his earlier publications, which are Existence 
and Existents (1947), Time and the Other (1947), and also his essay on ‘Philosophy and the 
Idea of the Infinite’ (1957). These texts constitute what one may call the building blocks of 




Levinas’s principal thesis in these early texts is that ‘the human breaks with pure being, 
which is always a persistence in being’ (Levinas in Bernasconi and Wood 1988:172) – or a 
kind of self-regard or self-interest, in his relation with the other human being. A relation with 
the other human being is described as sociality – that is, the order in which being is no longer 
a being-for-itself but is instead a being-for-others, a being-concerned-for-the-other.  
 
1.4 Rationale 
My interest in Emmanuel Levinas to try and answer these questions is not random. 
Emmanuel Levinas reverses the traditional conception of responsibility as accountability for 
one’s actions and proposes the conception of responsibility as sensibility to the face of the 
Other. Responsibility is no longer premised on the autonomy of the self. It does not begin 
with the self, but with an encounter with the ‘face’ of the Other person. In the face of the 
Other is inscribed the prohibition of murder and the demand to defend the life of the other 
(Tangyin, online article: 155).  
 
But what sets Emmanuel Levinas apart in his analysis of ethical responsibility is that he 
describes the existential crisis of human beings in a new way. He describes the human 
condition as the need to escape from being (the need to escape informs his understanding of 
human nature and his definition of responsibility. By examining objects, (such as the face) 
and subjective states (such as fatigue, sleep, insomnia, hunger, horror, indolence, desire, etc.), 
in Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas lays the foundation for his argument that 
responsibility is a movement towards the Good, which lies outside of Being (Existence and 
Existents 1947). This idea is a cornerstone of his philosophy. From this idea, Levinas draws a 
radical proposition that concern for the Other is prior to concern for self and that one is never 





Levinas repeatedly shows that his ethics, or his idea of ethical responsibility, is not for its 
own sake. It is not ethics in itself, but it is meant to lead us to a particular kind of politics, a 
politics that is oriented by, and justified by, ethics. Hence, his idea of ethical responsibility 
does not invite a naive dedication to the Other. In Totality and Infinity (1961) Levinas shows 
that philosophy is opposed to naivety (p. 21). It is for this reason that Levinas himself 
displayed an uneasiness to liberally avail his idea of ethical responsibility to any other, 
‘carelessly’. A case in point is his well-known remark that ‘in otherness we can find an 
enemy, or at least be faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong’ 
(Levinas’s interview with Shlomo Malka in Hand 1989:294). It is this remark that marks the 
shift in Levinas scholarship from viewing him as a philosopher of responsibility whose ethics 
has no place in the violent world of politics to viewing him as politically important. For 
instance, Caygill (2002) argues that Levinas’s ‘political theory’ can leave intact the worst 
forms of the state in the name of the Other person. It seems as permissible for Levinas to 
wage war as it is to pursue justice (ibid:143). In the same vein, Wolff (2011) maintains that 
with Levinas’s calculation of justice, someone might be sacrificed, someone might lose their 
right to life (p. 154). 
 
1.5 Significance of Thesis 
The question of political responsibility in Emmanuel Levinas addresses the ethical and 
political problem of our time, which is hatred of the Other (particularly the one who looks 
different from the majority), and the associated failure to acknowledge their humanity. 
Violence to, and even death of, such humans are usually of no concern to the dominant 
group. In response to the 2011 Norway attacks, German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked 




hatred is our common enemy’ (Angela Merkel, News24 ‘Norway attacks shock Europe’, 24 
July 2011, SAPA).  
 
I come from a political climate of hatred of Others, hatred (which includes inconsideration) 
of those from minority ethnic groups. The African political sphere, in general, is home to 
complex forms of political tension, the primary cause of which, I propose, lies in the manner 
in which participants in the political sphere typically react to the ‘otherness’ of their peers.  
The question of ‘what is my concern with (the plight of) the Other?’ (at a personal level, 
national level, and regional level) is often an excuse for non-responsiveness. The belief is that 
the Other is not my responsibility and that I am not responsible for their predicament. The 
much-touted African moral theory of Ubuntu, with its emphasis on human dignity and value 
of community, seems unrealistic to deal with the growing hatred of Others, especially those 
who look different and speak differently. Yet, in the face of all the cruelty, violence, and 
injustices done to others, ‘what is obvious and most disturbing is the frailty of humankind, 
the vulnerability of humans who have created an enormously complex and interdependent 
world and now must learn to assume responsibility for living together in this world’ (Isaac 
1996: 61-73).   
 
If there was a place, a more appropriate space, for calling into question the complacency of 
the self with regard to the destitution of the Other – if such a place could be named without 
objectifying it in vain – that place would be Africa. Even though Levinas’s scholarship has 
been confined to the Western tradition of philosophy, especially the Phenomenological and 
the Deconstruction movements, yet the urgency of the Levinasian ethical imperative – to look 
into the face of the Other and respond to its demand for justice – can be equally, if not more, 




called First World) is the space of interruption, which is the space of questioning. Africa is 
the time of justice, the time of decision making and of effecting responsibility for the Other. 
 
Apart from the daily news headlines (and pictures of malnourished children, crimes against 
humanity, and cycles of war and violence) about Africa, no one, has graphically documented 
the destituteness of Africa in comparison to Western countries than Ted Honderich in After 
the Terror (2003). Honderich powerfully compares the qualitative determinants of what he 
terms good and bad lives, using such variables as life expectancy, mortality rates of children 
under five years of age, GNP of rich and poor countries, percentages of the worst off and best 
off of a population, and so on. The fact of the matter is that these figures keep on reproducing 
themselves with no sign of ‘improvement’. Honderich asks: who is to blame for the figures? 
Who is to blame for their reproduction? Whose responsibility is it, anyway? Emmanuel 
Levinas uses similar gleeful images of helplessness inscribed in humanity, especially images 
from the Second World War (Shaw 2008).  
 
If it were possible, I would rewrite here Joshua James Shaw’s Prologue to his Emmanuel 
Levinas on the Priority of Ethics: Putting Ethics First (2008). Yet rewriting Shaw here and 
now would downplay the urgency of the African situation. Shaw provides a brilliant 
motivation for reading Levinas again, in spite of the criticisms against his ethics. Like Shaw, 
I find that most of the criticisms about Levinas’s ethics, despite the force of their validity, 
ignore what is practically at stake (yet the practical is what motivated Levinas to write at all) 
and instead they focus on endless conceptual analyses. It is in view of this that I suggest that 






The space of interruption is not supposed to be anyone’s home, if we take seriously Levinas’s 
description of the home (as a shelter from the elements, as an interiority, as a basis for 
complacency, and even as the condition for freedom). The space of interruption is a 
dislocation, a space of questions, such as: what is justice in view of conflict, war, and 
displacement? What is development, in view of poverty and disease? Yet Africa resembles 
this indeterminate space – hence, my motivation to read the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas, from within the dis-location that is Africa.  
 
I am of the view that centuries of colonial rule and domination in Africa have had far 
reaching consequences on the human status of the African, his conception of the other, and 
his conception of responsibility. The question of what it means to be human and to be 
responsible for the Other has practical importance for African political thought. But, Levinas 
did not write for Africa, nor with Africa on his mind. In fact, he has been labelled racist or 
androcentric for his comments on non-Europeans (see Hellen Douglas 2005 on the 
importance of reading Levinas in Africa) but, his ethics does not racialise or tribalise 
destitution. Destitution has neither gender, nor race, nor tribe. It is destitution. The ethics of 
Levinas points to the destitution of the human being, regardless of race, tribe, or context. It 
points to vulnerability, which is the nudity that remains when the human being is uncovered 
of every adornment. If we take away race, take away affluence, take away power, status, and 
so on, what remains is vulnerability. It is this vulnerability that speaks even before a person 
opens his or her mouth, even before his or her race or tribe or language is known. 
Vulnerability is a language-less speech, with neither form nor content.  
 
To my mind, vulnerability (and not rationality nor the ability to use language) lies at basis of 




Levinas’s ‘face’ of the Other. Most scholars have testified to the difficulty of Levinas’s 
notion of ‘face’, claiming that Levinas’s description of it either lacks clarity or it is religious. 
Yet it is the face that is central to understanding and locating Levinas within practical 
philosophy. If anything, it is the face that is more practical in all of Levinas’s philosophy. 
 
1.6 Clarifications, Limitations, and Methodology 
In my culture, when the elders have spoken, that marks the end of discourse. It is generally 
regarded as taboo for the uninitiated, or someone younger, to say again, or to contest, what 
has been said; or even to point out what the elders took for granted or did not pay attention to. 
This is the posture that I take up in view of the question of political responsibility in the 
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, especially after renowned elders such as Michael Morgan, 
Joshua James Shaw, Jacques Derrida, Simon Critchley, Robert Bernasconi, Roger 
Burggraeve, Bettina Bergo, Ernst Wolff, and others have eloquently spoken. Yet the urgency 
of the problem at hand – the growing hatred of Others, especially those who look different 
and speak differently, and the associated failure to acknowledge their humanity – permits the 
breach of cultural protocol, and the possibility to speak again.   
 
Studies on Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy have been confined to the continental and 
particularly the phenomenological tradition, structuralism, and post-structuralism. My 
observation is that these traditions have tended to problematise Levinas’s use of language 
and, in particular, his poetic style of writing. This has led to the confinement of Levinas’s 
work to the abstract and unfathomable aporias of possibility/impossibility, 
responsibility/irresponsibility discourses. This study, while it relies heavily on scholarship 
from these traditions, is not confined to these traditions. My reason for this is the conviction 




facing humans in this century – the most important of which I think is hatred of the Other, 
which lies at the root of all other problems.  
 
It is my view that Levinas’s philosophy arose out of a serious reflection on the political 
events of his time, including but not limited to, the useless suffering and the extermination of 
the Jews at the hand of the Nazis. This inevitably led him to question the meaning of life and 
what really matters. It is for this reason that, I think, Levinas’s philosophy is an attempt to 
provide justification for why one should put concern for Others before her own. Levinas is 
concerned with the suffering of, even useless suffering that others inflict on, other human 
beings. In Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas shows that ‘the supreme ordeal of freedom is 
not death, but suffering,’ (p. 239). This observation is well exemplified in the phenomenon of 
hatred of the Other, through suffering in which the Other exists as pure passivity (ibid). The 
human being, and especially the human body, is vulnerable and destitute.  
 
It is my view that Levinas’s ethics provides a foundation for normative action for the 
betterment of humanity, through humanitarian interventions, and the promotion and 
preservation of peaceful and just societies. So, to emphasise the literary and 
phenomenological aspects of Levinas’s ethics at the expense of his pressing concern for 
humanity is to fail to appreciate Levinas’s place in practical ethics and politics.   
 
It is for the above reasons that my focus on Levinas’s ethics and the politics it anticipates 
excludes a sustained engagement with the controversies that his work, apparently, ignites, 
such as his references to the feminine, his controversial exclusion of certain peoples from his 




everything else can be translated,)5 his constant references to the bible to justify his 
arguments, and so on. Most of these controversies have been dealt with brilliantly by leading 
scholars on Levinas such as Critchley 2004 and especially Morgan 2016. 
 
1.7 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter Two, Levinas’s Idea of Ethical Responsibility, is a reading of the ethics of 
Emmanuel Levinas that foregrounds the ideas of separation, subjectivity and the movement 
of desire towards the Good – all of which are crucial for understanding Levinas’s idea of 
ethical responsibility. I describe ethical responsibility as an event, which defines the ethical 
subject. I show that this event is a three-step process: 1) the ethical moment, which is the 
encounter with the face; 2) the welcome of the other, also known as transcendence, which is 
the self’s new position as being-for-the-other, and 3) the welcome of all the others. This 
interpretation builds my argument that the possibility/impossibility aporia of ethical 
responsibility is flawed. My claim is that the possibility of ethical responsibility sets the stage 
for, and anticipates, political responsibility.  
 
Chapter Three, The Question of the Moral Authority of the Third Party, focuses on the face 
of the other and its eyes in order to problematise the third party for politics in a novel way. I 
argue that the third party, by virtue of not facing the self save through the eyes of the other, 
have no moral authority to command ethical responsibility. Without a face, that by which the 
other speaks or presents themselves, the self has no ground to cede its place for the third 
party. What this implies is that the third party, which designates all the others, is anonymous, 
which is analogous to the il y a, or impersonal being that Levinas describes in Like the il y a, 
the third party has a hold over beings, and it is this aspect that gives it the power to enforce, 
                                                          
5 See Critchley’s ‘Five Problems in Levinas’s View of Politics and the Sketch of a Solution to Them,’ Political 




and even reroute the trajectory of responsibility. It is because of this hold over beings that it 
cannot be ignored. By virtue of its anonymity, the third party could be a site for anonymous 
injustices – injustices that have no subjects, hence political responsibility becomes 
imperative. but faceless forces. The look of the third party through the eyes of the other 
serves a three-fold purpose: 1) it reinforces the ethical subject’s new position, as a 
responsibility for the other; 2) it ‘teaches’ the ethical subject that it is also the Other just like 
any other – equal to every other in responsibility, and 3) it makes the need for justice and the 
political order urgent.  
 
Chapter Four, La Porte and the Time Between Times, identifies la porte, which is the 
threshold that opens the at-home [to which the Other is welcomed] (Derrida 1997,1999:26), 
as the space where ethical and political responsibility are determined. In my reading of 
Levinas’s description of the dwelling, the door 1) is the threshold of the ethical and the 
political, and for this reason 2) it is the limit of ethical responsibility, and consequently 3) it is 
the space of the determination of the political welcome (or political responsibility). In this 
chapter, I argue that the door is key to unlocking the movement from ethics to politics in 
Levinas. I will show that a proper analysis of the event of the welcome challenges the claim 
that ‘that there is no assured passage between ethics and politics in Levinas’. This claim 
renders Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility impossible and impracticable. In contrast, my 
claim is that Levinas’s allusion to the metaphor of the door and what happens there bridges 
the gap between ethics and politics, and in turn calls for an urgent turning towards not just 
one’s Other, but all the Others.  
 
Chapter Five, A Levinasian Calculus and Definition of Political Responsibility, is the 




knowledge about when to suspend the ethical relation to the other, what happens during the 
suspension, and when to restore it. I will show that ethical responsibility founds epistemic 
responsibility, one of whose derivatives is political responsibility. Political responsibility, 
inevitably, operates within the context of epistemology. Questions such as ‘who is right and 
wrong’, ‘what have all the others already done to each other’, are epistemic questions. 
Political responsibility is, precisely, an epistemology of time, and a judgement about what 
time it is. A knowing/knowledge of the time between times. One does not always make a 
decision based on knowledge (this is impossible, and this is why taking any particular action 
at all is a risk). Besides, the future does not always turn out as we plan it, hence political 
responsibility (and all responsibility for that matter) is a risky, but worthwhile, endeavour. 
Tied to the concept of risk, is the idea of fecundity of political responsibility – action and 
decisions are fecund. Taking a particular action is even riskier because one is unaware of the 
fecundity of that action over time.  
 
Chapter Six, Conclusion brings together the preceding analyses, summarizing the main points 
of the thesis: that ethical responsibility is a movement towards the Good, via the other person; 
that the possibility/impossibility aporia is flawed; that the third party has no moral authority 
to command or halt the movement of ethical responsibility but enforces it and redirects it to 
all others; that the metaphorical door that Levinas refers to is the space for the determination 
of the ethical and the political; all these culminating in my definition of political 
responsibility as the knowledge of the time: when to suspend the ethical relation, what to do 
during the suspension, and what to do after the suspension. What these main points purport to 








2.0 LEVINAS’S IDEA OF ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
“To cede one’s place to the Other is paradigmatic of what Levinas terms ethical.” 
– Robbins, J. (2001: 1). 
 
“The call of the Other … is a matter of our first experience, the very one that constitutes us – 
the ground of our existence. However indifferent one might claim to be, it is not possible to 
pass a face by without greeting it…”  
– Robbins, J. (2001:184). 
 
2.1 Introductory Remarks and Thesis Statement 
In Chapter One above, I have outlined the overarching thesis statement of this project, which 
claims to show that the idea of ethical responsibility in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas is 
coextensive with his vision of political responsibility. Ethics for Levinas ‘is not simply a 
moralism of rules, which decree what is virtuous. But it is the original awakening of the I 
responsible for the Other; the accession of my person to the uniqueness of the I that is called 
and elected to responsibility for the Other’ (Robbins 2001:182-187). For this reason, 
Levinas’s ethics cannot be classified under deontological, consequentialist and virtue theories 
of traditional ethics.  
 
As I show below, ethics for Levinas refers to the primordial relation of kinship that exists 
between one person and another – that is, their relatedness, (Levinas 1961: 214) a relation 
which stands behind traditional ethical theories mentioned above (Hand 1989: 247). It is this 




ethics can be described as an ethics for ethics – the reason why we need (traditional theories 
of) ethics at all is that human beings are related in the way Levinas describes. The reason why 
we judge actions as morally right or wrong according to deontologism or consequentialism is 
because human beings are related to one another in the manner that Levinas describes.  
 
As far as Levinas’s ethics is concerned, concern for the Other person takes priority over 
concern for oneself, and that this obsessive concern with the Other is infinite (or, endless). It 
is for this reason that Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility has been summarised by the 
expression ‘after you, Sir!’ (Filipovic 2011:58-73). Jacques Derrida is one scholar who has 
endeavoured to understand the nature of Levinas’s ethics and ethical responsibility. In his 
essay, ‘A Word of Welcome’, Derrida argues that [ethical responsibility] in the strictest sense 
that Levinas describes it, is not possible, owing to the initial breach or perjury of the ethical 
relation by the third party’s presence (1997, 1999: 33,34). What Derrida is saying is that the 
presence of the third party in the ethical relation prevents ethical responsibility per se from 
taking off. As an answer before any question, and a commitment or oath before any letter, 
ethical responsibility fails, according to Derrida, before it even begins (ibid: 33-34). Fagan 
(2009) also, in her essay ‘The Inseparability of Ethics and Politics: Rethinking the Third in 
Emmanuel Levinas’, argues that with Levinas’s idea of ‘… absolute responsibility to the 
Other, one betrays one’s duty to the third party’ (p. 13). There is, according to Derrida and 
Fagan, an inherent impossibility and irresponsibility involved in Levinas’s idea of 
responsibility.  
 
In the present chapter, I argue that the aporia of responsibility drawn from Levinas’s ethics is 
premised on a problematic description of Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. In order to 




foregrounds the ideas of separation, subjectivity and the movement of desire towards the 
Good – all of which, I think, are crucial for understanding Levinas’s idea of ethical 
responsibility. I describe ethical responsibility as an event, which defines and constitutes the 
ethical subject. There are three specific events that, structure ethical responsibility: 1) the 
approach of the face of the Other onto the ‘site’ and at-home of the self; 2) separation of the 
self from its site and self-interestedness, and culminating into 3) the welcome, which is the 
taking up, by the self, of a new position as a being-for-the-Other. The event of the welcome 
can be split further into three moments: 1) pre-ethical welcome, (the welcome of the at-
home); 2) the ethical welcome, (the welcome of the Other); and 3) the political welcome (the 
welcome of all the Others via the face of the Other). This interpretation of ethical 
responsibility as an event builds up my overarching argument that (the possibility of) ethical 
responsibility anticipates Levinas’s unsaid vision of politics and political responsibility.6  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
2.2.1 The Idea of Separation 
Separation is a central theme for Levinas’s ethics. In his article, ‘All the Rest is Dance: 
Another Look at Levinas’, Manu Bazzano argues that Emmanuel Levinas is first and 
foremost a philosopher of separation before he is a philosopher of otherness, (2016:24). 
There can hardly be an ethics of the Other outside the ontology of separation (ibid, 24). There 
are two related senses of separation, that are at work in Levinas’s ethics – separation as 
exposure of an existent and the unbridgeable separation of a self from the Other. The two 
senses of separation can also be understood using Levinas’s imagery of the feminine, on the 
one hand, which according to him is not the region of ethics, and on the other hand, the birth 
                                                          
6 There is not a clearly laid out politics that Levinas proposed, but his ideas or the implications of his ethics 




of a son, which is a proper ethical event (Levinas 1961). In this way Levinas puts side by side 
ontology (represented by the interiority of the feminine) and ethics (represented by the birth 
of a son). More specifically, Levinas wants to reverse the tendency of the Western tradition 
of philosophy that prioritises ontology over ethics, in order to underscore the priority of 
ethics over ontology. Levinas wants to show that ontology gives birth to ethics (in the order 
of chronology), but that it is ethics that has priority over ontology (in the order of intention). 
In this way, Levinas follows Aristotle’s ideas of substance (that the particular has priority 
over the universal) and causality (that the final cause is the first in the order of intention, but 
last in the order of execution). In the next section, I show how ontology is important for 
ethics. 
 
 2.2.1.1 Separation as Closedness (Ontology) 
In his essay ‘Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,’ Levinas quotes Aristotle as an authority for 
the idea that the singularity of beings cannot enter the horizon of science and philosophy (p. 
93, note 29). By insisting on the priority of singularity, Levinas comes close to Aristotle’s 
idea that substance primarily consists in the particular and only secondarily in the universal 
(Metaphysics Z3). For Aristotle, separateness and individuality are the only two 
distinguishing marks of a primary substance (ibid). In other words, a substance has to have 
independent existence – that is, it should be separable from the rest and should also be 
isolatable as ‘this particular individual’ – something about which statements can be said of.  
 
Levinas, like Aristotle, argues that separateness and individuality are marks of a self-
sufficient self (1961:36ff). He shows that the self exists as a separated being – separate from, 
though within, the external world. To be a self is to have identity as one’s own content 




being whose existing consists in identifying itself, and in recovering its identity throughout 
all that happens to it (Levinas 1961: 36). The self is at home in the world, free and at liberty 
to do whatever it can with everything at his disposal.  
 
According to Levinas, dwelling is the very mode of maintaining ‘oneself’. The self separates 
itself from the totality of the world by appropriating a portion of the world to itself as its 
home. The home provides and affords the means of sustenance, or maintenance, of the self– 
everything belongs to it, everything is comprehensible (Levinas 1961:37). The self is at home 
in the world, simply because the world offers itself to comprehension and possession. As far 
as the self is concerned, all reality unfolds around it. It realises itself by appropriating things 
of the world (Peperzak 1993:19).  
 
Levinas observes that the history of Western philosophy shows that the identity of the 
individual consists in the above: the self being itself; that is, in identifying itself from within’ 
(1961: 289). In other words, the self is separated, and set apart, as a self for itself – it has ‘an 
unconditional position in being’. It ‘refers to itself and maintains itself of itself’ by means of 
enjoyment or happiness (1961: 299). The self ‘identifies itself in its own acts as it identifies 
entities for itself, it is affected by its own identity but it is held, or rather chained, to its 
existence (Levinas 1974: xxx).  
 
In his earlier works, On Escape (1935) and Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas describes 
the formation of subjectivity, contrary to the Western model above, in terms of individuation 
of an existent as an instance of being, a being within being. Levinas’s analysis of the verb ‘to 
be’ or ‘to exist’ shows that the verb does not say anything about that which exists, the 




attribute) from beings (or existents).7 For instance, to say that ‘a tree is’ it means that the tree 
is already in existence; the being of the tree is already conjoined to existence. Being is said of 
the tree. Hence, for Levinas it is difficult to understand just how being belongs to the tree, or 
how it inheres in the tree. From this, Levinas concludes that being is impersonal, it adds 
nothing to an existent (1947:19).  
 
In the same way, to exist for the human being is to be conjoined already with existence. 
There is an implicit and prior contract with being. In view of this irremissible contract, 
Levinas describes the mode of being of the human being as an effort to exist, a conatus 
essendi (Bernasconi and Wood 1988:173). To exist, as being-for-itself, and to maintain this 
identity is an effort and a burden. One would indeed want to breach the contract with being in 
order to ‘get out of oneself’. Michael Purcell (2004) draws attention to the mode of being of 
the human that sets the ground for the need to escape. In his review of Levinas’s On Escape 
(1935) he observes that ‘duality is the mark of [human] existence (p. 36). ‘Although being is 
thought to be ultimately at one with itself and intends an identity, human existence has self-
referentiality, which is experienced less as being at one with oneself than as tension, effort, 
and burden’ (p. 36). The question of escape, therefore, is the need ‘to break the most radical 
and unalterably binding of chains, the fact that the [self] is oneself’ (Purcell 2004:36; Levinas 
2003:55, trans. by Bettina Bergo).  
 
For Purcell, Levinas describes the need to escape the overpowering and impersonal being as a 
‘world weariness’. It is ‘the disorder of our time’ (Levinas 2003:57). In this sense, therefore, 
                                                          
7 In her article ‘On Escaping the Seemingly Inescapable: Reflections on Being in Levinas’ (2012), Benda 
Hofmeyr explains the two senses of the word being in Levinas. First, being ‘as dynamism, which encapsulates 
the verbal sense of being’ (p. 460). Second, is the sense of ‘the overpowering stultifying sense of irremissible 
contract in which is inscribed the exigency of an impossible escape’ (p. 460). It is being in the second sense that 





to be a human being is ‘an effort and struggle, which one both wants to evade and escape’ 
(Purcell 2004:36).8 Anxiety over the nothingness, or emptiness, of being as such and its 
impersonality marks the mode of being of the human being. The human being feels all the 
weight and horror of being on its shoulders. Levinas describes this condition as insomnia – a 
pure enduring of being held to being (1947:10). Baumgartner (2005) observes that once one 
has an awareness of this state, it is an indication that one is slipping away from that mode of 
being. It is a condition when “consciousness is present to itself as conscious of something it is 
not, something out there, but which it cannot identify. Something is present to consciousness 
in an absent form, present without identifying itself” (Baumgartner 2005:70).  
 
According to Levinas, the self cannot rescue itself from the hold of being; not even death 
would heal the insomnia and nausea that one feels in the presence of being’s ungraspability 
(Levinas 1947). Levinas, like Husserl and Heidegger before him, locates the solution outside 
of oneself. In Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (1999:92) Husserl 
asks ‘What is the path from the immanency of the ego9 to the transcendency of the other?’ 
For Husserl, the other is given, and the ego experiences the other through empathy, which is 
the transcendental theory of experiencing someone else, (1999: 92). ‘The other according to 
his own constituted sense, points the self to itself; that is, the other is a mirroring of the self’s 
own self, and yet not a mirroring proper; an analogue of the self’s own self, and yet not an 
analogue in the usual sense’ (1999:94). Husserl shows that there is a way in which the other 
                                                          
8 It is the disorder of our time because, to my mind, modern man is more individualistic and more private than 
ever. There is a strong tendency in modernity for people to keep to themselves at least, or at the most to their 
closest family and friends. Hannah Arendt (1958) is one thinker who has lamented the loss of a shared world in 
favour of the private world of introspection. However, as Levinas points out, though this inner life is preferred, 
it is wearisome. To my mind, man finds escape from such weariness through social media and other narcissistic 
behaviours. Levinas thinks that the best escape from such weariness is through the interruption and eventually 
the welcome of the Other, sharing one’s world with Others (Levinas, Mensch, and Arendt would agree on this 
point).  
9 For Husserl, an ego is a monad existing purely in itself and for itself. This definition is close to Baruch 
Spinoza’s definition. Spinoza even claims that nothing can issue from one monad to the next. Each monad is 




makes the self know itself, and probably by experiencing what is not-self, the ego become 
aware of what is self (ibid, 94). What this means is that the constitution of one’s identity 
comes from the other, but it is confined to the self’s horizon of transcendental experience – 
that is, what is peculiarly the self’s own, (1999:95).  
 
While the route to ‘authentic’ life for Husserl is through empathy (seeing oneself in the 
Other), for Heidegger it is care (Gauthier 2004:162) – care for one’s own most existence, and 
not care for the wellbeing of others. Authentic existence, according to Heidegger, refers to 
those moments [the self] is most at home with [itself], (Moran 2000: 239). The self may 
initiate or take up possibilities as its own. It has a deep concrete experience of mineness, and 
togetherness [of its being], (ibid: 239). Inauthentic existence, by contrast, refers to those 
‘usual, normal, everyday moments when we treat things as affecting us deeply in our 
ownmost being’ (ibid: 239). The example of inauthentic existence that Moran (2000) gives 
separates Heidegger and Levinas in a significant way. Moran (2000) says: ‘we read about a 
tragic death in the newspapers, but do not necessarily absorb the event into our own selves or 
experience it personally. We experience such events inauthentically’ (p. 239). In the midst of 
others, (and their suffering or joy), Heidegger’s human being (Dasein) remains the same, 
intact, and unaffected. Its freedom is not put in question by the Other (Gauthier 2004: 161). 
In fact, the Other stands as an obtrusive impediment that potentially hinders its own self-
flourishing (ibid: 162). It is for this reason that Gauthier (2004) states that Heideggerian 
ontology is inimical to ethics (ibid: 161). To my mind, authenticity, which would be the 
ethical life for Levinas, or a life worth living, draws the self from itself; it detaches the self 





Contrary to Levinas’s idea that being’s absence or ungraspability causes anxiety and nausea 
in the self, for Heidegger it is the fear of death that causes anxiety (angst) in the self, and it is 
death that cuts short Dasein’s project of authenticity – that is, the urge to be a unified whole, 
at one with oneself. But for Levinas death is not something that causes anxiety. Instead 
Levinas thinks it is the hold of being that the human being wants to escape – that irremissible 
contract with being, and the only authentic exit is through desire for the Other and not care 
(Levinas 1947: 37). Care for one’s ownmost being is revealed in the ‘joyous appetite for 
things, which constitutes being-in-the-world,’ (ibid, 37). Levinas quotes Theophile Gautier to 
express the nature of [Dasein’s] being-in-the-world: ‘I am one of those for whom the external 
world exists,’ (p. 37). By contrast, in desiring the Other, the self is not concerned with its own 
being, but is absorbed with the desirable. The desirable is the terminus of the need to escape.  
 
It is important to note so far that Levinas does not confer the term ‘identity’ on the self that is 
described above. Levinas reserves the term ‘identity’ for a noun that has detached itself from 
the anonymous rustling of the impersonal being, (1947:87). The process of detachment, 
described below, is significant for Levinas’s definition of ethical responsibility. 
 
2.2.1.2 Separation as Exposedness (an Ethical Event)     
In my reading of Levinas’s ethics, it appears to me that separation as an ethical event is the 
contraction of identity – that is, separation is the formation of subjectivity. In Existence and 
Existents (1947), Levinas announces that ‘the principle theme of this book is the present. The 
study discusses the idea of Being in general in its impersonality, in order to analyse the 
notion of the present and of position, in which a subject, [or] an existent arises in impersonal 
being, through a hypostasis (1947: 19, my emphasis). Levinas’s ethics cannot be understood 




most scholars of Levinas’s ethics put a premium only on his latter (also referred to as his 
mature) works, especially Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise Than Being (1974), yet 
the foundation of his ethics presented in these recent works is laid in his earlier works, such 
as Existence and Existents (1947). In order to understand the formation of subjectivity in 
Levinas, one needs to go back to Existence and Existents (1947), in particular chapter 4: The 
Hypostasis (pp. 63-82), which, is the most important as far as Levinas’s ethics is concerned. 
 
Levinas defines ‘the present’ as a situation in being where there is not only the impersonal 
being, or being in general, but also a being – that is, a subject (1947: 73). To my mind, 
existence is exercised in the present, and not in the past nor in the future. Moreover, 
meaningful existence cannot also be exercised anonymously. What this presupposes is that an 
existent has taken a particular position or stance in being. Levinas argues that a subject does 
not exist before the event of its taking a position (ibid: 81). An existent is affirmed as a 
subject through taking a position in the anonymous there is (ibid: 82). What is interesting to 
note here is that no existent can become a subject apart from the there is, which is Levinas’s 
term for the impersonal and anonymous being. Levinas emphasises that an existent has a 
foothold in being (in the there is). In other words, even though there is movement within the 
self, the movement that leads to the self taking a position, yet this ‘freedom of movement’ 
“does not save me from the definitive character of my very existence, from the fact that I am 
forever stuck with myself. And this definitive element is my solitude,” (1947: 84). Further, an 
existent’s freedom of the present is ‘a weight and a responsibility’, which is ‘articulated in a 





Levinas’s description of an existent that has taken a stance, or position, maintains the 
impossibility of the self to annihilate its past (1947) 10. The self is the subject of the entirety 
of its history. However, the hypostasis presents the self with the opportunity to take a new 
position in being, or a new position with regard to the world around it. One important 
dimension of separation (or subjectivity) that Levinas underscores is the self’s mastery over 
being in general. Levinas shows that ‘subjectivity is a pre-eminence of the subject over 
being’ (1947: 83). In a subject’s mastery of the world, it is possible to speak about 
intentionality as ‘the forgetting of oneself’ and ‘a desire for things’ (ibid: 83). The question of 
the self’s mastery of being in Levinas is close to what Hannah Arendt describes in The 
Human Condition (1958) regarding the question of freedom.  For Arendt, ‘without owning a 
house a man could not participate in the affairs of the world because he had no location in it 
which was properly his own.’ One has to have a location in the world, that he can properly 
call his home, before he could participate in public life. In Arendt’s description, ‘the 
distinctive trait of the household was necessity – that is, maintenance and survival of the life 
of the species.  Hence, the private realm of the household was a sphere of necessity and not 
freedom. ‘It was a matter of course that mastering of the necessities of life in the household 
was the condition for freedom of the polis. In fact, public life was possible only after the 
much more urgent needs of life had been taken care of.  To own property therefore meant to 
be master over one’s own necessities of life and therefore potentially to be a free person, free 
to transcend his own life and enter the world all have in common’ (Arendt 1958: 29-31).  
 
The underlying point that I want to underscore in Arendt’s distinction between the necessity 
of the household and the freedom of the public life is that mastery over being, the ability to 
                                                          
10 This is why Levinas says later on that where many Others are involved, one begins to ask questions of right 
and wrong (1961:212ff). It is because the self has a history, even though it lives in the present, that one needs 




even possess property, is the condition for freedom. Much in the same way Levinas 
endeavours to show that separating oneself from the anonymous being, setting oneself apart 
and delineating a site to call the at-home for oneself is the condition for freedom and for 
ethics.  
 
Another dimension of separation worth considering is the idea of exposedness. Much as it is 
on its way to freedom (and time), yet a separated being exposes itself to death.11 Separation, 
therefore, is an exposure to risk, to the elements, and to death. It is an exposure to destitution 
and helplessness. Separation is a painful, yet necessary process. In order to foreground this 
idea of separation, I use the example of maternity (Levinas extensively refers to the feminine 
quality of ethics in Totality and Infinity). Maternity is the condition for the birth of a child, 
the birth of something new, that never was before in actuality but possibly as an intention. In 
relation to the outside world of its mother, the unborn child is anonymous: its gender is 
unknown, its identity is unknown, and it has no name. It is a living being, but at the most 
basic level of living beings. It is unqualified life, bare life.12 But when it is time for it to be 
born, it has to be separated from its mother, in order to have its own identity.13  
 
It is in this way that I understand Levinas’s (contested) reference to the feminine as other and 
non-ethical (see Critchley 2004, Katz et al 2005, just to name a few). Non-ethical is not 
equivalent to unethical, but it refers to the region outside of ethics. In other words, the ethical 
question does not arise in that region. As far as Levinas’s ethics is concerned, ethics begins 
                                                          
11 I use ‘death’ here lightly to refer to anything would thwart the self’s movement to freedom and time. 
12 See Agamben’s description of bare life in his book Homo Sacer (1998). 
13 Separation (from its mother), therefore, exposes the new born child to the elements – cold, heat, bacteria, 
viruses, and so on. The new born, much as it has innate survival instincts, yet it is helpless, vulnerable, and at 
risk of death. The unborn child was well nourished in the interiority of its mother, yet the time of birth cannot 
be postponed nor called off completely. It is my view that the time of birth, as an interruption to the economic 





with the birth of a son, an event which interrupts complacency and the flow of time. One 
cannot just ignore the new member of the family – it is there, it is, with its foothold in being, 
yet existing in its own right, with potential to change the direction of events. One can 
envisage a series of interruptions as new ideas are born (I develop this thought in chapter five 
below). The feminine represents interiority and the economic independence of the self that 
lives only for-itself and not for-the-Other – the self that still lives in the interiority and 
complacency of its own world. Such a self has no need of Others. Levinas’s famous 
description of Heidegger’s Dasein is exactly this: that Dasein, the being that cares for its 
ownmost existence and no one else’s, ‘is never hungry’ (Moran 2000: 336).  
 
As far as Levinas’s understanding of the self is concerned, there is no event that disrupts the 
self’s complacency more that the approach of the Other person. While the self can use and 
possess every object that is at his disposal, since ‘everything is at my disposal, … [and] 
belongs to me’ (1961, 1991:37), yet the Other person resists and contests possession. Nothing 
is more disturbing to the egoism of a self than encountering something that, by its very 
nature, resists possession and dominion. The event in itself seriously questions one’s freedom 
and complacency. Moreover, the Other that approaches the self touches some chord in the 
self that the objects at its disposal do not, and this touch affects the self in ways that the 
common objects do not. The Other appears familiar, yet at the same time distant. Levinas’s 
ethics shows that the Other is so frail that the self can easily overcome and possess it, yet in 
that weakness is a command heard: ‘thou shalt not kill!’ The Other is a being that one would 





2.2.2 The Event of Ethical Responsibility  
As shown above, the event of separation from the there is in which an existent arises in 
impersonal being through a hypostasis signifies its new posture or position in being, as being 
for the Other. Levinas shows that there is already a propensity or an intentionality in the 
unseparated being to transcend its mode of being from being-in-itself to its other (See page 6, 
7 and 8 above). In Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas shows that Husserl’s phenomenology, 
especially his theory of intentionality, has made possible Levinas’s ethics – an ethics that is a 
movement from the self’s interiority to metaphysical exteriority (1961: 29). Levinas argues 
that the ethical relation is transcendent, and that the essential of ethics is in its transcendent 
intention (ibid, p. 29). Consequently, transcendence and intentionality are central to Levinas 
ethics and his idea of ethical responsibility.14  
  
In this section, I describe the event of the approach of the Other that eventually leads the self 
to take up a new posture in being, which is also known as the welcome of the Other or ethical 
responsibility. The steps that I describe here do not factually take place. In fact, Levinas 
argues that we cannot properly describe with words what the face of the Other nor its 
approach is. The face is not a thing seen nor intended (Robbins 2001: 2). In his early work 
Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas describes the face as that through which a being 
gives itself, by which it comes forward. The description of the face retains its ‘quality’ in 
latter works. For instance, in on one of his interviews, Levinas says that ‘to encounter a face 
is to encounter a nakedness, a mortality, and or destitution (ibid, p. 2). Thus, when we merge 
the two descriptions of face, nakedness or destitution is what comes forward. Nakedness or 
destitution cannot indeed be seen nor intended. Levinas’s description of face, points to a 
deeper understanding of the human being, which as I will show below (see the section on 
                                                          





ethical subjectivity), both defines the human and is the ground of ethics. In The Levinas 
Reader, Levinas states that one cannot see the face but only speak to it (p. 12). Again 
Levinas’s ‘speaking’ has nothing to do with a mouth. To be in dialogue with the face is to be 
‘in touch’ with the nakedness and destitution of the Other. According to Levinas, “the face is 
a demand and the frailty of the one who is counting on you” (Bernasconi and Hand 1988: 
169). This is the origin of the dissymmetry between the self and Other (ibid, p. 171). 
So, it is for the mere purpose of exposition that I split the approach of the Other from, say, the 
welcome of the Other; let alone try to describe them as successive events. As far as Levinas is 
concerned, the self is already in a relation of responsibility with the Other, even before she 
realises it, before she actually speaks to the Other, and even before she does anything at all to 
the Other, (Hand 1988: 247).  
 
2.2.2.1 The Approach, of the Other 
In Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas distinguishes between the way in which the self 
encounters objects and the way it encounters, and welcomes, the Other. He argues that ‘the 
Other approaches me, not from outside of my home [as other objects], but from above. The 
height from which the other approaches is a teaching,’ (1991:171). 15    
 
In the text cited, Levinas distinguishes between the approach of objects and the approach of 
the Other. The Other does not approach from outside one’s home, hence she refuses 
possession. On the contrary, all the elements and things that approach from outside of one’s 
home are possess-able. The self sees the outside (objective, factual) world through the 
windows and doors of the home, but whatever is outside does not see the self (1961:170). 
Hence, it is easy for the self to go and possess what is outside (even if that includes 
                                                          




ambushing them, and dominating over them), since while the self was inside its home it could 
have sneak-peeked at what is outside and strategised on how to possess them. Possession 
presupposes labour and, often times, they come together. Yet the self cannot labour to 
possess the Other, for the reason that his approach is unlike that of objects. The Other 
approaches from a height, which is a teaching that the self receives, or welcomes. 
 
In contrast to the approach of things, when the Other approaches, the self has no readily 
available strategy nor clue with which to dominate and possess the other. All the self’s 
previous strategies that work on elements and things from the outside do not work on the 
other. It may choose to annihilate the Other, simply because it is incomprehensible and 
evades all efforts at comprehension. Levinas claims that ‘the absolutely other is the sole 
being that one would want to kill.’ Yet even if killing the other were possible, it only proves 
the dimension of height from which he comes and his endless unknowableness.  
 
Levinas (1991) shows that in order to free oneself from the routine of possession, one must 
know how to give of his possessions. This is only achievable through the encounter with the 
face of the other. Levinas’s formula is ‘I can therefore I am free’ (Levinas 1991: 37 
paraphrased). Since the home provides the means, everything is at the disposal of the self. 
The possibility of possessing enables the self to welcome, and not to possess, the absolutely 
other. The resistance to possession that the Other emits, allows the self to be dispossessed of 
his possession. In fact, the very idea and power of possession are ‘paralysed’ at the Other’s 
presence. 
 
Levinas describes the approach of the Other to the world of the self as a tragic event. The 




world of the self (Peperzak 1993:20). The Other’s face and speech interrupts and disturbs the 
order of the self’s world without ever permitting the restoration of the previous order (ibid, p. 
20). Raffoul (1998) shows that the identity of the self, as existing in itself and for itself, is at 
once ‘fractured and opened by the irruption or invasion of the Other’ (Raffoul 1998: 214). 
Consequently, there remains no proper place, or position, from which to receive or welcome 
the other. The previous position is challenged and dismantled. The subject is now a stranger, 
or homeless, in his own ‘home’ (Raffoul 2010:179). 
  
Levinas argues that ‘what is concrete in the encounter with the face is disinterestedness.’ The 
self suspends its persistence in being in its subjugation to the Other as if it were guilty with 
respect to the Other (Robbins 2001:229). Instead of seizing the Other through 
comprehension, as it does with objects that come its way, the self loses its hold before the 
face of the Other (Peperzak et al 1996: 17). The putting in question of the self by the Other is 
a summons to respond. By its very position (as overwhelmed, and the conquering of 
consciousness), the self is responsibility through and through, (ibid, p. 17).  
 
In other words, having been ‘deposed of its kingdom of identity and substance, the nucleus of 
the subject is uprooted, undone, and formless,’ (Levinas 1987: 168-169). There is a cessation 
of all possibility and power (Robbins 2001: 2). This is why Levinas talks about a subject in 
terms of trauma and hostage (in Otherwise than Being 1974) to show that all the self’s 
murderous tendencies have been arrested by the overflow of infinity. The self is now in a 
posture of subordination to the infinite and it is this position which is a new identity of the 
self. It is important to note, however, that ceding one’s place to the Other in this way is an 
extraordinary event and an exception to the natural order of things (Robbins 2001: 7). The 




being-in-itself and for-itself), but Levinas nurses hopes that in the realm of the human it does 
happen that man can substitute himself and die for another (disinterestedness or being-for-
the-Other). What this means for Levinas is that ethics hardly ever happens, but when it does 
happen, the human is the only possible site for it (ibid, p. 7). 
 
2.2.2.2 Intentionality, or the Movement of Desire 
The movement towards the Other, described above, is also known as transcendence, which is 
the ‘passing over to being’s [O]ther,’ (Hofmeyr 2012: 461). As I have shown above (see page 
14), the possibility of transcendence is founded on the idea of intentionality, or the movement 
of desire. 
 
Levinas discusses the intentionality of Desire (or Eros in Greek) in one of his earliest works, 
‘Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity’ (1957). Gosling (1975) defines Desire as a quality 
whose object is either the Beautiful or the Good (p. xxxvi). From its Greek origins, Desire, 
which is Eros, has two conflicting yet important attributes: poverty and wealth (op cit.). On 
the one hand, the poverty of Eros consists in its lack of [grasp of] its object (the Good or the 
Beautiful). It strives after the Good yet it cannot get hold of it. On the other hand, the wealth 
or riches of Eros consists in the vigour with which Eros strives after its object (even though 
the object is ungraspable, yet the vigour is unquenchable). As I will show, Levinas’s choice 
of the term Desire, especially its poverty and riches, is deliberate. 
 
Following its Greek roots, Levinas describes Desire as the Idea of the Infinite, which for him 
is an idea that thinks more than it thinks. It ‘overflows its container’ (Levinas 1961). Further 
he says Desire is unquenchable, not because it answers to an infinite hunger, but because it 




for satisfaction nor the affectivity of love in its various forms – friendship, erotic love, 
parental love, or piety, etc (Pepperzak 1993: 114, footnote 67). I suppose this to be the reason 
why later on Levinas will say that the relation between the self and the Other, as Desire, 
cannot be lost (or rather consummated) in the clandestinity of love (Levinas 1961). In other 
words, the idea of infinity cannot be contained in the two relation (ibid). It is in the nature of 
the Desire, or the idea of infinity, to overflow its boundaries. 
 
Hegel’s ontology, especially the Dialectic, helps to clarify Levinas’s idea of Desire for the 
infinity of the Other. It appears that for Hegel, just as it was for Plato, there are two sides to 
being – beings and Spirit (the true and essential being, which is necessarily out of reach yet 
desirable). It is otherwise than being (to use Levinas’s language). The Dialectic is Hegel’s 
way of describing movement of time in the cosmos through the series of thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis. The movement of time goes on and on through this series until movement is no 
longer possible, a situation which Hegel describes as the end of history, or the manifestation 
of Spirit. Levinas’s understanding of being and beings follows the same pattern as Hegel’s. 
But whereas for Hegel time progresses through a series of contradictions of thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis, for Levinas, my view is that time progresses through a series of interruptions. 
The idea is the same in both. There is the idea of contradiction or interruption that births 
something new in both Hegel and Levinas. For instance, the interruption of the Other gives 
birth to a being-for-the-Other, and the interruption of the third party gives birth to institutions 
of justice. While Hegel does not locate and emphasise the progression of time through the 
Other person, Levinas insists that there is an unquenchable desire that moves time through 






The idea of ethical responsibility in Levinas cannot be thought apart from the idea of 
intentionality, or the movement of Desire. One way of describing the movement of 
responsibility from interiority and self-interestedness to exteriority and disinterestedness is by 
using the terms complete and incomplete transcendence. Complete transcendence would 
describe a situation where the self has fully embraced the face of the Other. Incomplete 
transcendence would stand for the failure to fully embrace the Other, the failure to cede one’s 
place for the Other. 
  
Another way to illustrate the idea of ethical responsibility is by borrowing the idea of 
combustion: complete and incomplete combustion. Complete combustion describes the 
process where fuel reacts fully with oxygen and hence burns completely, whereas incomplete 
combustion describes the process where combustion is interrupted by a shortage of oxygen, 
and the fuel does not burn fully. As a result, some undesirable gases are produced. With 
complete combustion, there is no longer any trace of the fuel or substance left behind, but 
something other than the fuel is produced (the hydrocarbon, or fuel, completely oxidises to 
become carbon dioxide and water). On the other hand, with incomplete combustion, there is 
still a trace or residue of the substance (carbon monoxide). 
 
The illustration above serves to highlight the idea that the movement from being-in-itself and 
for-itself to being’s other is not unproblematic. Levinas’s idea of responsibility is that the self 
is given up completely, without any holding back (see section below). He argues that when 
‘the being of a person is more attached to the being of the Other man than to his own, that is 
saintliness,’ (Bernasconi and Wood 1988: 172). The human begins in the value of saintliness, 
which according to Levinas is the first value (ibid). Yet the being that we are [being that is 




174). The prevalence of moral evil, for instance, is an indication that ethical transcendence is 
indeed an extraordinary event (see page 16 above). 
 
2.2.2.3 The Welcome, of the Other 
Levinas uses the term ‘welcome of the Other,’ (also referred to as transcendence, or religion 
in Totality and Infinity [1991] and later on as proximity and substitution in Otherwise than 
Being [1974]) to describe the posture that is ethical responsibility. So far, it is clear that 
ethical responsibility involves movement, not from point a to point b, but at least from being 
in a certain way to being otherwise. In Levinas’s sense, it is the movement or change of 
position, from being in-itself and for-itself to being for-the-Other. 
 
The welcome of the Other follows the approach of the Other. As alluded to earlier on, the 
height from which the Other approaches is a teaching (Levinas 1991:171). The self is taught, 
not compelled. The teaching, which I have described above as the overflow of the idea of 
infinity, repositions the being of the self. To receive this teaching is to take a new position in 
being in relation to the Other. This teaching teaches the self: 1) the priority of ethics (or 
responsibility for the Other) before economic possession (self-interestedness). Levinas argues 
that ‘this teaching ... teaches height ..., which is tantamount to the ethical (1991:171); this 
involves a ‘passive violence’ which breaks or ruptures the closedness of the self’s home 
(ibid); 2) it teaches the self about the frailty, or vulnerability, of the body (of both the self and 
the Other), which is the ground of responsibility; 3) it teaches the self that it is not just the 
Other and the self that are vulnerable, but all human beings (the whole of humanity); 4) it 






It is worth mentioning that the teaching that comes with the approach of the Other goes 
contrary to Plato’s conception of teaching as anamnesis, or recollection, which is the idea that 
there is no knowledge to be gained except what comes from the self. In Totality and Infinity 
(1961), Levinas rejects this conception of knowledge by recollection. For Levinas, the Other 
is a teaching in the sense that he brings something radically new to the self, to the effect that 
the self changes fundamentally from being a self-interested creature to being-for-the-Other. 
There is probably no teaching that is more transformative than this. 
 
By welcoming the Other, the self is no longer rooted in its closedness but has opened up its 
once closed world; its world has become common. The self is now ‘homeless’ and a 
wanderer. Levinas calls this sharing or opening up one’s home to accommodate the Other a 
‘transcendence’ (ibid, 174). He further argues that transcendence brings into being a new 
home, the open and hospitable home, which is the very opposite of the home as root (Levinas 
1991: 172). The new open home retains the definition of home, as one’s point of orientation 
to the world and the condition for human activity, but the crucial difference is that it now has 
flexible doors and windows. This difference builds up my argument below (see section 
2.2.3.) that ethical subjectivity requires shifting doors, in line with Levinas’s claim that the 
ethical subject is a wanderer.  
 
One can distinguish at least three kinds of the welcome in Levinas’s ethics: the pre-ethical 
welcome, the ethical welcome, and the political welcome. The pre-ethical welcome signifies 
the welcome that the home as root and site accords the self.  
 




In Totality and Infinity (1961) Levinas states that ‘the other presents himself in my home – I 
welcome him by opening my home to him’ (p. 171). This statement encapsulates what 
Levinas means by the welcome of the Other. However, it seems to be a loaded statement. It 
would be an oversimplification to assume that the welcome of the Other is as simple as the 
quote suggests. Levinas’s description of the home in Totality and Infinity (1961) is very brief, 
yet it is crucial to understanding the welcome of the Other (and its political implications). 
 
Primarily, a home provides shelter and refuge to its inhabitants. It closes off its inhabitants to 
the outside world (Levinas 1991:170). If we think of modern houses with high walls, the 
sense of a home as a closed space, or an interiority, is more pronounced. A door links the 
inside and the outside. An open door typically welcomes one who is at the door inside the 
home. In the same way, a closed door keeps out the outside world.  
 
There are two senses of home that Levinas refers to: there is home as root, or site, and home 
as ‘a chosen place, which indicates a disengagement and a wandering (1961:172). Earlier in 
Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas states that the home involves taking a position, an 
attitude, a posture, or an intention (1961:37). The at-home is a site and a home. As a site it 
provides and affords the means of sustenance, or maintenance. ‘Everything is in the site ... at 
my disposal ... everything belongs to me’ (ibid). Everything is comprehensible and does not 
resist possession (1961:38). It is only the absolutely Other that, according to Levinas, resists 
possession. The contrast he proposes here – the relative otherness of the elements, which do 
not resist or contest but renders themselves for possession and the absolute otherness of the 
Other who resists and contests possession – is very important for his ethics in general and his 
definition of Other in particular. The absolutely Other escapes the self’s grasp by an essential 




number (ibid). The absolutely Other disturbs the welcome that the home (site) affords the 
self. Its approach on to the site of the self disturbs the being at home with oneself (ibid). 
  
What Levinas suggests here is that there are at least two types of welcome: 1) the welcome of 
the home, which he describes in feminine terms [the feminine welcome is what constitutes 
the home as a space of intimacy and familiarity; it makes the home, in quite literal sense, and 
the at-home, i.e., familiarity, possible], and 2) the welcome of the Other, welcomes the self to 
a home, not as a space of intimacy as above but as a chosen place. The welcome of the Other 
sends the self into an Abrahamic kind of exile, leaving the land of his origin or father forever 
in the direction of a foreign and unknown land; that is why Levinas thinks that man is 
essentially a “stranger on earth.” The chosen home is the very opposite of home as root 
(1961:172). Yet home as root is the necessary condition for home as chosen place to occur.  
 
What is more, Levinas says that ‘no human or interhuman relationship can be enacted outside 
of economy; and no face can be approached with empty hands and a closed home (ibid). For 
this reason, ‘the privileged role of the home does not consist in being the end of human 
activity but in being its condition, and in this sense its commencement (Gauthier 2004:193; 
Levinas 1961:152). The welcome of the Other can only happen if the self learns how to free 
itself from the possession that the welcome of the home establishes; that is, the self must 
learn how to give what it possesses (1961:170-171). In other words, the welcome of the 
home, which I refer to as the pre-ethical welcome, is a precondition for the welcome of the 
Other (or the ethical welcome).  
 
While Levinas makes no mention of politics in his description of the home, the distinction 




third type of welcome, the welcome of the third party. The third party is not a subsequent 
addition to the approach of the absolutely Other in the home of the self. The third party is 
present with the Other, through its face and eyes. To my mind, the welcome of the Other 
happens while the third party ‘looks’ on. This is one of the ideas that is less emphasised in 
most analyses about the ethical welcome of the Other. It has also led to the standard argument 
that it is impossible to deduce politics from Levinas’s ethics. On the contrary, my argument is 
that the event of the welcome of the Other hints at the welcome of the third party, which is 
the political welcome. 
  
2.2.3 Ethical Subjectivity  
In Totality and Infinity (1961) Levinas describes the ethical relation of self to the Other in 
terms of discourse or language, but in Otherwise than Being (1974) he describes it as 
sensuous contact and closeness. The intensity of the language with which Levinas describes 
the self succeeds to describe the burden of responsibility that the self has in relation to the 
Other. Subjectivity, for Levinas, is not the result of a work of a self itself (Levinas 1974: 
xxx). Rather, subjectivity begins in exteriority – with being named, or called, or elected, from 
the outside. The election is what individuates the self from anonymous existence and sets it 
apart to account for itself before another self. Levinas further describes subjectivity as 
substitution for the Other (p.184). To substitute oneself for the Other is to give up oneself 
entirely for the good of the Other. Levinas argues that to welcome the call of the Other is to 
put oneself in his place (to see things no longer from one’s selfish horizon but from the 
perspective of the Other), not with the aim of appropriating one’s own subjectivity, but in 
order to answer to the Other’s needs, to supply for his wants with one’s own substance 





Ethical subjectivity, as substitution, is also equated to giving oneself up. Ethical giving entails 
generosity, or liberality – to give generously or liberally means to give lavishly without 
holding back (1974: 75). An ethical subject is the one who gives oneself wholly unto the 
Other, without holding back any bit of self (without remainder).  
 
A bit earlier on (1974: 74), Levinas shows that giving is a tearing from oneself despite 
oneself. The condition for the possibility of ethical giving is enjoyment of a self and its 
ability to be complacent (Levinas 1974: 74). For Levinas, it is only a subject that eats that can 
give to the Other (ibid). It sounds more like the common parlance that you cannot give what 
you do not have. Indeed, it is only the subject that feels hungry and knows hunger, that can 
see the hunger of another. And so, ethical giving has meaning only among beings of flesh and 
blood, (ibid, p.74).  
 
To my mind, Levinas’s restriction of ethical giving to beings with flesh and blood allows for 
a partial location of Levinas’s ethics within the environmental ethics tradition, and more 
specifically the question of moral considerability: What factors or values determine the moral 
considerability of beings in general? One would argue that for Levinas moral considerability 
consists in a being’s ability to signify, which is another way of saying its ability to feel 
hungry. With this reading of his ethics, Levinas comes close to Peter Singer’s thesis of 
sentience: the ability to feel pain (there is no pain without flesh and blood), as a condition for 
moral considerability. For instance, it is because animals feel pain like humans that we should 
not cause them unnecessary pain. For both Levinas and Singer, to live for the Other would 
mean to live in the awareness of or in consideration of the Other (who is like oneself, feels 






However, Levinas would not admit to being an activist in the same way as Singer. What sets 
them apart significantly is Levinas’s introduction of yet another word to qualify what he 
means by giving. Levinas defines the subject’s exposedness to the Other as sensibility. The 
exposure to the Other is a passive one; it is not an active exposure. Contrary to an earlier 
sweeping supposition that ethical giving is simply giving oneself up for the Other, as if it is 
an act that one actually does (gives is an action verb), ethical giving is not the generosity of 
offering oneself, as an act, but it is precisely the having been offered without any holding 
back. Hence, sensibility (having been offered) is not generosity (the action of giving oneself). 
Sensibility, the having been offered, is non-present, non-commencement, non-initiative, it is 
older than any present, not contemporaneous with nor counterpart of an act (1974: 75). In 
having been offered without a holding back, sensibility becomes precisely what all protection 
and all absence of protection already presuppose: vulnerability itself (ibid, p. 75). 
 
A parallel would be drawn between Levinas’s idea of sensibility (having been offered 
without any holding back, a passive exposure, or nakedness) and Agamben’s figure of homo 
sacer (a life without any qualification, pure nakedness). Levinas’s idea of sensibility helps to 
show why the ethical subject as a passive exposure to the Other, becomes Other and subject 
to ethical demand in the presence of the third party. In Chapter Three below, I have shown 
that the self that is elected to responsibility by an Other from without, becomes an Other like 
all Others; the self as Other can also place the demand of responsibility on Others. What I 
want to show is that sensibility as passive exposure, or nakedness, presupposes vulnerability. 
It is for this reason that I suggest that vulnerability is the basic condition of humanity (on p. 
14 above). What makes the human being human is not rationality, nor action (as Hannah 




being that both Agamben and Levinas are describing (even if it is for differing purposes). For 
Agamben, it is not permitted to kill homo sacer, yet whoever kills it cannot be charged with 
homicide (Agamben 1998: 71). For Levinas, on the other hand, the self as Other is a being 
that one would want to kill, yet it is impossible to do so. It carries in its face the command 
‘Thou shalt not kill!’ What this parallel between Agamben and Levinas tries to show is that, 
regardless of the nametag homo sacer or Other, the definiendum of the ethical subject is 
vulnerability – a pure and passive exposure. This is in addition to Levinas’s insistence of 
flesh and blood, as qualification for beings that can meaningfully give or signify (see p. 16 
above).16  
   
The signification of ethical subjectivity in flesh and blood has a close affinity with the idea of 
sacrifice (as a passivity, not as an act) – that is, the ethical subject is a sacrifice. She does not 
(actively) sacrifice herself, but that she is a sacrifice for the Other. As a sacrifice for the 
Other, the ethical subject carries on her shoulders the burden of the Other.  
 
                                                          
16 Based on the priority of the human face over that of animals, Levinas has been branded as anthropocentric, a 
view in Environmental ethics that places the human pre-eminently above all creation. This view is thought to 
have led to man’s misuse and exploitation of the environment.  
It is important to note however that even though Levinas is qualifying beings that can signify, he is particularly 
interested in human beings. In an interview with Tamra Wright and others, Levinas argues for the priority of the 
face (as the point of exposedness and signification) of a human to that of a dog; he claims that it is in the human 
that the face is in its purest form, (Bernasconi and Wood 1988: p. 169).  
What is interesting to note, again, is that Levinas uses various but related terms to explain ethical subjectivity. 
For instance, the face on its own is not enough to describe the ethical subjectivity of an individual being. As we 
have seen above, events such as election, substitution, and sacrifice help to fully describe what Levinas means 
by ethical subjectivity. Based on these events, animals may not fully be ethical subjects. However, this does not 
mean that animals should be treated cruelly and without regard. Levinas would not have that. Animals have a 
face, and by that face they are vulnerable and devoid of all protection.  
As I have shown above, vulnerability would be the basic condition for moral considerability. So, a being does 
not have to be an ethical subject (as an actor) for it to be morally considerable. The face of an animal speaks and 
signifies according to Levinas, and that is enough to warrant them moral consideration. What is further 
important to note is that for Levinas, what ethics takes place between two humans, facing each other. What is set 
in motion when the two face each other cannot be confined in the twosome, but by its nature goes on to involve 
other people. In the interview quoted above, Levinas says that ‘everything begins as if we were only two. Yet, 
there are not only two of us in the world. The idea of justice always supposes that there is a third,’ (Bernasconi 
and Wood 1988: 170). So, what begins with two, as ethics, must move on towards justice. In other words, there 





In the book of Leviticus 16, there is the figure of the Azazel goat, which was used annually 
on the day of Atonement. The temple had to be symbolically cleansed annually of all the 
flesh and blood burnt on the altar during the entire year. The Azazel goat was used to 
symbolically carry away all the sins of the Israelites that had ‘accumulated’ in the Holy of 
holies due to the daily sin offerings burnt on the altar. The goat was then sent away to the 
wilderness, to die there. The Azazel goat was a passive sacrifice for the sins of all the 
Israelites during an entire year, carrying on its shoulders the burden of sin. Bible scholars 
believe that the figure of the Azazel goat symbolised the sacrifice that Jesus Christ was for 
humanity. Jesus Christ – from his election (slain from the foundation of the world, Revelation 
13:8) to the actual accomplishment of his mission (his birth, trial, and crucifixion), was a 
sacrifice for humanity, carried the burden of humanity on his shoulders, away to Golgotha 
(outside the holy city, just as was the case with the Azazel goat; that it was sent outside the 
city). The sacrifice that Jesus Christ was to humanity helps to demonstrate the passivity of 
subjectivity that Levinas underscores. 
 
The idea of sacrifice is, probably, what distinguishes Levinas from both Husserl’s empathy 
towards the Other and Heidegger’s care in view of the Other. The radicality of Levinas’s 
ethical responsibility for the Other consists in taking a radical position with regards to the 
Other person, which is to be a sacrifice, or an expiation for them – answering for and 
responsible for all the responsibilities of the Other. To my mind, it is the idea of the passivity 
of the sacrifice that has either been overlooked or underexplored in the critiques of ethical 
responsibility in Levinas (see section 2.3. below).  
 
Up until now, I have shown that ethical subjectivity is possible only when ‘the self is 




Other.’ The self, as a being-for-itself, a being interested in its own beingness [like 
Heidegger’s Dasein] becomes a being-for-Other, a being that is open to and exposed to the 
Other, a pure passivity and sensibility, fragile and weak to the point that ‘one cannot do 
anything at all’ ‘but command’ (Bernasconi and Wood 1988: p. 169).17   
 
To conclude this section on Ethical Subjectivity, I refer to the biblical story of Abram, which 
in my view best illustrates what it means ‘to leave oneself and become homeless and a 
wanderer’ for the sake of the Other. For Abram, this is a movement (from Ur of the 
Chaldees) towards the calling authority (God) into the boundless unknown (Canaan). There 
are two major ethical interruptions that occur to Abram: first, is the call to leave his country 
and his family and follow the calling authority on a journey into the unknown; second, is the 
call to sacrifice his covenant son (the intent and consequences of which are unknown to 
Abram).  
 
In Genesis 12, God as Other approaches Abram – God interrupts Abram’s economic 
interiority and complacency by asking him to leave all that he had, and all that defined him, 
behind. Abram, without any cost calculations, and without hearing the complete itinerary of 
the journey, obeys the calling authority and sets out on the journey. Later in Genesis 22, God 
approaches Abraham18 yet again. Abraham’s response is very significant: he says ‘Here I 
am.’ ‘Here I am,’ signifies total surrender and dedication of one’s entire being to the calling 
authority, pledging one’s dedication and obedience before hearing and understanding the 
reason for the call, and even before assessing one’s capability to carry out the command. In 
other words, Abraham pledges readiness and availability before he hears the command.  
                                                          
17 In my view, what Levinas describes here applies to both the self and the Other. It appears to me that the Other 
is already an ethical subject when he approaches the self. On the event that the self cedes its position to become 
a being-for-the-Other, she becomes equal to the Other in responsibility. This means that the Other is already 
ahead of the self in terms of subjectivity and responsibility. 





A further demonstration of Abram’s ‘here I am’ for God is found in Genesis 15. God 
promises Abram a multitude of offspring, yet Abram does not have even one child of his 
own. Nonetheless, Abram believed God (he believed the promise before it came to pass and 
dedicated himself to God). In order to certify the promise, God enters into covenant with 
Abram. What is important in this text for this thesis is the similarity of the event to what 
Levinas describes in Existence and Existents (1947). In verse 12, it says ‘a deep sleep fell on 
Abram. And behold, dreadful and great darkness fell upon him.’ The horror of being precedes 
the covenant. The horror of being necessitates the covenant. The horror of being reveals the 
hold of being over an existent. The Lord went between the pieces (of flesh) on behalf of 
Abram, taking Abram’s place, substituting himself for Abram (see verse 17 and 18). In 
Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas describes the il y a, the there is, as the impersonal 
nature of being. It is not an event but the fact that encircles us – ‘the impersonal, non-
substantive event’, ‘an experience of darkness, of night’ (Moran 2000: 333-336; Levinas 
1947: 64). The il y a has a suffocating embrace like the night (Levinas 1947: 63).  
 
Abram is powerless (represented by his falling asleep) in the presence of the il y a. He could 
not even go between the pieces of meat by himself, to do his part of the covenant – as a sign 
that he was entering into covenant with God. Yet this present (moment) is definitive of 
Abram’s subjectivity – he is no longer for-him-self but for-the-Other (God). Abram’s 
powerlessness can be looked at in two ways: first, in line with the il y a, as described above, 
powerless in the present absence of being. Second, which is most appropriate with Abram as 
my example of an ethical subject, is that Abram is powerless in the presence of the Other 
(God). Abram’s availability in this place is an ‘extreme exposure to the assignation by the 




the trauma is produced … is sincerity as saying, witnessing to the glory of the Infinite (ibid, 
143). Abram is too powerless to even do his part of the covenant. The Other goes between the 
pieces in Abram’s stead.19 The event of the covenant leads to a change of name for Abram – 
a change of identity. He is no longer Abram but Abraham – no longer a self living for himself 
but living for the Other.  
 
In order to test Abraham’s subjectivity to God, God commands him to ‘take [his] only son 
Isaac and go to the land of Moriah to offer him there as a burnt offering’ (Genesis 22). 
Abraham responds by setting out on the journey to Moriah –with him he takes his beloved 
and only son, as the ‘lamb’ of sacrifice, and the wood for the fire. He does not question God’s 
rationale for such an extreme demand to sacrifice his only son, who is also a hope for the 
fulfilment of God’s promise earlier on (Genesis 17, 18, and 21) that Abraham would be father 
of many nations through Isaac. 
 
According to Mensch (p. 43), Abraham’s ‘consent’20 to go to Moriah signifies that his 
relation is with God himself and not with any benefit. He does not act out of need, but for 
God’s sake (ibid). The relation between Abraham and Isaac on the other hand, is that of 
access to God. Abraham hears the command of God –thou shalt not kill! –upon seeing the 
face of helpless Isaac, bound up and laid up on the altar of sacrifice (ibid, p. 44). Mensch 
agrees with Levinas that the command ‘thou shalt not kill’ is the first word of the face, 
notwithstanding the fact that the face is destitute and helpless (ibid). Were it not for the 
                                                          
19 A basic, lay man’s, understanding of this verse points to the Jesus Christ as substitute for sinful mankind. But 
for Levinas’s ethics, it shows that responsibility of the self does not come from the self, it is not an action of the 
self, (Derrida even says that it is the Other who says yes, more like what is happening in the verse above, God 
going between the pieces for Abram, to establish the covenant between them). For Levinas, subjectivity is a 
passivity, which in Otherwise Than Being he likens to being hostage, and traumatised. 
20 I do not think it is consent as such, because he really does not think twice about whether to go or not, he just 
obeys – regardless of the cost (his only son’s death and what people might think of him). Consent seems to me 
to be an act of will, but there is no willingness in Levinas’s idea of responsibility. One finds himself in a 




‘interrupted’ sacrifice, Abraham would not have had access to the face of Isaac. He would not 
have experienced the speech of the face of Isaac – that is, the destitution and helplessness that 
bound Isaac was without the adornment of his father’s love, care, and protection. It is to 
helplessness per se that Abraham lifted his hand and knife. To my mind, this is the most 
excruciating pain that any moral person can feel. But for Abraham, the Bible is silent about 
his emotions, and may be rightly so; what is important is that regardless of himself (as being-
in-itself) he yielded himself up to the calling authority – God. He did it for the sake of God. It 
is this act that ‘moved’ God, so to speak.21 
 
What is Levinas’s point in referring to the story of Abraham to exemplify the movement of 
responsibility? There are a number of parallels that I draw between Abraham and any modern 
ethical subjects. In the first place, before the Moriah experience, Abraham already enjoyed a 
direct economic relationship with God. For Levinas, a direct relation with God is not possible 
without the relation to a human Other (Levinas in Hand 1989: 247? Check). He argues that a 
‘direct encounter with God is [strange] concept, but Jews are always a threesome: I, You, and 
the Third who is in our midst. God reveals himself only as a Third [not the third party of 
humanity but illeity, see chapter Three below] (ibid, 247?). So, Moriah teaches Abraham 
about an immediate relation with the Other person, Isaac in this case. Abraham’s relation 
with Isaac leads to God. In his encounter with the face (that is, the helplessness and 
destitution) of Isaac, Abraham encounters God – he hears a command from God (Let live!).   
 
Secondly, the Moriah experience opened Abraham’s eyes to destitution and helplessness that 
defined his son, one that he would have never experienced were it not for Moriah. In the 
encounter with the face of the Other, one encounters (the nakedness of) humanity, and hence, 
                                                          
21 Thank God it was a test of total devotion and complete trust in God! Abraham’s entire being depended on 




one’s responsibility to the Other, is also one’s responsibility to humanity. I think that as a 
would-be father of nations, Abraham was supposed to know this fact of humanity. Abraham 
needed to know the urgency of his immediate relation with human beings like him. Levinas 
shows that the idea of humanity (as the third party) is present in the face of the Other (1961: 
212ff). By implication, one cannot be in a position of authority, such a father of nations, if 
one has never encountered the face of the Other, since an encounter with the Other leads to 
humanity. Similarly, one cannot be in a position of authority if one has no relationship with 
the Other, since it is this relationship that teaches the basic fact of humanity – destitution and 
helplessness. The duty of anyone in authority, therefore, is to heed the command in the face 
of the Other: thou shalt not kill. To lift up one’s hand (representing authority, ability, means, 
etc.) as Abraham did at Moriah in order to kill a helpless human being (that is, to disregard 
destitution, even to actively take life), has been the political history of the nations worldwide: 
Nazi Socialism, which eventually led to the Holocaust, African slavery and colonialism, 
stranded and helpless migrants on the Mediterranean Sea, and many other humanitarian 
crises. To my mind, without the adornments of civilisation (security, human rights, 
technology, and so on) the human being – regardless of race, gender, and other differentiating 
factors – is destitute and helpless. 
 
Thirdly, Mount Moriah is the place of sacrifice of self – the place where one comes face to 
face with helplessness in its nudity. It is therefore the place of interruption, where self 
complacency is challenged, and put in question by the helplessness of the Other. Abraham 
ended up sacrificing himself (his self) at Moriah, and in this posture, he was able to hear the 
command of God through the face of Isaac. Would it have been possible for Abraham to 
ignore the command to let live? Not certainly in the posture that he was, his being was totally 




his country, for the sake of God). But it is possible that one can either heed the command or 
ignore it. In fact, Levinas argues that ‘the being that we are, being itself, prevents us from 
recognising our ethical duty,’ [which is to let live], (Bernasconi and Wood 1988: 174). In 
other words, there is a propensity to ignore the command in the face. As I show in Chapter 
Three below, the face itself, even though it is an authority, it lacks power or force to restrain 
violence, even though it commands against it. That is why, the idea of humanity (all human 
beings including the one on whom the decision to kill or let live rests) that is conveyed 
through the face is important for Levinas’s ethics since it necessitates politics (See chapter 
Three below). For Levinas, politics so far ‘is opposed to morality’ since it is marked by 
unnecessary violence (1961: 21). Violence is for Levinas not so much the injuring and 
annihilating of persons, but “it consists in interrupting their continuity, making them play 
roles in which they no longer recognise themselves, making them betray their commitments 
and their own substance; carrying out actions that will destroy every possibility of action” 
(ibid, p. 21). Levinas’s ethics, nevertheless, does not rule out violence completely, he argues 
that some violence is necessary as a way of responding to helplessness of the Other. It is for 
this reason that Levinas argues for an ethically necessary politics, a justified politics.   
 
To my mind, we are surrounded by Mount Moriahs. Much worse is the fact that we are 
already at Moriah, beholding the face of the Other. To be able to let live in spite of its 
helplessness is dedication to the face, and Levinas calls it religion or saintliness – ‘the person 
who in his being is more attached to the being of the Other than to his own’ (Bernasconi and 
Wood 1989: 172). For Levinas, the human begins in the value of saintliness (ibid). But, 
Levinas shows, however, that the purpose for his ethics is not to ‘moralise or improve the 
conduct of this generation’, in any case, ‘sermons have no power to raise the levels of morals’ 




exists between man and his neighbour, a relation which stands at the back of traditional 
theories of ethics and morality (ibid 247).22  
 
In the biblical call of Abram and the sacrifice of Isaac described above, there are a few 
elements that help to elucidate Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. First of all is the 
element of movement, which represents the abdication of interiority in pursuit of the promised 
Good. Abram leaves his country, his family, and his father’s house (representing all that 
makes for interiority and self-satisfaction that Abram’s home accorded him) in order to enter 
an economic relation of total dependence on God.  
 
Second, is the element of sacrifice. Abraham left his house with the thought that Isaac would 
be his sacrifice. Only to realise that it was his own self that was sacrificed at Moriah. 
Abraham came back from Moriah more learned that he was previously. The face is a teaching 
(see section 2.2.2.3 above). It overflows. As I will show in the next section, some authors 
such as Derrida take Isaac for the sacrifice, yet what was sacrificed at Moriah was really 
Abraham’s self. To my mind, this difference forms a significant divide in as far as Levinas’s 
idea of ethical responsibility is concerned. Scholars like Derrida and others argue that, by 
being responsible to God, Abraham is being irresponsible to Isaac (and to humanity). Yet as I 
will show, it was Abraham’s self that was sacrificed at Moriah, not Isaac, and not even 
humanity. 
 
                                                          
22 Levinas’s ethics is the basis on which other theories of practical morality are founded. For instance, 
Bentham’s utilitarianism defines a moral act as that which brings about more pleasure (or satisfaction) to as 
many people as possible and diminishes pain. Bentham and other Utilitarian theorists have not questioned why 
augment pleasure and not pain for human beings? They have not questioned what it is about the human being 
that necessitate pleasure or satisfaction? To my mind, Levinas’s analysis of the basic nature of human beings as 
sensibility and vulnerability provides justification for utilitarian ethics. A similar analysis can be done with 
Kant’s duty theory. At the back of all these theories is Levinas’s ethics. This is why Levinas describes his ethics 





To wrap up this section on Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility, I propose a redefinition of 
ethical responsibility to include the element of movement and of sacrifice of self. Ethical 
responsibility is a movement (of self) towards the Other (who calls the self). What this means 
is that the self leaves itself to be for the Other (to be his expiation, or sacrifice). The 
affectivity of the self by the destitution of the Other is prior to reason and calculation. The 
self is affected, which means to be in communion with the destitution of the Other, before it 
begins to think of ways of meeting the needs of the Other. For this reason, therefore, 
Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility denotes a passivity. The self does not, in actual fact, 
(actively) give itself up in order to be for the Other, but it is in communion with the face of 
the Other at the most basic level of sensibility that defines both self and Other. 
 
2.2.4 Derrida’s Interpretation of Levinas’s Welcome of the Other 
In this section, I examine Derrida’s interpretation of Levinas’s event of the welcome of the 
Other in his essay ‘A Word of Welcome,’ in order to show that his redefinition of the 
subjectivity of the subject as hospitality, or as a welcome of the Other, within the context of 
contemporary political and social problems of immigration and homelessness, confuses the 
welcome of the Other with the welcome of the third party. 
  
According to Francois Raffoul’s review of Derrida’s Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1999), 
Derrida insists that Levinas’s entire thought is and wants to be a teaching on what to welcome 
or to receive should mean, (Raffoul 1998:212). What does it mean to welcome? For Derrida, 
it is the welcome of the Other that defines the subjectivity of the subject, to the effect that the 
subject equals the welcome of the Other. This is also Levinas’s definition in Totality and 
Infinity (1961). Levinas describes subjectivity as welcoming the Other. ‘…it is hospitality, in 





In order to develop an interpretation of welcome or of hospitality, Derrida brings into the 
picture contemporary political and social problems that demand an urgent response – the 
problem of immigration, the precarious states of illegal immigrants, peoples without homes, 
and so on (Raffoul 1998: 211-222). Derrida allows these contemporary problems to alter our 
understanding of hospitality, and calls for politics as hospitality – a politics of borders, 
humanitarian politics, and so on. It does not yet add up, to my mind, how Derrida moves 
from ethics as hospitality to politics as hospitality. 
 
In an interview with Le Monde on his book Of Hospitality, Derrida clearly distinguishes 
between ‘the unconditional law of hospitality’ and ‘the laws of hospitality,’ but shows that 
the two are neither in opposition nor contradictory (Derrida 2005:6). In the spirit of Levinas, 
Derrida states that ‘the principle of hospitality demands a welcome without reserve and 
without calculation, an exposure without limit to whoever arrives. Yet a cultural or linguistic 
community cannot not suspend and even betray the principle of absolute hospitality in order 
to protect what is proper to itself’ (p. 6). The challenge for Derrida is to maintain the 
mutuality between unconditional and conditional hospitality – the double law of hospitality. 
Hence, he argues that the most just laws of hospitality are necessary for the sake of 
unconditional hospitality. Moreover, the laws of hospitality are necessary to avoid the 
perverse effects of unconditional hospitality. So far. Derrida is not saying anything different 
from Levinas. I have shown above that for Levinas, laws and the political order are necessary 
for the sake of ethics. Politics is a response to the ethical demand. Yet what remains for 





In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1999) Derrida asks whether Levinas’s ethics can found a law 
and a politics beyond the familial dwelling? With a society, nation, state, or nation-state?  (p. 
20). Derrida admits the seriousness and the difficulty of the question, but what is important to 
note already is the boundary that he sets for Levinas’s ethics – the familial dwelling. By this 
enclosure, Derrida implies that Levinas’s ethics, which is unconditional hospitality, is 
possible and effective in the familial dwelling. Yet, as I show below, this is not what Levinas 
thinks of unconditional hospitality. The welcome of the at-home, that welcomes the self to 
interiority and self-interestedness, is not ethical since there is none who calls the self to 
question. There is nothing that interrupts the self’s complacency and freedom. For this 
reason, the welcome of the at-home (or what Derrida calls the familial dwelling) is not the 
same as the welcome of the Other, which is unconditional hospitality. 
 
Further, Derrida (1999) literally transposes the door of the at-home, which is the place of the 
encounter with the Other, for national borders, which are places of encounter with 
immigrants and foreigners. Derrida also uses the term Sinai, the place where Israelites 
encountered the divine, to refer to these borders. Modern Sinai is represented by the door, or 
the borders, where the destitution and precariousness of the life of foreigners and immigrants 
without proper travel documents is exposed in its full measure (1999:64). It is not surprising 
therefore how Derrida ‘arrives’ at politics as hospitality – a politics of borders, or 
humanitarian politics.  
 
Derrida points out that the door is the threshold that opens the at-home to which the Other is 
welcomed, (p. 26). The open door calls for the opening of an exteriority, or of a 
transcendence of the idea of infinity. The idea of infinity comes through a door (ibid, 26).  




him, reason is a receiving and also a sensibility. It is not clear, though, if Derrida is saying the 
same thing as Levinas when he talks about sensibility (see section 2.2.3 above). For Levinas, 
sensibility defines the welcome of the Other, but it is not the realm of rationality. Levinas 
does not equate ethics, which is the welcome of the face, to reason. What Levinas says rather 
is that ‘the welcome of the Other is concretely produced as the calling into question of the 
self by the Other. While it is agreeable that it is at the door where one welcomes or turns 
away the Other, it is not the case that the welcome is rational. The idea of infinity that comes 
through the door comes before the self is open to reason. For Levinas, reason is secondary to 
ethical responsibility. In fact, even if one is rational and conscious about her relationship to 
the other person, there is already prior to that a relationship of responsibility that exists 
between them.  
 
As far as Derrida’s argument is concerned, that the welcome is rational, my observation is 
that he does not distinguish between the three types of welcome that are at work in Levinas’s 
ethics: the welcome of the at-home, and the welcome of the Other, which displaces the self 
from the at-home and makes her a wanderer (1961:170). There is also a third type of 
welcome, which is the welcome of all the Others. In each of these welcomes, the door ushers 
in a new dispensation. For instance, the self at-home welcomes the Other at the door and her 
identity is transformed forever. But the welcome of all the Others comes after ethical 
subjectivity is already constituted, and it marks the recovery of consciousness. There are no 
questions asked in the welcome of the at-home and the welcome of the Other, but questions 
are asked in the welcome of all the Others –which Other came first? What did these Others 





The welcome that Derrida describes in Adieu (1999) falls within the third type of welcome, in 
which comparisons and calculation are called for. Hospitality to immigrants at national 
borders is not ethical in itself according to Levinas. For Levinas, ethics defines the 
connectedness of one person to another – a relationship of fraternity or kinship (Levinas 
1961:214). Hospitality to immigrants and strangers is a response to this prior relationship of 
kinship, even though the immigration officers may have no idea that they are responding to 
the ethical demand. Response to the ethical is politics. But this is not to say that politics has 
no foundation, as Derrida argues in Adieu to Levinas (1999). 
 
2.3 Recap of Thesis Statement 
Thesis: the aporia of responsibility drawn from Levinas’s ethics is premised on a problematic 
description of Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. 
 
I argue that ethical responsibility in Levinas should be understood as the movement from the 
position of self-centeredness, or of being-for-one-self, to an altruistic position of being-for-
the-other. In other words, ethical responsibility is a sensibility and sensitivity towards the 
being-human of the Other person, which is the being frail and destitute of the other person. 
By being responsible, essentially, one is not actually doing something for the other person, 
but only taking a ‘new’ position, so to speak, regarding the other person. Consequently, I 
suggest that one can ‘show’ that they are ethically responsible, first and foremost, in their 
attitude (posture, the way of being towards, or in relation to the other human being), which 
eventually informs their action towards the Other. In fact, one can be ethically responsible by 
virtue of his attitude (or posture) alone, or both attitude and action, but action alone is not 




from a wrong ‘position’ or attitude of the subject. I consider objections to my thesis statement 
below. 
 
2.4 Objections and Replies 
In this section, I focus on Derrida’s possible objections to this chapter’s thesis statement. In 
sections 2.2.2.3 and 2.2.3, I have described ethical responsibility as a movement from one 
posture of being to another – from interiority to exteriority; from self-interestedness to 
disinterest. But Derrida would object to this description for a number of reasons: 1) according 
to him, ethical responsibility in the strictest sense as Levinas describes it is not possible; 2) 
Levinas’s idea of responsibility involves an irresponsibility. My aim, therefore, in this two-
part critique, is to show that Derrida’s aporetic reading of Levinas’s ethics ignores important 
cues that help to demystify Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility.  
 
2.4.1 Possibility and Impossibility 
For Derrida, the term ‘possibility’ is synonymous with the term ‘invention’, which is to make 
something new and different, (Anderson 2012:73). It also means to imagine a future that can 
be achieved through calculation (ibid). In this sense, what is possible is empirical. Further, 
Derrida argues that since what is possible is empirical and hence knowable, the future 
(possibility) is reduced to the present. In other words, what is possible exists within a fixed 
future horizon (Anderson 2012: 74). If this is the case, then possibility is an invention of the 
same and the Other is also the same (ibid). On the other hand, impossibility is 
undeterminable, unforeseeable, and incalculable (Anderson 2012: 75). What is impossible is 
not solely determined by, and within the horizon of, the same (ibid). What this means for 
Derrida is that what is impossible is always to come – that is, it will never come, nor arrive, 




comes – it is yet to come. So, what calls the self to question and to responsibility? What is the 
self in relation with if the Other never comes?23  
 
In order to understand Derrida’s critique of Levinas’s idea of responsibility, it is important to 
first of all come to grips with what he means by the paradox of the impossibility, since this 
will clarify what Derrida means by the impossibility of responsibility. Derrida argues that ‘if 
possibility as invention is to be genuinely possible, it much contain the trace of impossibility’ 
(Anderson 2012: 75). In other words, impossibility is what makes possibility possible. For an 
event to be possible, it must be an invention – the coming of the impossible (ibid). But then 
again, contrary to Derrida, once the impossible arrives as invention it loses its impossibility 
and comes to be. This is why Derrida says later on that possibility and impossibility are not 
antithetical since impossibility is not absolutely outside possibility (ibid, 75). 
 
With the question of the Other, Derrida insists that it is always coming, or about to come 
(Anderson 2012: 75). The Other cannot be invented and thus is impossible (ibid). In view of 
the above, what does Derrida mean when he says that ‘[ethical responsibility] in the strictest 
sense that Levinas describes it, is not possible?’ (1997, 1999: 33, 34). What makes it an 
impossibility? Why is it always about to come? In the same text cited (1999: 33-34), Derrida 
attributes the impossibility to the ‘initial breach or perjury of the ethical relation by the third 
party’s presence.’ However, since Derrida accepts that impossibility contaminates possibility 
(that impossibility runs through possibility and leaves in it the trace of its withdrawal), ethical 
                                                          
23 Besides who is the Other, or what is the Other? There is an essential difference between the otherness of 
the Other person and the otherness of, say, justice. One is ethical and the other is conceptual. Justice, as a 
concept, responds to the ethical Other; instances of justice are possible. But concepts such as ‘golden 
mountain’ remain an impossibility, a golden mountain can never be approximated. The impossibility of ethical 
responsibility is not at the same level of impossibility as a golden mountain, since with the former there is 
actually progression of time towards the Other, and this progression occurs via the human person. The 
possibility of justice as other would remain absolutely impossible apart from the human being. The 




responsibility is possible. If ethical responsibility is desire for the Other (or the impossible), 
what it means is that the desirable draws the self to itself (to the desirable). The desirable sets 
the self in motion, yet the self can never arrive at the desirable. In section 2.2.2. above, I have 
explained this in terms of intentionality of desire for the Infinite, which is the ungraspable 
that Derrida is talking about here. The motion towards the desirable is possible because of the 
trace that the desirable leaves as it withdraws further and further away from being uncovered. 
This is why Levinas says of the Other that it refuses to be known. It is an evanescent. In 
Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas says that the essentially hidden throws itself toward the 
light, without becoming signification (p. 256). It is not nothingness, but what is not yet [what 
is to come] (ibid). It appears without appearing (profanation). The Other, though nude and 
bare and present in the flesh, present to one’s caress, is distant and absent. A little later on, 
Levinas says that the Other is ‘the untouchable in the very contact of voluptuousity’ … 
‘future in the present’ (p. 258). It is this ungraspability of the Other that accounts for the 
dimension of height which is an essential ‘force’ that separates the Other from the horizon of 
the same (the self). It also justifies the endless desire for the Other.  
 
So far, Derrida agrees with Levinas that the Other is outside the horizon of the knowable and 
the known. Responsibility for the Other, is therefore, an impossible relation to the extent that 
the Other is outside one’s grasp. Yet, this impossibility conditions the possibility of 
responsibility. Hence, Derrida invents a new way of thinking about responsibility.24 To my 
mind, Derrida’s thinking about ethics as hospitality in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1999) is 
an invention that is aimed at making the impossible possible. Ethics as hospitality makes 
possible laws of hospitality. In the same vein, Perpich (1998) also argues that the demand for 
justice (justice as an impossibility, ungraspable in itself) originates necessarily from within 
                                                          
24 According to Derrida, when faced with an impossibility, one has to reinvent invention itself, or rather 




ethical responsibility and the relationship to the Other even as it betrays and suborns that very 
relationship, (p. 60, my emphasis). 
 
How does justice or politics betray ethical responsibility? In Totality and Infinity (1961), 
Levinas shows that one’s response to the approach of the Other refuses the clandestinity of 
love (1961:212-213). In other ways it is impossibility that a love relationship can occur 
between the two. The impossibility of a love relationship does not suggest any perjury to the 
arche of ethical responsibility. As a movement towards the desirable, responsibility has 
already ‘begun’. But instead of moving towards only the Other that faces ‘me’, the third party 
redirects the movement towards the absolutely Other (justice in this case). To my mind, one 
of the reasons why the third party is faceless is to save the movement of ethical responsibility 
from the failure to begin. If ethical responsibility cannot begin, then we cannot move towards 
politics and justice. There has to be a beginning, which is at the same time the basis, for 
politics and justice. 
Instead of talking about the perjury to ethical responsibility, I propose that it should rather be 
called another moment of questioning, or another interruption. The approach of the Other is 
the first interruption, and so third party’s presence is another interruption, so to say – the 
interruption that leads to the possibility of responsibility as politics and justice. Levinas 
argues that ‘justice is the way of responding to the face (Bernasconi and Wood 1988: 174).  It 
is important to recall in this place that we cannot arrive at justice. Derrida seems to agree with 
Levinas that justice is wholly Other and impossible, yet it is this impossibility that makes 
instances of justice possible. We can only experience justice in the trace of its withdrawal. 
This is why it is possible to invent laws of justice, and continually examine and amend them 





2.4.2 Responsibility and Irresponsibility 
In The Gift of Death (1995), Jacques Derrida argues that Levinas’s notion of ethical 
responsibility involves an inherent irresponsibility – one’s responsibility to the Other is, at the 
same time, an irresponsibility to the third party. This is also to say that one can only respond 
to the Other by actually failing in one’s responsibility to all the Others and sacrificing them 
(1995:70). Like Derrida, Fagan (2009) and Wolff (2012) argues that the nature of Levinas’s 
ethics, in view of the third party, means that responsibility cannot be separated from 
irresponsibility (2009:11,21) and (2012: 151-157), respectively. On the one hand, Fagan 
points out that the ethical is corrupted by the presence of the third party. Whereas Derrida 
maintains that this foundational aporia is essentially the meaning of the ethical and of 
responsibility, Fagan maintains that ethical responsibility is impossible, that we can never live 
up to what the Other demands of us and that we can never fulfil our responsibilities (2009:12, 
my emphasis).25  Wolff (2012), on the other hand, shows that, as far as Levinas’s idea of 
ethical responsibility is concerned, killing someone could be shown to be a valid response to 
the ethical imperative: thou shalt not kill! In other words, killing the third party could be one 
way of being ethically responsible to the Other, in which case responsibility is coupled 
together with irresponsibility. However, this way of putting the contradiction does not 
properly capture what Derrida has in mind. Fagan and Wolff’s observations are aporetic but 
do not quite represent Derrida’s responsible-irresponsible aporia. For Derrida, the aporia does 
not come by at the time of responding to the Other, if there is such a time! But, to my mind, 
irresponsibility is involved in the very definition of responsibility. This understanding is what 
I want to closely scrutinise below. 
 
                                                          




Morgan argues like Derrida on sacrificing others in order to be responsible. Arguing in this 
manner is akin to Hobbes’ description of the social contract which leads to the formation of 
social and political institutions.  ‘If proximity ordered to me the Other only, there would not 
have been any problem’ (Levinas 1974). But in the real world are many Others. Faced with 
many Others, it is up to the subject to decide who to be responsible to and who to ignore or 
be violent to. Yet this is not what Levinas means by responsibility. Ethical responsibility is 
not a realm of decision making. Neither is it a realm of action. But it is passivity. It is 
sensibility, proximity. It is maternity and substitution. Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility 
is not calculation. It is not a war of one against many Others, but it is exposedness to the 
Other – total exposure to the Other without any holding back. In fact, there is no remainder to 
the exposure (or offering). The whole person is offered in her entirety there is nothing that is 
held back.  
 
In The Gift of Death (1995), Derrida (1995:53-81) takes up the analysis of the idea of 
responsibility as sacrifice. However, for Derrida responsibility involves one sacrificing others 
(the third party). Yet for Levinas neither the Other nor the third party is a sacrificial lamb (see 
section 2.2.3). Derrida employs the story of Abraham and Isaac as told in Genesis 22 to 
demonstrate that ethical responsibility (that is, Abraham welcoming the call of the Other, 
God) involves at the same time an irresponsibility (that is, the disregard for the other, Isaac). 
There are two critical points to note at this point in Derrida’s account: first, Derrida 
interchanges the sacrifice – the ethical subject is no longer the sacrificial lamb as Levinas 
supposed it to be.  Second, it appears to me that Derrida takes Abraham’s relation to God for 
an ethical relation, in the same way he takes Abraham’s relation to Isaac for an ethical 
relation. To my mind, the two relations are not equivalent. Abraham’s relation to God is not 




Levinas makes references to God as Other, but God is not Other for Abraham in the same 
way that Isaac is Other to him. This example points to different alterities that Levinas clearly 
distinguishes in his work. The alterity of God as Other is not the same as the alterity of the 
Other human being. Nevertheless, Levinas claims that we find the trace of God in the alterity 
of the Other human being (See Chapter Three below). My view is that Derrida confounds the 
two different relations.  
 
More importantly, I cannot argue based on the God-Abraham-Isaac situation that Abraham 
succeeded in his ethical responsibility to God, but I would agree that he failed in his ethical 
responsibility to Isaac – that is to say he did not regard the other, Isaac (but again, regard is 
an act of will, yet Abraham did not actively will to disregard the face of Isaac). Levinas 
defines evil precisely as the disregard for the face of the Other. Hence, Abraham’s ‘disregard’ 
of the face of Isaac came into the picture as a condition, or a test (Genesis 22) for the 
presence of a higher relation (God-Abraham). It is a situation where two different relations, 
one higher order and the other lower order, cross paths. God and Abraham were, at this point, 
in a ‘give and take’ (or economical) relation. God and Abraham would give each other 
conditions. But ‘give and take’ does not describe an ethical relation. For Levinas, the ethical 
relation issues from the self to the Other all the time and it is not reciprocal. The self is 
infinitely, or unconditionally, obliged to the Other. 
 
In the first place, the allusion to the Abraham and Isaac situation to describe the ‘foundational 
aporia’ in the ethical violates a contextual distinction described in the above paragraph. 
Secondly, it would therefore be incorrect to maintain that ethical responsibility in Levinas 
involves an inherent evil, or irresponsibility, since there is indeed no sacrifice of the Other or 




pointed out above, it can be argued that Abraham was not in an ethical relation with God, or 
that their relationship was beyond ethical, and that anethical relation (neither ethical nor 
unethical) required Abraham to ‘fail’ in his ethical relation with Isaac. But this could be well 
pursued in theology, which is beyond the scope of the present work. Nevertheless, Levinas’s 
allusion to the example of Jesus Christ bearing the guilt of all mankind best signifies the 
subjectivity, or substitution, that marks the ethical relation of one to the other. But I find the 
allusion to Abraham significant in showing the extent of leaving oneself that Levinas insists 
on. Abraham left his fatherland, his people, his language, his identity in Ur in pursuit of the 
Other. The call to sacrifice Isaac is indeed a test to find out if there is still any trace of self left 
in Abraham. Abraham is fully divested of self.  
 
One would argue that distinguishing between the otherness of God and the otherness of Isaac 
in relation to Abraham still does not solve the problem of the ‘failure’ of responsibility to 
Isaac. That even when we single out the ethical relation of Abraham and Isaac alone, 
Abraham cannot be ‘ethical’ towards Isaac through and through because there are others 
present with Isaac (the third party). In other words, the ethical relation cannot be ‘effected’. It 
is a similar point that Fagan (2009) also raises as shown above, that one doesn’t get to ‘do’ 
his/her responsibility. However, if one understands Levinas’s ethical responsibility as a 
movement, then responsibility really has nothing to do with doing. By being responsible, one 
is not actually doing something for the Other person, but only taking a ‘new’ position, so to 
speak, in being.  
Consequently, I suggest that one can ‘show’ that they are ethically responsible, first and 
foremost, in their attitude (posture) towards the Other, which eventually informs their action 
towards the Other. In fact, one can be ethically responsible by virtue of his attitude (posture) 




is possible that a ‘seemingly’ responsible action can come from a wrong ‘position’ or attitude 
of the subject. Hence, it is not possible that one can ‘fail’ to be ethically responsible.  
 
To add to this, it is important to recall that the need to escape that brings us to ethical 
subjectivity is an event that individuates, or singularises, the self. The election and call to 
respond to the Other, which is the individuating event, distinguishes the self to the extent that 
the self is irreplaceable. No other self can take the position of the self with regards to 
responding to the call of the Other. If we are to remain consistent with this train of thought, 
then, the ethical subject cannot delegate its responsibility to another. The self has been called 
to a position of responsibility, and for Levinas one cannot return to the previous position 
again (because the Other has disrupted it, put it to question, and dismantled it). Once again, 
ethical responsibility, from the point of view of a new position, is possible. 
 
2.4.3 Wood and His Step Back on Levinas 
Another objection to Levinas’s ethics comes from David Wood (2005). Wood argues against 
Levinas’s prioritising of ethics over and above Ontology, especially knowledge. Wood thinks 
that one’s capacity to respond to the Other’s needs will, for instance, depend on the health 
and expansiveness of one’s understanding of self and what it is to be human (p. 57). One’s 
obligation to reach out depends on insight and knowledge to enable her to reach out and help 
the Other (p. 58). But, as I have endeavoured to show in this chapter, Levinas’s ethics does 
not involve doing anything for the Other. In fact, the ethical encounter produces subjectivity, 
which is a new position in being (of the self) in relation to the Other. One is infinitely obliged 





Wood further argues that ‘ethical commitment is no substitute for medical training when one 
is faced with a roadside accident victim. He cites the need for first aid and therapeutic 
knowledge in order to be able to help accident victims, which according to Woods is 
Ontology (p. 58). All this knowledge is essential, but Woods (like Derrida above) does not 
distinguish ethical responsibility from political responsibility. Helping a roadside accident 
victim is not in any way ethical responsibility, but responsibility in action (as Morgan 2007 
defines political responsibility). I am able to assist the victim through therapy, and so on 
(ontology) because I am first and foremost primordially indebted to the victim as my Other. 
The destitution of the victim speaks to my person before I even think about helping her. My 
relation to the Other is that of sensibility rooted in flesh and blood (see section 2.2.3. above). 
Actually, doing something for the victim is secondary to my sensibility of her destitution. 
Hence, ontology and knowledge are necessary for the administration of responsibility. What 
is most telling for Levinas, as far as ethical responsibility is concerned, is that I do not need 
Ontology (and knowledge) to know the destitution of the Other. I do not need knowledge to 
know the demand for justice in the Other.  
 
Lastly, perhaps Levinas should be read not as claiming that ethics is free from Ontology, but 
that it somehow supersedes it – but it does not involve the reading that Woods (2005) 
suggests.  
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has shown that reading Levinas’s idea of responsibility as a movement towards 
the Good avoids the aporias of responsibility. Levinas’s ethics need not be aporetic for it to 
make sense. What Derrida (1995, 1999) and others such as Fagan (2009) and Wolff (2012) 




responsibility. My assessment of their readings has shown that certain key events have been 
largely ignored. In my alternative reading I have underscored the events of separation, 
subjectivity and the movement of desire towards the Good – all of which, I think, are crucial 
for understanding Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. I have described ethical 
responsibility as an event, which defines and constitutes the ethical subject. In turn, I have 
further described three specific events that structure ethical responsibility: 1) the approach of 
the face of the Other onto the ‘site’ and at-home of the self; 2) separation of the self from its 
site and self-interestedness, and culminating into 3) the welcome, which is the taking up, by 
the self, of a new position as a being-for-the-Other. I have split the event of the welcome 
further into three moments: 1) pre-ethical welcome, (the welcome of the at-home); 2) the 
ethical welcome, (the welcome of the Other); and 3) the political welcome (the welcome of 
all the Others via the face of the Other).  
 
In my assessment of the other authors, I have not found a detailed examination of the 
welcome. With Derrida, in particular, this has led to a conflation of the welcome of the Other 
with the welcome of all the third party. Moreover, Derrida argues that the welcome is 
rational. Yet, the welcome of the Other is not in the region of rationality, like the welcome of 
the third party. The mix up has also led Derrida to conclude that the event of third party 
perjures ethical responsibility. My proposal has been that ethical responsibility, in as much as 
it is the movement towards the Good (or the desire for the impossible), is geared more at the 
subjectivity of the self – to ‘produce’ a subject divested of self. The approach of the Other is 
an event that reconstitutes the self into being-for-the-Other. The presence of the third party in 





What is more, in this chapter I have dispelled Derrida’s claim that there is a hiatus (or gap) 
between ethics and politics. If by hiatus Derrida means interruption (and not gap, or 
discontinuity), then there is no problem. But a gap? How can there be a gap when there is a 
door? Derrida refers to the trope of the door quite significantly (1999: 26). The door is the 
site for the interruption, which is the calling to question. The approach of the Other is an 
interruption just as the approach of the third party is an interruption. The moments of 
interruption are necessary to the movement of responsibility. In Chapter Three below I 
explain the interruption of the third party, and further in Chapter 4 I tackle the question of the 
‘in-between’ of the before and the after of the interruption. I make use of the trope of the door 







3.0 THE QUESTION OF THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE THIRD PARTY 
“The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other…” – Levinas, Totality and 
Infinity (1961:213, my emphasis) 
“The presence of the face … is … a presence of the third party (that is, of the whole 
of humanity which looks at us) ….” – Levinas, Totality and Infinity (1961: 213). 
 
3.1 Introductory Remarks and Thesis Statement         
In chapter two above, I presented an outline and a critical appreciation of Emmanuel 
Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility as a movement towards the Other. I showed that the 
movement is singular, continuous, and one-directional (proceeding from a regard to self 
towards a regard to the Other, a movement that does not long to return to the ‘original 
position’, or the at-home). It is singular in its intention (in that it aims at the Other in his or 
her singularity or alterity) and also singular in the sense that it highlights the irreplaceability 
of the ethical subject through the irreplaceability of his or her responsibility for the Other. 
The ethical subject is a substitution for the Other – a sacrifice, or an expiation, for the Other.  
 
The self and the Other are two of the three constitutive elements of the ethical encounter that 
Levinas describes in his ethics. The third element is the third party. Although the third party 
is empirically absent in the ethical encounter yet it is present in the face of the Other from the 
very beginning. Levinas claims that the third party, which is the whole of humanity, looks at 





Levinas introduces the third party into the ethical relation as an interruption and a limit to 
ethical responsibility (1961:213). He shows, however, that the third party is not a subsequent 
addition to the face to face relation, but that it interrupts or contradicts ethics from the 
beginning. This is an important point as far as the nature of the third party is concerned. 
Besides, Levinas stretches the boundaries of meaning of the terms ‘contradiction’ and 
‘interruption’. Ordinarily, the terms suggest subsequence: that whatever interrupts sort of 
‘disturbs’ something that was already there. But according to Levinas, the third party is 
‘always already’ present in the face to face relation. So, what manner of contradiction and 
interruption is this, that happens simultaneously with what is contradicted and interrupted? 
How does Levinas explain the simultaneous equation of the dyadic structure (face + face) and 
the triadic structure [face + (face + the third)]? 
  
There are various interpretations in literature about the nature of the third party and the nature 
of the interruption that it causes. Some authors have argued that the third party foils the event 
of ethical responsibility, for the reason that it corrupts and interrupts the ethical relation from 
the very beginning (see Derrida 1997, 1999; Fagan 2009; Perpich 1998; Bernasconi 1999; 
Treanor 2006; Fagan 2009, 2013; Westmoreland 2008). Fagan (2009) is by far, the foremost 
critique of Levinas’s presentation of the third party in the ethical relation, and I will look at 
her argument in detail, in section 3.3. below. Some authors have even gone further to argue 
that ethics, by its very nature, consists in the interruption – that there cannot be ethics without 
interruption (Derrida 1999; Raffoul 2008; Peperzak 1993). 
 
While it is generally agreed among Levinas’s scholars that the third party is the site and 
passage to politics, some authors argue that the presence of the third party complicates and 




Levinas’s ethics (Drabinski 2000, Fagan 2009)26; it perjures ethical responsibility before it 
takes off (Derrida 1997, 1999); and that the constitution of ethical responsibility includes 
irresponsibility (Fagan 2009, Wolff 2012). The underlining argument in all the critiques is 
that Levinas’s ethics is always already concerned with the third party and, hence, with the 
political (Fagan 2009, Wolff 2012). Hence, the question that I endeavour to answer in this 
chapter is: does the third party make ethical responsibility fail to take off? Consequently, 
what implications does this have for politics? 
 
The present chapter focuses on the nature of the third party and the nature of its presence in 
the ethical encounter, in order to show the significance of the third party for politics in a 
novel way. I defend the thesis that the third party has no moral authority to place the demand 
of ethical responsibility on the self, let alone halt the movement of responsibility. In other 
words, by virtue of not having a face with which to approach and speak to the self, the third 
party has no ground to lay the burden of responsibility on the self. Based on Levinas’s 
description of the ethical subject as one who has ceded her place for the Other and sacrificed 
its being for the sake of the Other, there remains no subject, as it were, to welcome the third 
party. It is for the same reason that the Other cannot reciprocate a responsible gesture from 
the ethical subject. There remains no longer an addressee at the old address, since the self 
gave up its place. Nevertheless, I argue that the third party’s lack of authority to command 
ethical responsibility justifies the possibility of political responsibility. The exigency of 
political responsibility would not arise if the third party were as morally authoritative as the 
singular Other. I discuss two related premises in order to defend my argument: 1) the third 
party does not have a face with which to approach and speak to self; yet, 2) the third party is 
capable of interrupting and redirecting the trajectory of responsibility.  
                                                          





The third party is central to Levinas’s ethics because it is directly tied to the question of the 
possibility and impossibility of ethical responsibility (see Chapter Two above). But Levinas 
does not pose the question of its relatedness to the possibility or impossibility of ethical 
responsibility, let alone the question of the moral authority of the third party. In Existence 
and Existents (1947), Levinas equates the third party to humanity; and he describes humanity 
as bare nudity, that does not have a face, but shows up through the eyes of the Other. Again, 
Levinas hints at the facelessness of the third party when he describes the movement from ‘the 
Other to all the Others’ in Totality and Infinity (1961:212-213). Owing to this section in 
Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas’s scholars affirm that the third party is the passage from 
ethics to politics, and that it is the birth of the question of justice. But so far, what this 
‘passage’ assumes and implies is vague. I have not found a sustained focus in literature on the 
nature of the third party (that is, its facelessness) and why that is politically significant.27  
 
To recap the foregoing introductory remarks to this Chapter (the Moral Authority of the Third 
Party), I highlight the following: The core argument in this chapter is that the third party 
neither has the moral authority to command ethical responsibility let alone halt its movement. 
To support that claim, I critically look at the manner in which the third party presents itself in 
the ethical encounter. It looks through the eyes of the Other. Thus, it does not have a face, 
with which to approach or speak forth. At the same time, I notice that while the third party is 
faceless yet it cannot be ignored. It is powerful enough to influence a redirection of the 
trajectory of responsibility, from the Other to all the Others. I show that the third party 
rescues the movement of responsibility from being lost in a twosome love relationship, 
                                                          
27 It is only Huett and Goodman (2012) who have underscored the facelessness of the third party, in their paper, 
‘Levinas on Managed Care: The (A)Proximal, Faceless Third Party and the Psychotherapeutic Dyad. But in this 




towards justice for all the Others (that is, from love to justice). What follows in the next 
section is a critical engagement with literature, beginning with Levinas’s description of the 
third party followed by select authors’ reactions to Levinas’s description and my responses to 
them. This is followed by a defence of my claim and a consideration of objections to it. 
 
3.2 Literature Review  
 
3.2.1 Levinas on the Third Party 
Levinas’s earliest intimations about the third party are to be found in his Existence and 
Existents (1947).28 In the third, and probably the most important chapter of the book (as far as 
his ethics and politics are concerned) Levinas makes a distinction between the social 
relationship from the relationship with the Other (chapter 4: The Hypostasis, subsection: 
With Another and Facing Another p 94-96). The social relationship says ‘we’ and feels the 
other to be alongside of oneself, and not facing one’ (p. 94 my emphasis). The social 
relationship is not a relationship with alterity but is a collectivity of comrades (p. 94). What is 
essential in the social relationship is that the collectivity is set up around a third term, an 
intermediary, which supplies what is common in the communion (p. 94 my emphasis). The 
third party makes common what was uncommon and almost sacred. In the presence of the 
third party, the face and the self are equal to each other. They are comrades. 
 
In contrast, Levinas goes further to describe the relationship with the Other, which he calls 
the I-you collectivity. This twosome collectivity is not a communion, he says. It is rather a 
fearful face to face situation of a relationship without an intermediary, without mediations (p. 
                                                          
28 As I mentioned in Chapter One above, Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility has its foundation in his earlier 
texts, which are not usually referred to as his major or mature works, yet they set the ground for his ethics 
(and politics). He writes in the Preface to Existence and Existents (1947) that ‘the study [of existence and 





95 my emphasis). The I and the you are not comrades, and so there is no reciprocal 
relationship between them. The Other is not just an alter ego but it is ‘what I am not: it is the 
weak one whereas I am the strong one; he is the poor one, the widow and the orphan’ (p. 95). 
Or else, Levinas says, the Other is the stranger, the enemy, and the powerful one. It is by 
virtue of his alterity that the Other has these qualities (p. 95). 
 
The above extracts from the Existence and Existents (1947) clearly anticipates Levinas’s 
Totality and Infinity (1961), and Otherwise Than Being (1974). What is of interest is that in 
Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas does not use the term ‘third party’. Rather he hints at 
the third party when, for instance, he describes the ‘we’ that feels the other to be alongside of 
one. The self and the Other are contemporaries and comrades in the ‘we’. He also uses the 
terms ‘third term’ and ‘third man.’ It is in Totality and Infinity (1961) that Levinas 
unambiguously uses the words ‘third party’ in his description of the ethical relation and also 
as he moves to the realm of politics. The most important section is the one titled ‘The Other 
and the Others’ (1961:212), where Levinas states that:  
 
“With regard to things or phenomena, one’s response to a particular thing or phenomenon 
can remain between oneself and the thing. But since the face of the Other is not a 
phenomenon Bernasconi &Wood 1988: 171), what happens between the self and the Other 
cannot remain between them. It concerns all Others – that is, the whole of humanity. It takes 





Levinas assigns the term ‘third party’ to the class ‘all others’. The third party looks at the self 
in the eyes of the Other (1961:212, my emphasis).29 One’s response to the Other, which is 
discourse or language, does not invite complicity with a particular Other, it refuses the 
clandestinity of love (p.212). In other words, the responsibility of one for the Other … does 
not imprison the self and the Other in the intimacy of an exclusive love, but necessarily 
extends the responsibility to all the other Others, (Peperzak 1993:167). All the Others, which 
Levinas designates as the Third, look at ‘me’ in the eyes of the Other. It is not that there was 
first the Other, then the Third (Levinas 1961:213). Everything that takes place between ‘one 
and the Other’ concerns everyone; it takes place in the full light of the public order (212-
213).  
  
Levinas says that the Other attests the presence of the third party. It is not that there was first 
the Other, and only afterwards the revelation of the third party. It is as if both the other and 
the third ‘arrive’ at the same time, so to speak. As the Other approaches, so does the third 
party albeit through the eyes of the Other (and this is significant). Levinas shows that the 
presence of the Other is the presence of the third party. It appears to me here that Levinas is 
merging the two relationships described above (in Existence and Existents) – the ‘we’ and the 
I-you. The I-you, which is the relationship with the Other, includes in it the ‘we’, which is the 
third party. The ‘you’ of the ‘I-you’ attests the presence of the third. While the ‘you’ 
approaches and faces the ‘I’, the ‘we’ is present in the face of the ‘you’.  
 
It is in Totality and Infinity (1961) that Levinas wants us to understand that the third party is 
the idea of humanity, comprising all the Others. ‘All the Others’ include all human beings – 
                                                          
29 I will keep referring to this statement throughout this chapter. It is key to understanding the facelessness of 





the dead, those that are alive, and those yet to be born.30 It is this idea that informs my 
suggestion that the idea of humanity precedes the individual human being. And I will show in 
my defence below that the third party, as the idea of humanity, is prior to the individual 
human being. The third party as the idea of humanity is the site for the ethical encounter. But 
it is the individual human being that can be said to have a face, and to be able to approach. 
The third party cannot approach. Yet the destitution of the individual speaks to the destitution 
of the third party – the totality of humanity. It is in line with this idea that I have argued, in 
Chapter Two above, that to be human is to be sensitive to the destitution, or the vulnerability, 
of the Other. It is to see the Other’s destitution in oneself, in as much as ‘oneself’ and the 
Other are part of the totality of humanity. But, Levinas is careful not to let the presence of the 
‘we’ in the ‘you’ make the two relations described above, nor the terms in the relations, 
indistinguishable. Each term – the I, the you, the we – is important in itself. 
 
In Otherwise Than Being (1974) Levinas gives a fuller description of the nature of the third 
party. He says:  
 
“if proximity ordered to me only the Other alone, there would have not been any problem. 
Proximity, which is responsibility for the Other, becomes a problem when a third party 
enters. The third party is other than the neighbour, but also another neighbour, and also a 
neighbour of the Other, and not simply his fellow (Levinas 1974:157 my emphasis).  
 
“The responsibility for the Other is antecedent to questions, yet with the entry of the Other, 
questions are born: what are the Other and the third party for one another? What have they 
done to one another? Which passes before the Other? ‘The third party introduces a 
                                                          
30 This understanding will help us appreciate the broadness of the demand of justice, that we can seek justice 
even for past atrocities, even on behalf of the departed Others who died of injustices. We can even seek 




contradiction in the Saying whose signification before the Other until then went in one 
direction. It is the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question ‘What do I have to do 
with justice?” (p. 157) 
 
A contradiction? 
In Totality and Infinity (1961) Levinas refuses a relation of contradiction between the self and 
the Other, emphasising that the self and the Other do not contradict each other. There is no 
tension between them. In Otherwise than Being (1974) Levinas introduces the contradiction, 
but it comes from the third party and it is a contradiction between the Saying and the Said. 
Levinas introduces the concepts of the Saying and the Said in order to demonstrate the 
movement of the transcendent relation and its disruptive power on ‘the established’ or ‘the 
dominant’ – the realm of sameness, laws, universality, and appropriation.  
 
Levinas credits Edmund Husserl for paving way for the philosophy of transcendence. Husserl 
claimed that ‘not every intentionality is an objectifying one.’ This is important for Levinas 
because the face of the Other to which one is intentionally directed is not an object. The 
directedness of the self to the face is the Saying. The Saying is an exceptional form of 
intentionality, one that exhibits no noetic-noematic structure (Peperzak 1993: 218). Michael 
(2008)31 states that: 
“the Saying, which would be literally translated as to say, is the infinitive form of the verb to 
say. The infinitive form is thus called because it lacks such specifiers as person and number, 
and is thus less finite or defined than the conjugated forms. ‘The form to say [is] related to 
the Infinite in Levinas since he wishes to express by it a pure enunciation or unintended 
utterance without the defining traits we are forced to furnish by the grammatical conventions 
of language (ibid). The Saying is a responsiveness or rather a sensitivity of the Other person, 





which occurs before actual speech. Before one actually classifies the Other into racial and 
ethnic categories, social class, sex, and so on, the Saying is already taking place. The Saying 
happens on the verge of speech, before we fall from silence to words (ibid). For instance, the 
greeting ‘hello’ is a recognition of the Other person. It is an undefined, indefinite, and 
infinite acknowledgement of proximity to the Other.”  
 
The Said, on the other hand, is the realm of space and time in which the Saying is incarnated. 
However, the Saying incarnate does not manifest but hides and immobilises. The Said has 
this hold because it designates and hence denies the transcendence of the Saying. The Saying 
becomes trapped in the Said’ (Dawson, 1999). The Saying interrupts, or contradicts, the Said. 
The ethical consists in the disruption. Without the contradiction we cannot have ethics, in the 
same way we cannot have politics without the Saying.  According to Peperzak (1993: 219), 
[this] disruption is the ever-renewed-attempt by the Saying to bear witness to the preceding 
Saying. The Saying is the unending critique of the synchronous and systematic, which is the 
Said. John David Dawson says in a review of Robert Eaglestone’s Ethical Criticism: Reading 
After Levinas (1997), that ‘the ethical [is] the state of not-being-at-home, the strangeness of 
the ineluctable call to responsibility, which is also a call to love.’ The Saying or the ethical is 
unstable32, striving for the uprightness or justice of the face of the Other. By this, I want to 
emphasise the movement or the directedness of the ethical intention towards the Desirable. 
Though caught up in the Said, it is in the nature of the ethical to act as a ‘nuisance’ to the 
Said until justice to the Other is achieved. It troubles ‘conscience’ in its desire for justice to 
the Other and all the Others. In other words, the contradiction between the Saying and the 
Said produces a synthesis, which is responsibility to the Other in the form of political justice. 
The next section will help clarify how we get to political justice. 
                                                          
32 I have in mind something like an unstable atom in the Periodic table, always looking for another atom to 





The limit of responsibility?  
‘The third party is the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question ‘What do I have to 
do with justice?” (Levinas 1974:157). 
 
Many years later after the publication of Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise Than 
Being (1974), Levinas declares that ‘there are no limits to responsibility’, ‘that one is never 
absolved from responsibility,’ and that ‘responsibility is unbounded’ (Hand 1989: 291).’ This 
was in response to Alain Finkielkraut’s interview question, about two weeks after the Sabra 
and Chatila massacre. Finkielkraut wanted to know from Levinas whether the Jewish people 
have any responsibility towards the non-Jew, in view of the fact that history has marked out 
the Jew as Other and victim. Does the Jew have any responsibility towards the non-Jew? To 
which Levinas responds: 
“I don't at all believe that there are limits to responsibility, that there are limits to 
responsibility in ‘myself’. My self, I repeat, is never absolved from responsibility towards the 
Other. But I think we should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no 
right to do so, and that consequently, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, 
there is certainly a place for a defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’, but of those 
close to me, who are also my neighbours. I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics 
that's ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics,” (Levinas in Hand 
1989:291-292).33  
 
So, what does Levinas mean when he says that the third party is the limit to responsibility? In 
what way is the third party the limit? It is obvious from Levinas’s response above that ‘limit’ 
                                                          
33 This is a very important quote from Levinas, which helps to elucidate Levinas’s idea of responsibility as 





is not synonymous with boundary or perimeter, since he insists that responsibility is 
unbounded. Yet from the description above about the manner in which the third party is 
present in the face to face encounter, I suggest that the third party is an obstacle and an 
impediment to the face to face. Instead of the movement of responsibility to go in the 
intended direction, towards the Other, the third party redirects the movement towards all the 
Others. Responsibility for the Other becomes a problem when the third party enters (Levinas 
1974:157). There would be no hiccup at all in the movement of responsibility were it not for 
the presence of the third party in the encounter. The term ‘interruption’ probably describes 
the nature of the third party better than ‘problem’. The third party interrupts the movement of 
responsibility. Its interruption is not without importance. In a key text in Otherwise Than 
Being (1974) Levinas declares that: 
“the third party is an incessant correction of the asymmetry of proximity (his new term for 
ethical relation or the face to face) in which the face is looked at (p. 158). The third betrays 
‘my’ anarchic relation with illeity, but at the same time it signals a new relationship – I can 
be approached as an Other by the Others; that is, I can be approached for myself (p. 158). 
The incomparable subject (that is, the Other) is now reverted into a member of society. My 
inequality (in the face to face relation where I have a surplus of my duties over my rights) is 
the birth of equality for all. The forgetting of self moves justice (p. 159 my emphasis). Justice 
is only possible, or can be established only if I, always desituated and divested of being, can 
become an Other like the Others (p. 160). The infinite command from the Other is also the 
turning of the I into ‘like others’ for which it is important to concern oneself and take care 
(p.161).”34 
 
                                                          





A quick summation of what Levinas says about the third party, thus far, indicates that the 
third party’s interruption signifies a moment of questioning and a redirection (limit) of 
responsibility. The third party, through the Other’s face, summons the self to redirect its 
concern from only the Other to the ‘we’. Furthermore, the third party’s persistent look 
(through the face of the Other) gives an indication that it is a witness, as before a court of law 
– a witness to either the successful redirection of the one-directional flow of responsibility to 
all the Others or the failure to redirect.35  
 
3.2.2 Fagan on the Third Party 
An important critique of Levinas’s account of the third party is Madeleine Fagan (1999). In 
her article, ‘The Inseparability of Ethics and Politics: Rethinking the Third in Emmanuel 
Levinas’ (2009), Fagan argues that ‘if the third party is taken seriously in Levinas’s work, 
then we cannot talk of a separation between ethics and politics; and hence, it is impossible to 
deduce a politics from his ethics (p.5). She further argues that Levinas’s idea of responsibility 
is neither possible nor something on which a politics can be built (p. 6).  
 
I have formatted Fagan’s ‘inseparability thesis’ as follows: 
i) If the Third party is taken seriously in Levinas’s work, then we cannot talk of a 
separation between ethics and politics. 
ii) Separation is a necessary condition for deduction (Implicit premise). 
iii) Levinas’s ethics is entwined with the Third party. 
iv) Levinas’s ethics and politics are inseparable. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                          




Therefore, it is impossible to deduce a politics from his ethics. 
 
Based on the format above, Fagan’s argument seems convincing. But the truth value of some 
of the premises is questionable, upon closer scrutiny. For instance, premise i) and iii) assume 
that the third party is the same as politics; to the extent that since the third party is present 
with ethics from the beginning, ethics and politics are inseparable. But, the third party is not 
the same as politics, and for this reason premise iv) is false, and the conclusion is, therefore, 
also false. 
 
Is the third party the same as politics? Some scholars, such as Caygill (2002) and Gauthier 
(2004), have argued that politics is largely absent in Levinas’s work (his ethics). Gauthier’s 
reason is that the ethical relation occurs on an anarchical, non-political plane (2004:201). A 
similar reason is to be found in Simmons (1999). What this implies is that the ethical relation 
does not need politics for it to be, which is true even though Levinas does not explicitly say 
that. The ethical relation comes to be by virtue of the encounter with the face of the Other. 
Even though the third party is present in the face of the Other, the ethical encounter does not 
need politics. But once ethical responsibility, which follows the encounter, is set in motion, 
there is consideration and recognition of all the Others (which leads us to politics and justice). 
The third party is therefore not the same as politics, but it is the interruption that leads to 
politics. 
 
Furthermore, in Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas shows that an object is the end of an 
intention, or the terminus of a movement (p. 45). Yet neither the ethical subject nor the 
responsibility that it takes on is an object in that regard. And neither is the Other an object. 




the face to face relation. Levinas already rejected clandestinity of the love relation. It is my 
view that the face to face relation cannot contain what is set in motion by the welcome of the 
Other. Raffoul (2010) has put it remarkably, that this movement beyond being and toward the 
Other human constitutes the core of Levinas’s thought, and indeed Levinas characterised it as 
the kernel of all I would say later (Raffoul 2010:168). It is for this reason that the ethical 
relation anticipates politics. 
 
Another complication with Fagan’s argument comes from her interpretation of Levinas’s idea 
of the face. She argues that ‘the face is the third person (p. 10). This is close to what Morgan 
(below) describes in terms of the face as the trace of illeity (thirdness), but on the contrary 
Fagan equates this thirdness to the third party; and hence wrongly interprets Levinas when he 
claims that ‘the presence of the face ... is the presence of the third party’ (Fagan 2009:10; 
Levinas 2005:213). But in my reading of Levinas, the presence of the face as a destituteness 
points to the destitution of the third party. There is really a temptation to think that the face is 
the third party, but there are good reasons to put the two apart (see my thesis defence section 
below). The face is not the third party. What is similar about them is that they are both 
destitute. There destitution is similar, and it also appears that it is the same destitution that is 
said of the Other and the third party.  
 
Consequently, to blame the third party for the inseparability of ethics and politics is to forget 
that the third party does not approach the self, it does not speak to the self, in the manner that 
Levinas understands speech and what it means to approach. Even though the third party 
obsesses the relation of the self to the Other from the beginning, yet it does not bridge that 
distance. The distance remains untraverseable, even in the event that the self has become an 




does not annul the asymmetry between the self and the Other. Levinas’s description of the 
ethical encounter favours the idea of an asymmetry within symmetry.36  
 
Were it possible, in Levinas’s description, for the third party to approach the self in its home, 
make demands and persuade the self to obligate itself to a responsibility for the Other and for 
all Others, that would amount to totalitarianism. Yet, it is the idea of totalitarianism as 
starting point of ethics or politics that Levinas is trying to overthrow in Totality and Infinity 
(1961). Levinas wants to establish and appreciate the singularity of the self first and maintain 
it throughout the progression to a justified totality. Even in his vision of a justified totality, it 
is singularity that has (ethical) priority over totality.37 Totality comes into being for the sake 
of singularity. While he admits that we cannot do away with totality, his vision is to have a 
totality that is founded in, and is not forgetful of, singularity; a totality that responds to the 
demands of singularity. 
  
In the same vein, the separability of the self from the Other is not equivalent to the 
separability of ethics from politics. The self is not equivalent to ethics, and the Other (plus the 
third party) is not equivalent to politics. But the idea of separation goes beyond the self and 
the Other, to affect and influence the relationship between ethics and politics. The idea of 
separation makes possible the foundation of political responsibility in ethical responsibility. If 
ethical responsibility names a movement, then there must be a starting point and a terminus. 
It is for this reason that I think that Fagan’s thesis of inseparability is misleading. 
 
                                                          
36 This point is important for Levinas’s project of overthrowing the Western tradition of prioritising totality 
over singularity. 
37 I distinguish ethical priority from chronological priority as I will show below. In terms of chronological 
priority, I argue that the third (or totality, or anonymity) is prior to the Other (singularity). But in terms of 




Again, to blame the third party for the possibility and impossibility of responsibility, as Fagan 
(2009) does, is to disallow Levinas’s thesis of ethical responsibility as a movement towards 
the Good via the Other. Once we are caught up in the possible/impossible aporia,38 there is 
no movement at all, but the self, the Other, and the third, are locked up in a stalemate. 
Logically, the stalemate does not entail ethico-politics as Fagan claims, but, to my mind, it is 
non-movement, since there is no way out. It also means that the Good towards which the 
movement (of responsibility) is directed, is not desirable enough to elicit desire for the Good 
in the self. This is obviously contrary to Levinas’s idea of the intentionality of desire; that 
Desire as the other that desire desires is accomplished in transcending itself (Levinas 1961: 
269). It engenders itself and transcends itself. This intentionality of desire makes possible the 
movement towards (political) justice as the desirable. We cannot be complacent that we have 
arrived at political justice, since political justice by its nature has to transcend itself (see 
chapter Five below). 
 
Further to her inseparability argument, Fagan (2009) argues that ‘the third does not interrupt 
the face to face’ (2009:10). She echoes Levinas’s claim that one’s responsibility to the Other 
does not find itself constrained to a calculus by the ‘force of things’, that is the empirical 
entry of the third (ibid). She observes, instead, that the third obsesses ‘me’ from the 
beginning; and that ‘the third alters the way in which we can think about or respond to our 
infinite responsibility to the Other’ (p. 10 my emphasis).39 Because of the presence of the 
third party from the beginning of the face to face, Fagan argues that ‘the third entangles 
                                                          
38 Fagan makes it explicit that Levinas does not provide a way out – not because of a failure, but the aporia 
itself conditions the possibility of responsibility. There is little hope from Fagan’s analysis of the third party that 
Levinas’s idea of responsibility can be possible.  But Derrida (1997, 1999) explains that the claim of 
impossibility does not connote the failure of responsibility (see Chapter Two above).  
 
39 I take Fagan’s statement here positively. As I show later on, this ‘altering’ that the third party is capable of, is 
its legitimate power to redirect the trajectory of responsibility. The power to ‘alter’ the way we think about 




totality and infinity to the extent that it is difficult to find an uncorrupted ground in Levinas’ 
(p. 10). We are always turning away from the face of the other, sacrificing them, and 
reneging on our responsibility to them; partly because what is demanded is infinite and 
excessive (p. 13, my emphasis). Hence, for Fagan, we can never live up to the demands of the 
Other; we can never fulfil our responsibility. In absolute responsibility to the Other, one 
betrays one’s duty to the third party (my emphasis). I respond to these claims below by 
arguing that the self has no ethical duty whatsoever to the third party.  
 
Furthermore, the sense in which Fagan uses the notion ‘infinity’ (that the responsibility 
demanded in infinite) is unclear (see Fagan 2009:12). It appears as if she is referring to 
mathematical infinity. According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, mathematical infinity occurs 
as the number of points on a continuous line or as the size of the endless sequence of 
counting numbers: 1, 2, 3….40 Fagan (2009) says that what is demanded of us are infinite 
responsibilities from the Other and all the Others (one is faced with endless and countless 
plural responsibilities). Hence, one cannot actually do anything at all.41 My view, however, is 
that the infinity of responsibility that Levinas talks about is epistemic infinity – that is, an 
infinity arising from the unknowability and incomprehensibility of the face of the Other (one 
is, here, faced with one endless, boundless, and unremitting duty). In this case, the infinity 
has nothing to do with number as in mathematical infinity, but it has everything to do with 
the boundlessness (that is, the nature) of that singular responsibility that one has to the 
Other.42 As alluded to earlier,43 the ‘here I am’ which encapsulates Levinas’s idea of 
                                                          
40 Rucker, Rudy (2018) Infinity: Mathematics, Encyclopaedia Britannica 
41 It is true for Levinas as well that with ethical responsibility, one does not actually do anything. But Fagan’s 
conviction here stems from her idea of plural and infinite responsibilities. 
42 Epistemic infinity is, the origin of the idea of responsibility as risk 
43 As explained in Chapter Two above, responsibility is first a posture before it can be an action. The 
proclamation ‘here I am’ is a once and for all pledge of responsibility. One cannot rehearse the ‘here I am’ each 




responsibility, is a dedication to duty before one is given the job description, and in this case, 
the job description is not outlined, its boundaries are not known. For the reason that the idea 
of ethical responsibility in Levinas is epistemic in nature, and not mathematical, Fagan’s 
claim of infinite responsibilities is flawed. There can never be plural or infinite 
responsibilities, but only infinite responsibility. This would be in line with the idea that 
responsibility (singular) is a movement towards the Good, via the Other person. 
  
Fagan’s claim of infinite responsibilities leads to the problem of conflict of responsibilities. 
Fagan argues that [the call of the Other] is always in competition with the incompatible calls 
of other Others’ (p. 13). Fagan’s usage of the plural gives me the impression that there are 
plural responsibilities. But if responsibility for the Other is a movement towards the Good, 
then it is impossible that responsibility to all the Others would be plural and result in conflict. 
There cannot be conflict of ‘responsibilities’ as if they were many, or as if ‘responsibility’ is, 
primarily, taking a particular action. To my mind, ‘my’ responsibility for the Other who faces 
me is concurrently a responsibility for all the Others. Besides, the Good towards which 
responsibility moves is not self-contradictory. The good (or responsible response) that 
responds to the face of the neighbour may not necessarily be pleasant for the stranger,44 but it 
is not in any way a negation of the Good. Similarly, what is good for all can encompass what 
is good for individuals.45  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Other. In other words, the economy or generosity that leads to the ‘here I am’ is used up, otherwise it 
would not be generosity. 
 
44 Levinas states elsewhere that the good is not pleasant. 
45 The distinction between the Good and the good, or the absolute good and particular good, is very important 
here. Levinas’s idea of responsibility is a movement towards the Good, which is synonymous with Justice. 
Particular goods are instances of the Good but are not the Good itself. Similarly, instances of Justice are Justice 
itself. I think this is in line with Levinas’s insistence that the Good (or Justice) is otherwise than being. It is the 




Like Fagan (1999), Wolff (2012) also argues that all the Others [which refers to the third 
party] lay their claims on the subject (p.151). He states that the [self] is faced with a 
multitude of contemporaneous and equally valid claims, and it asks how to distribute its 
loyalty, efforts, and means. This leads Wolff to claim that Levinas’s humanism does not give 
direction concerning what should practically be done (p. 152). As a result, Wolff declares that 
Levinas’s subject is not competent to establish what justice entails in a particular context; that 
is, the subject is not competent to obey the imperative to unlimited responsibility. For Wolff, 
Levinas wants the subject to be sent his/her way to responsibility towards the Others, but 
without ever posing the question of means (2012:152). There are resources in Levinas’s 
thought that address this question. For instance, when Levinas defines what a face is he says 
‘the face is a demand, it is a frailty of the one who needs you, who is counting on you’. He 
says this is where the idea of dissymmetry comes from; that I am strong and you are weak. I 
am rich and you are destitute (Bernasconi and Wood 1988:171ff).  
 
In Levinas’s view, the self has the means to respond to the call of the Other and all the 
Others. He describes responsibility for the Other that approaches (not responsibility for all the 
Others) as a sacrifice – the being-for-itself is sacrificed for the being-for-the-Other. What this 
means is that the self gives itself up, entirely, for the (good, or well-being of the) Other. It 
cannot sacrifice itself each time another Other appears, since by its very nature (that is, by 
ethical subjectivity) it is already a sacrifice, ‘slain once and in advance’46 so to speak, for the 
Other (and all possible Others). All the Others benefit, so to speak, from the self’s initial 
generosity to the Other that comes face to face with it. It is in giving of itself that the self is 
able to see the destitution of all the Others, and sigh: ‘what have I to do with justice’ (Levinas 
1974:157)? It realises the enormity of the demand of responsibility for the Other that it has 
                                                          
46 The imagery here fits the sacrifice that the biblical Jesus was to humanity, those living at the time of his 




shouldered (since it reveals the destitution of not only the Other but all the Others). The self 
is hostage to the Other forever, (for the reason that it has already ceded it place for the Other, 
it cannot undo that, it cannot go back to the old home, so now it is hostage). It is like a 
sacrificial lamb – once sacrificed the lamb cannot live again, for itself. 
 
This reading of the economics of giving is consistent with Levinas’s idea that responsibility 
does not in the first place refer to deeds and actions. If this were the case, then his idea of 
responsibility as a movement would fail. It would require that the self encounter all the 
Others at different times, or different encounters, for the calculation and comparison of 
justice to take place. But this is not possible as I have shown above using the imagery of a 
sacrificial lamb. There are Others whom one has never encountered, and will never 
encounter, yet they demand justice from the self; some are long dead and Others are yet to be 
born, yet they all demand justice from the self.47 It is for this reason that I have argued, 
above, that the welcome of the Other, necessitates the welcome of all the Others; that the 
presence of the face as destitution is also at the same time the presence of the destitution of 
the third party. My understanding is that one does not need to have an ethical encounter with 
the third party, since by welcoming the face which faces me, one has welcomed all faces that 
comprise ‘the whole of humanity including myself.’ So, to say that the self does not have 
enough resources and that it is virtually impossible to encounter all of humanity (Wolff 2012) 
is a good observation, but my contention is that that is not what ethical giving consists in. 
 
Nevertheless, the question of competence and means that Wolff raises above is pertinent to 
our understanding of Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. It is my view that ethical 
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realisation of justice for humanity. Assuming that one did not care at all about justice, and contributed nothing 





subjectivity is the measure of competence for responsibility in action. The chronology here is 
not without significance: one cannot be a political subject and be able to actually do 
something about the Other’s destitution without first being an ethical subject. Ethical 
subjectivity does not equip one to actually do, distribute, and allocate responsibility for all (be 
it in the form of social or political justice), but it teaches48 one the sensibility to, and the 
recognition of, the exigency of justice which is masked in the destitution of the Other and all 
the Others. Alongside this posture (ethics) in the self arises the need to actually do something 
(politics and justice systems) about the destitution of Others. It is in this regard that Levinas 
talks about comparisons: who came first? Whose need is urgent? and so on. But in order to be 
consistent with Levinas’s description of the face, as something unique and incomprehensible, 
there cannot be an ‘all in one’ method of responding to the face (that is, justice). What 
Levinas does is to lay down the structure of justice, or the framework for the administration 
of justice, the content of which will depend on the particular manifestation of the face – that 
is, the unique demand presented by the face that approaches.49  
 
Like Fagan (2009) and Wolff (2012) above, William Simmons in ‘The Third: Levinas’s 
Theoretical Move from the An-archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics’ (1999) 
argues that the third is a specific Other (p. 84, 93, & end note 4), and that is why he 
capitalises it. He argues that the self is confronted by the Other and the Third (ibid, p. 93). 
Simmons shows that the self is confronted with all these Others and must now prioritise who 
to help first, he must give attention to all and not just to those in proximity. Simmons’ 
account of the third party raises the question of whether the third party is indeed a specific 
Other? Whether by itself and of itself it can confront the self? To claim that the third party is 
                                                          
48 In Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas says that the approach of the Other, or the welcome of the Other, is a 
teaching.  




another face is problematic. The third party does not have a face. It is not another Other (see 
defence section below). 
 
The argument that the third is another Other (in both Fagan and Simmons) also fails on 
account of the impossibility of the self encountering each one of the Others. This would 
require that the self go on encountering Others ad infinitum, and this would distort the idea of 
responsibility as a movement from being-in-itself to being-for-the-other. The self cannot re-
enact the event of leaving itself every time it encounters a second Other, third Other, or a 
fourth, and so on. The self takes leave of itself once and for all, and it cannot go back to its 
previous position (since it does not exist anymore; the self ceded it for the Other). The 
singular event of leaving oneself for the Other is enough to permit the welcome of all the 
Others in the present, and in the future. In other words, the singular event of leaving oneself 
is enough to permit the self to be affected by, and identify with, the destitution and 
vulnerability of humanity. This is in line with my definition of what it means to be human in 
Chapter Two above: to be human is to recognise, and identify with, the destitution of 
humanity. Recognition is very important (as I will show in Chapter Five on Political 
Responsibility) in the political realm. To be able to recognise the Other person as human, and 
to be able to identify with their vulnerability. Otherwise, if one does not recognise and 
identify with the human in Others it becomes easy to kill them.50  
 
To recap the foregoing section about Fagan and others on the Third Party: I have focused my 
analysis on Fagan’s inseparability thesis, which claims that Levinas’s idea of the third party 
makes ethics and politics inseparable. The implications of this line of thought has far 
reaching consequences for Levinas’s ethics and the politics that he envisions. Besides, Fagan 
                                                          





insists that Levinas’s idea of responsibility is neither possible nor something on which a 
politics can be built. In the next section, I provide a counterargument to Fagan. My intention 
is to rescue the face to face relation from contamination by the third party as Fagan 
emphasises, in order to retain Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. I show that, apart from 
looking and unsettling the trajectory of intentionality, the third party has no moral authority 
to command the self to cede its being-for-itself in order to become being-for-the third party. I 
will show that this is logically impossible.  
 
3.3 Defence of Thesis statement 
In this section I defend my central argument for the present chapter, that the third party has 
no moral authority to place the burden of ethical responsibility on the self, let alone to halt the 
movement of responsibility. My argument arises out of two main critiques of the possibility 
(and practicality) of Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility (as presented in Chapter Two 
above).51 Firstly, I show the source (or origin) of moral authority in the face of the Other. I 
show that it is the third person character of illeity (the Infinite) that gives the face the 
obligatoriness that the self responds to. Secondly, I show, by implication, that by virtue of the 
third party not approaching and not facing the self (like the Other does), it has no moral 
authority – for the reason that moral authority resides in the face (which is the saying) and the 
third party does not have a face. Michael Morgan’s reading (2007) of Levinas’s idea of illeity 
is insightful in this regard. Third and last, I show that the third party’s lack of moral authority 
is ironically the ground for political responsibility. The lack of moral authority to command 
ethical dedication to the third party is the very reason why political responsibility is urgent. 
 
                                                          
51 The foremost critics are Derrida (1995, 1999) and Fagan (2009), but in this chapter, I focus on Fagan (2009) 




3.3.1 Moral Authority of the Face of the Other  
Emmanuel Levinas claims that ‘there are two strange things in the face: its extreme frailty 
(that is, the fact of being without means) and authority. The face is a demand …an open hand 
in search of recompense. In its silence, it calls you…Your reaction is a response and a 
responsibility’ (Bernasconi and Wood 1988:169) – infinite and non-reciprocal responsibility. 
But why is the face of the Other so ethically authoritative that one should even pledge his or 
her entire being for the Other?  
  
Levinas introduced the neologism ‘illeity’ to justify the ethical authority and force of the face 
of the Other. In Otherwise Than Being (1974) he says that illeity (from the French pronoun 
ille for he), lies outside the ‘thou’ (in the I-thou/you relation) and the thematization of 
objects; it indicates a way of concerning me without entering into conjunction with me (p. 
12). Later he says the Infinite … signifies as illeity, in the third person. But this thirdness is 
different from that of the third man, it is the third party that interrupts the face to face of a 
welcome of the other man, interrupts the proximity or approach of the neighbour, it is the 
third man with which justice begins (1974:150). Illeity is the third person, just like the 
personal pronoun from which it is derived (pronoun ‘he’). But Levinas is quick to distinguish 
this thirdness from that of the third man, or third party with which begins the question of 
justice. On the contrary, in ‘The Third Party: Levinas on the Intersection of the Ethical and 
the Political,’ Bernasconi (1999) suggests that there are two other thirds in Levinas’s ethics, 
apart from the third man or the third party: that is, the third person and illeity (p. 76). 
Bernasconi claims that ‘these three interrelated senses of the third are at times barely 
distinguishable’ (p. 76). For Bernasconi, it would be possible to read the relation to illeity as 
personal and ethical and to overlook the fact that it also addresses the political (Bernasconi 




directed, even if in Otherwise than Being illeity is expressly distinguished from the third 
party. When Levinas says ‘there is a betrayal of my anarchic relation with illeity, but also a 
new relation with it (1974:158), Bernasconi argues that illeity has certain indirect ways that, 
through the presence of a third party alongside of the neighbour, lead me along the path of 
thematization and consciousness to that comparison of the incomparable that is necessary for 
justice (1999:82). Part of the function of the illeity is to hold together in a single term the 
conflict between the ethical and the political that arose from the location of the third party in 
the face of the Other (1999:82). 
 
However, it is clear from Levinas’s description above that these senses of the third are 
distinct: the third man is the third party, and the third person is illeity. In order to understand 
fully what Levinas means by illeity and what its place is in the ethical encounter, and whether 
or not it relates directly to the political as Bernasconi claims, I find Michael Morgan’s 
explanation of Levinas’s notion of illeity useful. In Discovering Levinas (2007), Morgan 
distinguishes the third person character of illeity from the third party: 
 
“Illeity is not the same as the third party. The third party interrupts the face to face; it 
interrupts proximity; and ‘begins’ justice. Morgan shows that while illeity is present in the 
face in form of a trace, the third party has a different relation to the face of the Other. Illeity 
is related to the Other not as a third party but as the Other’s ethical force. Whereas illeity is 
other, but it is not an Other. Illeity ‘resides’ in the face, calls to the self from the face, and 
gives the face its imperative character, while the third party compels one to stand back, and 
to judge and assess how one is to execute responsibility to all Others. Illeity compels one to 
responsibility prior to judgement, deliberation, and prior to principles and rules. Illeity is the 
author of moral responsibility, while the third party is the author of justice, through 





Further, Morgan shows that the face has authority, and it is this authority that pleads and 
commands. It singles us out and calls us into question at once, and speaks to us or addresses 
us from a height that is as low as it is high (2007:183). Morgan observes that Levinas names 
this authority illeity, and characterises it with the divine, or the infinite. At times, he names it 
‘God’, but he states that it is not the Judeo-Christian God. The face is not a sign of a hidden 
God (Morgan 2007:184). In addition, and this is important as far as Levinas’s ethical 
encounter is concerned, the face to face relation has two sides (Morgan 2007:186): 1) it the 
face of the Other person petitioning and commanding, 2) it is the self readied to respond, 
acknowledging the face and accepting the Other person. Even though Levinas does not 
explicitly describe the self as having a face, but since Totality and Infinity (1961) Levinas has 
always described the ethical encounter as a face to face relation (that is, two faces facing each 
other, or conversing with each other). This implies that the self is also a face. This is further 
proved by the third party’s contradiction and limit of responsibility when the self, at the 
peering of the third party through the eyes of the Other, realises that it is also an Other, thanks 
to God! Not thanks to the third party. The third party is not an authority for ethical 
responsibility to the self. But it is illeity that resides even in the face of the self that authorises 
the obligation to care for the self. Just like illeity authorises the obligation and command to 
care for the destitution of the Other. Hence, Levinas’s face to face relation.  
 
Moreover, can that which is not a face itself be subjected and respond to the command that is 
in the face of the Other, to the point of substitution? There is something that Morgan (2007) 
says about the face to face that helps answer this question. My suggestion is that the self as 
face is in a relationship with the infinite. The infinity in the face of the Other overflows the 




hostage. Morgan shows that the self’s giving of itself to the Other is the glory of the infinite 
(p. 185). The readiness to respond (the Here I am!) is in itself a ‘witness of the infinite’. It is 
not a witness to an event, but a witness which belongs to the glory of the infinite.52 The 
infinite is glorified in responsibility (ibid, 186). 
 
For Levinas, as well as for Morgan, the face does not point beyond itself, to something 
transcendent or absolute that it signifies. There is nothing beyond the face, writes Morgan (p. 
188). “Yet for the face to carry the force it does, there must be such a beyond or absolute 
ground – either each face must be such a ground or must point beyond itself toward a ground.  
The face proceeds from the absolutely absent, but its relationship does not reveal or indicate 
the absent, yet the absent has meaning in the face. The beyond from which the face comes 
signifies as a trace. The face is in the trace of the utterly bygone, utterly past absent” 
(2007:188). The absent or the beyond is not encountered, nor does it encounter the self, it is 
neither the first nor second person, neither I nor you. It is there in the third person: something 
distant, separate, and always so. It is that – illeity (thatness or he-ness) (ibid, p.188). 
Precisely, illeity is the otherness of the Other that is present in that Other as a trace. This 
otherness constitutes the Other’s ethical force – its obligating me to respond to it, its 
compellingness and gravitas (ibid. p. 189).  
 
To recap Morgan’s description, illeity is in the face of the Other as a trace of what is forever 
absent and never present. It is never present in itself, but only in the face of the Other. The 
obliging character of the face is this trace of divinity or infinity (as height of illeity). To 
respond to the Other’s face, which Levinas names the Here I am, is to witness the divine and 
its impact. A response (or a responsibility) means availability and a readiness to heed the 
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command in the face; a readiness to respond and obey prior to any cognitive act – prior to 
hearing, understanding, and deliberation (Morgan 2007: As I showed in Chapter Two above, 
the biblical call of Abram (just like the call of Samuel, Isaiah, and others) best exemplifies 
what Levinas has on mind when he talks about responsibility. Abram responded with the 
‘Here I am,’ signifying a total surrender and dedication of one’s entire being to the calling 
authority, pledging one’s dedication and obedience before hearing and understanding the 
nature of the command, and even before assessing one’s capability to carry out the command 
(in other words, it is the initial pledge of readiness and availability before one hears the job 
description). 
Levinas’s notion of illeity is consistent with his earliest attempts at describing the ethical in 
Existence and Existents (1947).  Levinas describes the human condition as the need to escape 
the hold of being (the il y a). And Levinas gives the name illeity to what is left by what seeks 
to escape. But it is in his later works Some scholars, such as Hofmeyr (2012) have underlined 
the impossibility of escaping being. Hofmeyr (2012) notes the two senses of the term ‘being’ 
in Levinas: i) as dynamism (denoting the verbal sense of being), and ii) as the overpowering 
stultifying sense of the irremissible contract in which is inscribed the exigency of an 
impossible escape. Hofmeyr notes that it is the second sense that informs Levinas’s trans-
ontological quest for a path otherwise and beyond being (2012:460). The contract with being 
is irremissible yet the need and the effort to escape being is real.53  
 
While Hofmeyr’s account suggests that escaping being is impossible, I think that there is a 
way in which we can talk about escaping and still get where Levinas wants us to get. The 
desire to escape is, to my mind, a longing for justice (in view of the overbearing il y a). Yet 
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(absolute) justice in itself never was, and never is present, but the trace of it resides in the 
face. What is left behind, then, (as the human being tries but fails to escape being) is the trace 
of the demand for justice. This is the statement, or speech, that is made by the desire to 
escape. It is for this reason, that, I think, Levinas says of the face that it is speech – speech 
before any word is uttered.  
 
In Otherwise Than Being (1974), Levinas says that ‘the infinite passes in Saying’ (p.147). In 
the face to face and in responsibility God has passed by, and his trace remains’ (Morgan 
2007:190). The most authentic way to respond to this Saying, is through responsibility for the 
Other. By responding to the other, one seeks the trace of justice that is inscribed in the face of 
the Other. Morgan shows that ‘the self’s giving [of itself] to the Other and its dedication to 
the Other is a responsible donation; it is sincerity. Levinas says in Existence and Existents 
(1947:) that ‘justice is sincerity’ (p. 43-44). The self’s readiness to respond to the face, the 
‘here I am!’ is a ‘witness of the infinite’. It is a sincerity before (in the presence of) the 
infinite.  
 
Based on the foregoing discussion about illeity as the ethical force of the face, I want to 
propose that the face of the Other is the (Levinasian) foundation of human dignity and 
rights.54 I have redefined the human, in Chapter Two above, not in terms of rationality, but in 
terms of sensibility, or sensitivity, to the Other’s destitution and vulnerability. Rationality 
(Levinas talks about calculation) is only a tool to help administer one’s responsibility to 
Others. Why do I define the human as a sensibility to vulnerability? My view is that, by 
virtue of its embodiment, the human being is vulnerable. Levinas, quoting Spinoza, argues 
that ‘the face is a conatus essendi’, which is the effort to exist (Bernasconi &Wood 
                                                          




1988:173). The face is hence the first meaning of all speech – there is no speech without a 
face. By implication, there is no speech without vulnerability and destitution, since this is 
what is in the face (ibid, p. 169). Levinas says that there are two things in the face: its 
extreme frailty (or vulnerability) and authority. Again, by implication, vulnerability is the 
speech of the face. It is what the face says, even if the Other’s mouth is silent. So, if there 
would be only one human right, or the first and foundational human right, it would be the 
recognition, or the respect, of human beings as human. The respect of persons points to their 
dignity as humans, their uniqueness, and their self-worth. A derivative of this foundational 
right would be the right to life – the silent command of the face not to harm the Other; that is, 
to let them be, and let them be human. 
 
Emmanuel Levinas argues that the authority and command in the face of the Other says ‘thou 
shall not kill’ (Levinas 1961:213). ‘Thou shall not kill me,’ so to say, is an expression of 
vulnerability and also a demand on the hearer to protect the vulnerable. Hence, to be human 
is to be sensitive to see the Other’s vulnerability, to even recognise it in oneself (that is, to see 
the Other in oneself). 
 
3.3.2 The Faceless Third Party 
The foregoing section has shown that the face of the Other has moral authority (or ethical 
force), the source of which is illeity (or the infinite). It is illeity that gives the face of the other 
its compellingness. In other words, illeity resides in the face of the Other, and gives the face 
its ethical force.  
 
On the other hand, and this leads us to the present section, the third party is present in the 




that the third party does not have a face, so to say, with which to approach and speak to the 
self.55 By implication, the trace of illeity is absent in the third party. As Levinas reminds us 
above, the infinite passes in the saying (1974:147), hence the infinite cannot pass in the third 
party. The third party ‘approaches’ only through the face of the Other. If it will receive any 
consideration at all it is because it is present in the face of the Other. Moreover, the third 
party does not have the dimension of height like the Other – that is, it does not come from 
without, but from within proximity. Hence, the third party interrupts from within the ethical 
relation. 
 
Before going further with the argument about the facelessness of the third party, which is one 
of the reasons for the third party’s failure to command ethical responsibility, I want to let 
Levinas explain once again what the third party is, essentially. In Existence and Existents 
(1947), Levinas says that ‘humanity is bare nudity, it does not have a face,’ … ‘the 
relationship with nudity is the true experience of the otherness of the Other’ (p. 40). Levinas 
maintains the idea of facelessness in Totality and Infinity (1961). He says that ‘the other 
attests the presence of the third party, the whole of humanity, in the eyes that look at me, (p. 
213ff).  To say, therefore, that the third is another Other and that the self is confronted by 
both the Other and the third party (see Simmons 1999; Gauthier 2004; Fagan 2009) is 
contrary to Levinas’s idea of the third party. 
 
I suggest two senses in which we can talk about the third party in Levinas’s ethics: first, the 
third party as ‘all the Others’ – that is, the totality of humanity. Levinas says that ‘all the 
Others’ look at me …. All the Others interrupt the flow of responsibility from the self to the 
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Other and insist on the correction of the asymmetry of responsibility. Ethical encounter, as it 
were, ‘reveals’ the humanity of the Other. Humanity is a common element that defines the 
being of human beings. The third party is plural – it is all the Others. It is inconceivable for 
the self to face ‘all the Others.’ Besides, ‘all the Others’ is not synonymous with the sum of 
living human beings (about 8 billion). It is synonymous with humanity, which is the genus 
‘human’ itself. This understanding leads me to the second sense of the third party: as the idea 
of humanity. Humanity can be said of every Other. It is the essential element that defines 
each and every Other. But humanity, as Levinas reminds us is bare nudity. Hence, it is 
impossible to ethically encounter the third party as the idea of humanity. In Existence and 
Existents (1947), bare nudity is an evanescence (p. 41), it cannot come forth. Levinas 
introduces the terms ‘form’ and ‘face’ to be able to talk about bare nudity:  
 
“Form is that by which a being is turned toward the sun, that by which it has a face, through 
which it gives itself, by which it comes forward. It conceals the nudity in which an undressed 
being withdraws from the world, and is as though its existence were elsewhere, … This is 
why the relationship with nudity is the true experience of the otherness of the other” (p.40). 
 
Levinas stresses that a nude being withdraws from the world. Yet through the face, it gives 
itself and comes forward. Furthermore, he says that humanity is bare nudity. The relationship 
with nudity is the true experience of the otherness of the Other. Humanity in itself cannot 
come forth and disrupt the self. For Levinas, nudity is disturbing (p. 40), hence a nude being 
withdraws from the world, and from light. It has to have a face for it to come forth to light. 
As it were, the Other (person)’s face carries with it (in its eyes) humanity. To my mind, the 






Thus far, Levinas’s idea of the third party can be understood in two senses: 1) as all the 
Others [that is, the totality of human beings past, present, and future], and 2) as the idea of 
humanity [that is, the element that defines; the definiendum of human beings; the humanity 
of the human being]. The two are related.  
 
My argument thus far is that the third party has no moral authority to command ethical 
responsibility and to halt the movement of responsibility. But Levinas has told us that the 
third party, which is ‘present’ in the ethical encounter from its inception, contradicts and 
interrupts the movement of responsibility (Levinas 1961, 1974). Why is the third party so 
‘forceful’ that the face to face redirects to all the Others? In order to answer these questions, I 
propose a controversial idea – the priority of the third party to the face to face.  
 
As I have shown above, Levinas claims that the third party is not a subsequent addition to the 
face to face. He says the third party is not a contemporary of the Other (by peering through 
the eyes of the Other, one would think so). But from my description, above, of the two senses 
of understanding the third party, especially the second sense of the idea of humanity, I 
suppose that the third party has chronological priority over the Other. For instance, the instant 
(Socrates) is primary to the genus humanity (or human being). I want to bring in Levinas’s 
discussion of the il y a, the instant, and hypostasis, in order to justify, by analogy, the 
chronological priority of the third party to the Other.  
 
In Chapter Two above, I outlined Levinas’s description of the way in which an existent, or a 
subject, arises from the There is through a hypostasis, or through taking a particular position. 
Building on this foundation and emphasising the critical importance of the process of 




being at one with the There is, to being an existent, with a face. In this chapter I suggest a 
reversal of this reading. Levinas does not say that the There is, is the third party, but I want to 
draw parallels between the two. My suggestion is that: if I substitute the anonymity and 
impersonality of the There is for the anonymity and impersonality of the third party as the 
idea of humanity, then I would propose that the Other approaches from the very same process 
of separation and individuation. The separated Other approaches and speaks forth. The 
presence of the face of the Other as a destituteness, is the presence of the third party (the 
whole of humanity). This substitution justifies the chronological priority of the third party to 
the Other. 
The point made so far is that, in terms of chronology, the third party is prior to the Other, and 
it is precisely this priority that gives it power – the power that redirects the movement of 
responsibility from love to justice for all Others. I see that this power is analogous to the 
overbearing power of the There is that suffocates beings to the point that beings long for an 
escape, or a separation, from being. The individual human being cannot escape the hold of 
being human. He or She is ‘condemned’ to be human and carries with it the imprint of 
humanity. However, as it is now obvious, there is anonymity and neutrality in the idea of 
humanity. But as far as the singular Other is concerned, there is no order of justice in 
anonymity and neutrality, no appropriate rewards and punishments in anonymity. Justice that 
is due humanity by virtue of its destitution cannot become a reality unless the destitution of 
the individual Other comes forward. Similarly, injustice done to a group of people cannot be 
comprehended and the people cannot be recompensed unless the face of the Other speaks.  
 
Until one sees one destitute human being, whose body bears vulnerability and helplessness, 
the need for justice to all the Others affected becomes exigent. In Otherwise Than Being 




forces governing an impersonal totality’ (p. 161). Justice requires unveiling of the face of the 
Other, to compare Others, and to determine whose need is most urgent. Justice requires the 
administration of resource allocation, and so on. Justice as responsibility in action cannot be 
anonymous, but must address actual needs and situations.  
 
What is more, there is another sense in which power can be said of Levinas’s idea of the third 
party (as referring to all the Others). Hannah Arendt’s idea of power fits in very well with the 
sense of power that I am attaching to Levinas’s idea of the third party. Arendt in d’Entreves 
(1994) argues that ‘power is the ability to act in concert with Others’ (Tomoka 2012:108). 
This ability is at the same time an opportunity to begin something new. For Arendt, power is 
always plural; for it to exist, there must be other centres of power (Arendt 2006c). Similarly, 
Levinas’s idea of the third party as ‘all the Others’ connotes the idea of power. And as per 
Levinas’s description, the third party (all the Others) compels the redirection of the trajectory 
of responsibility. Mel Thompson (2008) defines power as ‘the ability to do something, 
whether what is done is right or wrong’ (p. 133). He further states that ‘… if you have the 
power to do something, the question remains as to whether it is right to do it. And that is the 
question of authority. (ibid:133). Thompson defines authority as ‘the agreement that the 
power can be exercised (p. 133). In other words, authority is the legitimacy or the right to do 
something, that something can be done.  
 
Arendt and Thompson provide an interesting way of looking at Levinas’s idea of the face and 
the third party. On the one hand, the face is unique, singular, and has authority invested in it. 
The face authorises the third party to ‘begin’ justice. It is because of the face that justice 
makes sense (see section 3.3.1 above). Equally true is the statement that there is no justice 




I respond to the face’ (Bernasconi & Wood 1988: 174). Elsewhere, he says ‘the forgetting of 
self moves justice’ (Levinas 1974:159). When the self cedes its place in order to respond to 
the face of the Other, justice is in motion.  I think that this relationship between the face and 
the third party in terms of authority and power helps answer Diane Perpich’s question about 
singular justice (in her paper, ‘A Singular Justice: Ethics and Politics Between Levinas and 
Derrida): ‘can there be an abstract principle or law that does justice to the absolute singularity 
of the Other who faces me?’ (1998: 59). In Levinas’s view, the most responsible response to 
the face of the Other is with justice. It is the face of the Other that legitimises the third party 
to institute the institutions of justice. The self in itself has no power to execute responsibility 
which is demanded by the face (that is why Levinas says ethical responsibility is not an 
activity but a passivity – it is a posture and not something that the self can do). Only the third 
party has the power to turn that passivity into an activity. The third party’s power is 
legitimate only if it is oriented by the face. As it were, any third party action is illegitimate if 
it is not authored and authorised by the face of the Other.56 
 
Based on the idea that the third party has legitimate power to execute responsibility, I propose 
that the third party is the ground of political responsibility. 
 
3.3.3 The Ground of Political Responsibility 
So far, I have shown that the third party has power to enforce responsibility. For the self, 
responsibility is a passivity, whereas for the third party responsibility is activity. Hence, it is 
not possible to talk of ethical responsibility for the third party (for reasons discussed above), 
but only political responsibility (which is in this work synonymous with justice and also with 
                                                          
56 This is an interesting idea, but will be developed in subsequent works. Suffice it to say, however, that the 
aim of Levinas’s ethics is to dislodge this framework of doing ‘justice’ – he is against the idea of totalitarianism, 
a totality cannot author justice. In other words, there is no justice without the face of the Other. Anything 




responsibility in action). The face legitimises the third party to interrupt and redirect the 
trajectory of responsibility from only the Other to all the Others. The third party makes 
common – the inequality that separates the Other from the self is dissolved in the third party. 
To the extent that at the presence of the third party the self sees itself as any Other, that it can 
be approached (by Others), and that its needs can be met. The third party makes destitution a 
common denominator – every Other, including the self as Other, is destitute.  
 
However, the third party does not relieve the self of its ethical responsibility to the Other. As 
shown above, ethical responsibility, as infinite obligation to the Other, is the bond that binds 
the self and the Other. In other words, it is he bond that defines the human. Again, ethical 
responsibility is not something that one can actually do or not do. It is a posture. Once the 
being for itself (self, I) becomes being for the other the ethical subject is born. Since it is a 
body prone to vulnerability, it can still speak. It has a face. Hence Levinas’s face to face, and 
not self to face.   
 
I have shown above that for Levinas, ‘justice is not an anonymous law of the human forces 
governing an impersonal totality.’ Justice has to do with real persons (faces), and the 
administration of their needs. So, by virtue its power, and in order to begin responsibility in 
action, the third party begins questioning: who came first? whose needs are urgent? and so 
on, all of which belong to the question of justice, and its administration. Michael Morgan 
(2016) defines justice as responsibility in action, which is an accurate representation of 
Levinas’s idea of political justice.57 
 
                                                          
57 I have differentiated ethical justice from political justice in Chapter Two above. I use ethical justice 
synonymously with ethical responsibility, and political justice is synonymous to political responsibility 




In his recent work, Levinas’s Ethical Politics (2016),58Morgan reiterates that that ‘the third 
party does not generate or cause justice to come into being’. Central to his claim is his 
reference to Levinas ‘latent birth of justice’ that the third party brings (see Totality and 
Infinity 1961). For Morgan, this is not a literal birth. He contends that justice is the 
ramification of responsibility; it is what results when one organises and orchestrates the 
responsibilities of all parties.’ ‘It is only because each and every self is responsible for every 
other that justice, as a result of every responsibility becoming both limited and yet unlimited, 
becomes necessary and hence that thought and language, as justice’s prerequisites, also 
become necessary’ (2016:53). What is important for my argument is that the third party does 
not cause justice, but makes it necessary. Justice comes with the organisation of plural 
responsibilities: the comparisons, objectification, and so on, of faces in an effort to respond to 
their particular demands. Morgan discusses this in detail in the chapter ‘Responsibility for 
Others and the Discourse of Rights’ (pp 90-124), in which he underscores the argument that 
justice is responsibility in action. 
 
Levinas’s description of the third party in Otherwise than Being (1974) underscores an 
important dimension to the political significance of the third party. He says that the presence 
of the third party necessitates justice. ‘Now, there is co-presence on an equal footing, as 
before a court of justice (ibid). The third party is an incessant correction of the asymmetry of 
proximity in which the face is looked at’ (p. 158). In the face to face relation, the self has a 
surplus of duties over rights, hence the inequality; but with the third party, the self is counted 
among others. It is now a citizen with all duties and rights measured and measurable. For 
Levinas, this is the precondition of justice. He says ‘justice is only possible, or can be 
established only if the self, always desituated and divested of being, can become an Other 
                                                          





like the others (p. 160). This claim is significant as I will show below. Levinas puts a 
premium on ethical responsibility for justice to become a reality. It is for this reason that I 
argue that the third party in itself is not problematic for Levinas’s politics (does Levinas have 
a politics?), as has been supposed. Although it causes a contradiction in the movement of 
responsibility but it does not halt the movement.  
 
My suggestion, therefore, is that what is problematic for politics is the face to face relation 
itself – that is, to take up responsibility, to cede one’s place for the Other. Without forgetting 
the self, or without ceding one’s place, for the Other as a gesture of responsibility, there 
cannot be movement towards justice. This is, to my mind, the problem of (ethics and) politics 
in Levinas. It lies at the core of what it means to be human59 and it is the ground of what it 
means to be relational.  
 
Consequently, there cannot be politics without first there being ethics. Ethics produces 
politics. Ethics justifies politics. Most scholars have taken this for granted and problematised 
only politics. Of course, Levinas shows that the relation of responsibility exists even when 
human beings do not realise it, nor acknowledge it. But for ethical responsibility to become 
reality human beings need to take up responsibility. Since responsibility in Levinas names a 
person (since ethical responsibility defines subjectivity), human beings have to become 
responsibilities for Others. Only then, can we talk about politics. What this means is that one 
cannot be a political subject if they are not in the first place an ethical subject. Ethical 
subjectivity precedes political subjectivity. By implication, ethical responsibility precedes 
                                                          
59 As said earlier on, to be human is to see and recognise the vulnerability of the Other. Also, it is to 
respond to the face of the Other. To be able to respond to the Other entails that one has ceded its 




political responsibility. One has to be an ethical subject first before they can become political 
subject. 
 
Similarly, it means that political subjectivity is impossible without ethical subjectivity. Hence 
Levinas’s argument that politics is needed because man is responsible for his neighbour 
(Levinas in Hand 1989). It is important to note that Levinas does not say that politics replaces 
responsibility for the Other (ethics), but that the latter needs the former for it to become 
reality. This takes us back to the argument above that the third party has no moral authority to 
command ethical responsibility, but that it has power to influence the movement of 
responsibility from the Other to all the Others.  
 
3.4 Objections and Replies 
In this section, I offer one possible objection to the main argument of this chapter (that the 
third party has no moral authority to command ethical responsibility, let alone halt its 
movement). 
Fagan would argue that by demonstrating that the third party has no moral authority to 
command ethical responsibility, I still have not disputed her claim that ethics and politics are 
inseparable in Levinas. In order to respond to that possible objection, I refer to two key 
assumptions in Fagan’s inseparability thesis: 1) politics is always already concerned with the 
ethical, and 2) ethics is always already concerned with the political (Fagan 2009:7).  
 
In the first place, my view is that assumption 1 is wrong for the following reasons: a) it is not 
always the case that politics is always already concerned with the ethical. I have shown above 
that there is no ethics and politics in Levinas’s philosophy, but only a politically potent 




writing non-existent). But the politics that Levinas envisions would indeed be always 
concerned with the ethical, since it would have come into being in order to respond to the 
ethical. Politics that is not birthed by ethics, cannot always be concerned with the ethical. 
Machiavelli’s politics, Nazi politics, Colonial politics, apartheid politics – all the politics that 
arises from the anonymity the third party – do not have legitimate authority to exercise their 
power on human beings, for the reason that they are not oriented by the face of the Other. 
Levinas’s ethics, especially Totality and Infinity (1961) is clearly opposes his ethics to such 
(unethical) politics. He argues categorically that ethics is opposed to politics. The ethics that 
he is describing has very little or nothing at all to do with the politics that gave rise to the 
horrors of the twentieth century. 
 
Secondly, Levinas argues that politics that is not founded on ethics is tyrannical. Fagan 
quotes Levinas that ‘politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and the 
Other who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus as in 
absentia’ (Fagan 2009:17; Levinas 2005:300). As I have shown above, the subject and object 
of the political order (all the institutions of government and the Law) is man. So, if the 
political order arises from anything but the face to face relation, then it exercises its power 
illegitimately, and hence the face is in absentia. The political order, according to Levinas, 
should respond to the demand in the face of the Other. So, if the face is absent, then the 
political order that comes into being is illegitimate. It is a tyranny. 
 
Thirdly, and for the reasons outlined above, it is only a justified political order that would be 





What is more, Fagan has not clarified what she means by the words ‘ethical’ and ‘political’ 
when she says that ‘politics is always already concerned with the ethical, and ethics is always 
already concerned with the political (p. 7). As I will show in Chapter Five below, both the 
ethical and the political refer to time – the time or moment of questioning. On the one hand, 
the ethical, signifying the approach of the Other questions the complacency of the self and 
leads to the constitution of ethical subjectivity.  On the other hand, the political, signifying 
the presence of the third party in the face to face encounter, leads to the constitution of 
political subjectivity and responsibility in action. As it were, the ethical and the political go 
hand in hand. 
 
In conclusion, Fagan’s argument that the third party’s presence in the face is a problem for 
deducing politics is weak. I have shown that the face and the third party coexist in Levinas’s 
ethics. The human comprises both the face, as the singularising event and the legitimating 
authority; and the third party, as the idea of humanity and, hence, the power to make and 
enforce laws. The human comprises both the face and the idea of humanity, we cannot 
separate the two.  
 
What is more, it is not misconceived to argue for the separability of ethics and politics in 
Levinas. If we think of Levinas’s description of ethics it cannot be inseparable from the 
politics that he is trying to dismantle in Totality and Infinity (1961). Yet there is another way 
in which we can talk of separation between ethics and politics, which is consistent with 
Levinas’s thought. Levinas’s ethics as a separate and independent realm can exist. It is 
conceivable that the self would take up responsibility for the Other and ignore the beckoning 
destitution of the third party in the eyes of the Other. Levinas is not unaware of this 




it and welcome all the destitute Others. The failure to transcend renders ethical responsibility 
as an injustice; for the reason that it refuses to ask the question of justice for all the Others. It 
does not consider the relation of the Other to all the Others. It does not ask what they have 
already done to each Other. It forgives and covers wrongs in the clandestinity of love, (in 
fact, true forgiveness happens in clandestinity but it neglects the question of justice). What if 
the Other wronged another? Responsibility for the Other includes assuming his 
responsibilities, and that involves answering for the Other. If the duo closes itself up, 
separates itself from the rest, that is injustice.  
 
It is my view that ‘pure ethics,’ if it would exist, (see Drabinski 2000:51 & Fagan 2009:21) 
would be injustice and Levinas knows that too well to be advocating for the same (Perpich 
1998:63). Diane Perpich (1998) argues that ethics was never a question of purity in Levinas. 
She insists that the language of purity is at odds with Levinas’s own language and 
descriptions, but also that there is nothing in Levinas’s main works that implies the need to 
conserve the purity of the ethical (1998:63). In politics, Perpich further argues, the desire for 
purity has expressed itself in policies of apartheid and genocide, and Levinas would have 
good reason to steer clear of that (1998:63). Religious fundamentalism (and its intolerance 
and failure to recognise Others), and the Holocaust (and its failure to heed the ethical 
command ‘thou shall not kill’) are all born of pure ethics. Pure ethics forgets the reason why 
the self ceded its position for its Other. It ignores the fact that what was initiated by the 
ceding its place cannot be contained in, and does not terminate in, the love between the self 
and its Other. Initially, it is the vulnerability of the Other that speaks to the self, a 
vulnerability that the self identifies with, and relates to. It is this vulnerability that speaks 




itself up to the vulnerability of the third party. The consequences of this closure are acts of 
violence and cruelty against the third party. 
 
It is important to also mention that the argument from ethical purity sounds consistent with a 
corrupted idea of unconditional hospitality. While this unconditionality is the idea that 
Levinas attaches to the ethical welcome, yet he does not want to ignore the fact that ‘there are 
Others, equally destitute as the Other that approaches, who are looking on (and looking 
forward to) the face to face relationship.’60 More importantly, Levinas does not want to 
ignore that fact that ‘there are Others who are wrong’ (Levinas in Hand 1989:247-248). 
Hospitality does not include glossing over injustice. It is my view that Levinas’s vision of a 
political community is one in which citizens are selfless and put Others first, without 
conditions, yet do not tolerate any traces of injustice. The reason is simple. Tolerating 
injustice is forgetting the fact of vulnerability, which underlies human nature. Tolerating and 
ignoring injustice is suicide. Injustice contradicts human nature (as frailty and 
vulnerability)61. Vulnerability invokes protection, it authors laws, human rights, and so on. 
Hence, punishment corrects the contradiction brought on human nature by acts of injustice. 
This is the framework of my argument that the third party is witness. Witness to the self’s 
commitment to ethical responsibility, since it is only a disinterested self that would endeavour 
to protect vulnerability of Others. Only a disinterested self would author laws, and be subject 
to them, laws that protect vulnerability (see the political theories of John Rawls and 
Immanuel Kant).  
 
                                                          
60 For the reason that the welcome of the other leads logically to the welcome of all the Others 
61 Based on my redefinition of human nature as vulnerability, one would argue that so what is the difference 
between humans and animals, and every thing in existence for that matter, seeing that every thing in nature is 
vulnerable? To which I would answer that everything has a face. Just like Levinas claimed. The focus of ethics 
and politics is human vulnerability. But everything else can be said to have a face. Everything else is vulnerable. 
But it is a different question to say that everything else other than man can respond by substituting 




Like Fagan above, David Wood has argued that Levinas’s ethics is flawed. In The Step Back: 
Ethics and Politics After Deconstruction (2005), Wood shows that Levinas’s ethics rests on a 
flawed ontology. It is first a commitment to the Other human, especially the one in need, for 
the reason that it is dependent on the capacity to speak (2005:53). What it means, therefore, 
for Wood is that Levinas’s ethics discriminates against Others who may lack the capacity to 
speak (ibid, 53). Wood’s argument rests on the meaning of ‘to speak’. What does Levinas 
mean by that? I have showed above that ‘to speak’ for Levinas is not literal. Levinas argues 
that ethical speech comes before any words are uttered, and that does not involve a mouth at 
all. I have shown above that the destituteness of human being is speech in itself, it is what 
speaks to someone and elicits a response. Further to his argument above, Wood argues that 
“my capacity to respond to the Other’s needs depends on the health and expansiveness of my 
understanding of myself, and what it means to be human. My obligation to the Others is 
inseparable from my acquiring the insight and even the knowledge that would enable me to 
reach out and help the Other” (2005:58). Indeed, as Wood shows, the capacity to respond is 
dependent on one’s understanding of what it means to be human (paraphrased). However, if 
one understands humanity to mean destitution, then one’s response to that destitution does 
not rest entirely on doing something about it, but even by being affected by it and by putting 
on a disposition that shows concern for the destitution of the Other. Hence, the health factor 
and the knowledge imperative that Wood brings in as necessary conditions for a responsible 
response is not merited in this case. I have already emphasized, above, that ethical response 
on Levinas’s terms does not require one to actually do something about the Other’s plight. 
Wood gives the example of a roadside accident (p. 58). He says that when one is faced with a 
road accident victim, it is essential to grasp some of the complexities involved in therapeutic 
assistance to the Other. Wood argues that all this involves ontology (yet Levinas removes 




to best help the victim, one needs specific medical knowledge and training. On the contrary, 
my argument is that helping a roadside accident victim is not ethical responsibility; but 
responsibility in action. Responsibility in action is in the category of political responsibility, 
and it indeed requires ontology. One is able to assist the victim using medical expertise 
because she is first and foremost ethically related to the victim. The situation and condition of 
the victim speaks to me, obliges me, whether I am a paramedic or not. The human in the 
victim speaks through the present destitution to the human in me. In order to actually do 
something to help the victim, I need ontology, I need knowledge, I need calculation. In my 
reading of Levinas’s ethics, knowledge of what to do in order to reach out to the Other in 
need comes after sensibility to the Other’s suffering. Sensibility precedes knowledge. Ethics 
precedes ontology. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter set out to research the question of the moral authority of the third party. I have 
demonstrated that the third party has no moral authority to command ethical responsibility, 
let alone halt its movement. I have in particular examined Fagan (2009)’s inseparability 
thesis, which claims that if the third is taken seriously in Levinas’s work then we cannot talk 
of a separation between ethics and politics, and hence, we cannot deduce a politics from his 
ethics. She further argues that by virtue of the presence of the third party from the inception 
of the face to face, then Levinas’s idea of responsibility is not something that can uphold a 
political project. 
 
I have shown offered three arguments for the lack of moral authority of the third party. I have 
shown that moral authority only resides in the face of the Other. I have shown that the third 




the Others. I have shown that it is the face of the Other that legitimises the third party’s 
power to enforce responsibility in action. And because of this, I have argued that the third 
party is the ground of political responsibility. 
 
I have addressed a number of objections to my argument for this chapter, and also to my 
defence of it. Of particular importance are the objections from Fagan (2009), Wolff (2012), 
and Wood (2005). The objections from these authors rest on the meaning of ethics itself in 
Levinas, and what he means by ethical responsibility. Hence, one’s understanding of what 
Levinas means by ethical responsibility determines how one understands ethical response. In 
my case, ethical responsibility is not something that one can do. I have shown that it is only a 
posture, or a disposition, indicative of affectiveness or sensibility to the Other’s destitution. I 
have underlined the ability to be affected by the Other’s destitution as definitive of the 
human. Hence, to be human is to be affected by the Other’ it is a sensibility to the destitution 
of the Other. Ethical responsibility anticipates political responsibility, which requires to 









 4.0 LA PORTE AND THE TIME BETWEEN TIMES   
“C’est l’heure de la justice!”  – Levinas quoted in Levin, DM (1999:334) 
 
“Is it insignificant that Levinas speaks in this place of a door [porte]? 
– Derrida, J (1999:26). 
 
4.1 Introductory Remarks and Thesis Statement 
In Chapter Three above, I have argued that the third party does not have the moral authority 
to command ethical responsibility let alone halt its movement. I have used the term ethical 
welcome, or the welcome of the Other, to describe ethical responsibility. My view is that the 
welcome of the Other is an event that takes place at the door (la porte) of the at-home (or the 
dwelling). Levinas’s idea of the door as the threshold of the welcome of the Other goes 
beyond the mere welcoming of guests into one’s home. In this chapter, I argue that the door 
1) is the threshold [the dawn, or the beginning] of the ethical and the political, and for this 
reason 2) it is the time between times. The door is also, 3) the space of the determination of 
the political welcome (or welcome of the third-party). For these reasons, my view is that 
Levinas’s idea of ethics or ethical responsibility cannot be completely understood apart from 
the idea of time that the door announces. Yet, the concept of time is largely missing in most 
literature on Levinas’s ethics. I will further show that a proper analysis of the event of the 
welcome at the door challenges the claim that ‘that there is no assured passage between ethics 
and politics in Levinas.’ My view is that Levinas’s allusion to the metaphor of the door 
(1961: 170) and what happens there bridges the gap between ethics and politics, and in turn 




more, it is because of the door that the need to define political responsibility (n+1) is 
imperative and urgent (time).  
In order to achieve my objective in this chapter, I closely read Levinas’s presentation of The 
Hypostasis, in particular some parts of section 2 and 3, in Existence and Existence (1947: 71-
91). In the selected passages Levinas discusses the question of time in relation to the Other. 
This reading will be juxtaposed with Derrida’s and Heidegger’s thoughts on time. Heidegger 
(Being and Time, Chapter VI, p. 371ff.) because of his influence on Levinas’s writings, and 
Derrida because of his noteworthy scholarship on Levinas’s ethics.  
 
I also read arguments presented in Section II of Totality and Infinity (1961), subsection C 
‘The Dwelling’ (pages 152-174) in order to understand how the event of the ethical welcome 
at the door eventually sets in motion the event of the political welcome. I will underscore the 
assumptions on which Levinas makes his argument, and also the implications of his argument 
on my definition of political responsibility. I also closely read Derrida’s argument, ‘A Word 
of Welcome,’ in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1999), in which Derrida undertakes a detailed 
examination of the event of the welcome in Levinas. In particular, he focuses on the ‘subject 
of the welcome.’ His broader objective, however, is to show how ethics, or the welcome, as 
hospitality founds a law, or politics, as hospitality, in spite of the hiatus between them. 
Derrida builds this analysis on the assumption that there is no assured passage between ethics 
and politics in Levinas. Derrida is very important for the present study because he is the only 
one, to my knowledge, among many Levinas scholars, to have underscored Levinas’s 
allusion to the metaphor of the door in relation to the question of ethics and politics.  
 
In the next sections, I present a literature survey on the relationship between the door, time 




obscures the seamless (or hiatus-free) movement from ethical responsibility to political 
responsibility. I will also consider possible objections to my argument. 
 
4.2 Literature Review  
 
4.2.1 Levinas on the Dwelling, its Doors, and Windows 
Levinas’s reference to the physical home and its interiority is analogical to the home as one’s 
the zero-point point of orientation to the world (including beliefs, prejudices, attitudes, and so 
on, from which the self makes sense of the world around it). The world is intelligible, and the 
self is able to be (in that position at all), as a consequence of its particular point of orientation. 
James R Mensch (Lectures on Totality and Infinity, online notes, retrieved 29 October 2017, 
22:10:18), fittingly, describes the home as an extension of the ego, which is the zero point in 
space and time from which one views the world (Mensch:59). As an extension of the ego, the 
home extends its interiority to a part of the objective world, hence the home becomes the zero 
point.  
 
However, the reference to the physical home is not without significance in Levinas. As 
Gauthier (2004) rightly observes, Levinas’s discussion of the home provides a normative 
standard by which the adequacy of the human relationship to place can be ethically judged (p. 
200). One’s status as a moral being is judged by his/her treatment of strangers or foreigners 
who show up at his/her doorstep. This is in line with Levinas’s concern about homelessness 
as a reminder of man’s failure to meet his ethical obligation to the other (Gauthier 189).  
 
Derrida (1999) also underscores Levinas’s concern with the homeless. Derrida shows how 




foreigner, the immigrant (with or without papers), the exiled, the refugee, those without a 
country, or a state, the displaced person or population (Gauthier 2004: 189; Derrida 1999:64). 
It is for this reason (probably one of the reasons) that Derrida engages with the thought of 
Levinas from the point of view of ethics as hospitality and how it is related to politics as 
hospitality. As I will show later on, Derrida takes this thought further to claim that the door at 
which the welcome of the other takes place in modernity is the border or the frontier.  
 
There are two interpretations of the concept home in Levinas: in the proper sense of the word, 
home means the physical space of habitation – a house, with its doors and windows, and 
other demarcations. It is closed off as private property. In the loose sense of the word, home 
is the space of familiarity, which extends beyond the physical home proper. Any space one is 
familiar with, one feels at home. Both senses of the word home, in Levinas, are significant for 
thinking about the political welcome. The welcome of the other that takes place at a country’s 
borders signifies presupposes the law and the politics of that particular country, which are 
embodied in the citizen’s attitudes and beliefs. These give them an identity as a separate and 
self-sufficient country. On an individual level, one’s attitudes and belief also determine how 
they welcome others (as well as other people’s attitudes and beliefs).  
 
Taking his cue from Levinas’s argument that language or speaking, is the mode of the 
welcome of the other, Mensch (online notes) has argued that speaking is equivalent to sharing 
– sharing one’s world with the other. He further shows that sharing makes one’s world 
common. By sharing one’s world, the self is disposed of their its home [in the loose sense of 
the word] (Levinas 1991:173; Mensch 70). It is no longer theirs its alone. The home is no 





It is important to note, however that the absolutely other does not compel the self to open [the 
door to] its home and share it. In its egoism, the self can choose to shut out the other, which is 
an indication of radical separation (Levinas 1991:173; Mensch 70). This entails interiority at 
its best –that the self does not need anything from outside; all its needs are fulfilled. Mensch 
underscores the idea that the other has authority yet without power, since it does not compel 
the self to open up.62 (See Chapter 3 on the question of the moral authority of the third party).  
The idea of the door does not terminate with the welcome of the Other, or the welcome of the 
third party, but is present with the ethical subject on his trajectory towards the good. In other 
words, using the loose sense of the word door in understanding the welcome of the other, 
suggests that the door is not fixed in one place [as the door of the house].  As a space of 
familiarity, the home and its door cannot be fixed. One can enlarge their horizon of what 
makes them feel at home, as long as they maintain an open mind to embracing change and 
learning new things. The possibility of shifting one’s mindset to accommodate other ideas 
and things gives me the idea of shifting doors, which is in line with Levinas’s idea of 
responsibility as movement towards the good, or towards justice in particular. The search for 
justice is a continuous process. One cannot arrive at one instance of justice and feel 
contented; the movement of towards justice is a continuous process in search of better and 
perfect justice.  
 
In foregrounding the idea of the door in Levinas’s thought, my assumption is that it is at the 
door that the self, the other, and the third party come together (if we use the imagery of home 
as a physical dwelling). Even in terms of home as a space of familiarity, there is a place or 
time that the world views of the self and those of the Other (and the third party) come into 
                                                          




‘confrontation.’ One can still locate a door, or a time of confrontation of beliefs. It is for this 
reason, that I suggest that the door is the locale for ‘calling into question.’  
 
The phrase ‘calling into question’ occurs many times in Levinas’s description of ethics and 
the ethical. It is interesting to note that he uses the same phrase, in Proper Names (1996), 
chapter 6, to describe Derrida’s style of writing (particularly with reference to the latter’s 
Speech and Phenomena (1967), which ‘overthrows logocentric discourse’, (1996: 56).  
Levinas observes that ‘at the outset, everything is in place yet after a few pages or paragraphs 
of formidable calling into question, nothing is left inhabitable for thought’ (ibid). For 
Levinas, [Derrida’s] ‘literary effect’ culminates into ‘a no-man’s land, an in-between that is 
uncertain even of the uncertainties that flicker everywhere – an unusual time in which what is 
held as truth is suspended. Derrida’s manner of writing represents the obliteration of ‘the past 
and future as modes of presence.’ ‘Time is no longer subordinate to the present (ibid, p. 60). 
Although Levinas does not take his observation in this direction, it is my proposition that 
Derrida’s ‘in-between’, ‘a time between times’ best describes what I have in mind here with 
regards to the metaphor of the door in relation to the approach of the face of the Other at-
home of the self.  
 
4.2.2 Derrida on the Door, or the Border, as Modern Sinai 
In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1999), in particular the second essay ‘A Word of Welcome,’ 
Jacques Derrida engages with the thought of Levinas from the point of view of the welcome 
of the other. His objective is to find the relationship between Levinas’s ethics as the 
unconditional welcome of the other on the one hand, and politics on the other. Derrida asks 
whether it is without significance that Levinas speaks in this place of a door [porte]? Is the 





In Chapter Two above I have shown that the door is, for Derrida, the threshold that opens the 
at-home to which the Other is welcomed. The idea of the open door, in particular, is 
significant for Derrida.63 According to Derrida, the open door calls for the opening of an 
exteriority, or of a transcendence of the idea of infinity. The idea of infinity comes through a 
door (ibid, 26).  But Derrida equates the welcome (or, the ‘to receive’ the idea of infinity) 
with reason. For the reason that Derrida confines the welcome to the familial dwelling, which 
is manifest at national borders and similar points of entry into a country, Derrida uses the idea 
of the door to argue that the welcome of the other is rational. I agree with Derrida that reason 
is present at the door – no one blindly welcomes strangers into their home! But as I have 
shown above, the welcome of the Other for Levinas is not rational. What Levinas says rather 
is that ‘the welcome of the Other is concretely produced as the calling into question of the 
self by the Other. While it is agreeable that it is at the door where one welcomes or turns 
away the Other, it is not the case that the welcome is rational. The idea of infinity that comes 
through the door comes before the self is open to reason.  
 
As I have shown above, reason is present at the open door as ‘the calling into question,’ even 
though it is not the homeowner who asks questions but the stranger. The homeowner is called 
upon to justify her freedom and spontaneity in view of the destitution of the Other. This idea 
is well argued for in Derrida. By focusing on the distinction between guest and host, and 
whose welcome it is between the homeowner and the stranger, Derrida argues the self 
(subject) is both host (as owner of the home) and guest (as one who receives the teaching of 
the Other’s infinity). The Other is also both guest (by virtue of being welcome into the home 
of the self) but also host (as one who teaches the self). In other words, the welcome comes 
                                                          




from the other (the guest), and not from the subject (host). The subject is a welcome of the 
other, an openness to the other. It is the welcome that defines subjectivity. The decision and 
responsibility to welcome the other, the yes to the other is secondary to the yes of the other. 
 
It is at the door that one receives or rejects the idea of infinity revealed in the face of the 
Other. It is at the door that one takes up responsibility to the other and all the others. It is not 
surprising that Derrida suggests that the welcome is rational. It is indeed at the door that 
reason comes upon the ‘host’, who is the self – one can now compare, and judge, etc. But 
contrary to Derrida, I want to argue instead that the idea of infinity that comes through the 
door comes before one is open to reason, before comparisons, and is antecedent to questions. 
In principle, reason comes after the ethical relation is established. It is after this establishment 
that one realises that all the others are in need of one’s response. It is also at this ‘time’ that 
the ethical subject realises that s/he is now equal in responsibility to all the Others. 
 
Even though Derrida (1999: 20, 64) does not explain the metaphor of the door in terms of a 
bridge between ethics and politics, it is my view that he refers to it when he discusses the 
problem of immigrants (which was also Levinas’s concern). Derrida (p. 64) expands the 
meaning of Sinai at which the Torah was given, to include ‘modernity’, and shows that today 
Sinai represents ‘a front and a frontier between war and peace, a provocation to think the 
passage between the ethical and the political, at a moment when [the innocent] are open to a 
cruelty without precedent (p. 64). The door can represent physical borders at which the other 
is welcomed into a particular country or turned away. The door can also represent the mindset 
of the self, who can be called into question to justify its narrow world view and welcome the 
perspectives of other people as well. The latter description of the door feeds into the former, 




determines their laws and policies for handling such vulnerable peoples. Derrida (1999: 64) 
shows how Levinas ‘never turned away his eyes from the violence and distress experienced 
by the foreigner, the immigrant (with or without papers), the exile, the refugee, those without 
a country, or a state, the displaced person or population (Gauthier 2004: 189). It is for this 
reason that I think Derrida’s suspension of the question of foundation at the beginning of 
Adieu is inconsistent with his discussion (later on) of how ethics as hospitality inevitably 
founds law or politics as hospitality.  
 
4.2.3 Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida On Time 
The ‘concept’ of time is not a common theme in Levinas literature. Even Levinas did not 
write widely about time in itself as he did about responsibility for instance. Yet, ethical 
responsibility in Levinas cannot be understood apart from the concept of time. In the few 
occasions where Levinas has discussed time, such as in God, Death and Time (1993, 2000), it 
is clear that ‘time is the very relationship which an ethical subject has with the Other’ (Hand 
1989: 37). In Existence and Existents (1947. 1978. 1995) time is the inner structure of 
subjectivity, that is, of the movement of ex-isting (p. 11); by which he means an escape from 
subjectivity (Levinas 1947. 1987: 6). According to Levinas, time is the only thing that can 
redeem us from the solitude of the instant. Time presses history forward (Severson 2013: 
743). So, what is the nature of time in Levinas? Is time measurable or not?  
 
Ever since Plato, the traditional conception of time is that time is a movable image of eternity 
(Plato 1929:37d, Alweiss 2002, p. 119). According to this tradition, time is a linear series of 
now points that can be measured. Time is also a modification of presence (ibid, p.119). In 
Being and Time (1953, 1996), Heidegger questions whether we can experience eternity as 




2002, p. 120). For Heidegger therefore the meaning of time can only be understood from 
Dasein’s originary temporality (ibid, p. 121). In other words, what defines the very existence 
of Dasein is that it is a being-towards-death. Humans are destined for death. Hence, time is 
only because we are mortal; apart from humans, time is nothing (ibid, p. 122).  
 
Against the traditional understanding that time is a series of now points, Heidegger argues 
that the now is not pregnant with the not-yet-now, but the present arises from the future 
(Alweiss 2002, p. 122; Heidegger 1962: 81, 427). The meaning of time therefore does not lie 
in eternity, which is beyond our grasp, rather it lies in an end, and that end is within our grasp 
(ibid, p 122). In God, Death, and Time (1993. 2000), Levinas argues that according to 
Heidegger, the entire structure of time is drawn from the relationship to death, which is a 
modality of being (p. 58). But Levinas wonders whether meaning is always an event of being, 
as Heidegger suggests (Levinas 1993. 2000: p. 57): 
 
“Does everything that is examined in man come down to the question: What is it to be? Or 
indeed, is there not a more interrogative question behind this question, such that death, 
despite its certitude, would not be reduced to the question, or the alternative between to be 
and not to be? Does death come down only to tying the knot of the intrigue of being? Does 
death not have its eminent meaning in the death of others, where it signifies by way of an 
event that cannot be reduced to its being? In this being that we are, do things not come to 
pass in which our being does not count as first? And if humanity is not exhausted in the 
service of being, then does not my responsibility for another (in its emphatic sense: my 
responsibility for the death of another, my responsibility as a survivor) rise up behind the 
question: What is it to be? Does it not arise behind the anxiety over my own death? And 
would time then not call for a different interpretation of the projection toward the future?” 





Levinas finds an answer in Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy. Whereas Heidegger 
reduced Kantian philosophy to the first radical exhibition of the finitude of being, Levinas 
thinks otherwise. Levinas uses Kant’s four questions posed in philosophy in order to 
demonstrate that it is possible for meaning to signify without reference to being (p. 60): What 
may I know? What must I do? What am I entitled to hope? And What is man? (ibid, p. 59). 
According to Levinas, there is no reference to being in the second question. And for him, this 
is the greatest contribution of the Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(ibid. p. 60). Kant’s practical philosophy shows that the Heideggerian reduction is not 
obligatory (ibid, p. 61). This finding is very useful for Levinas. He will use it to think the 
meaning of time without recourse to the question of being.  
 
According to Bergo (2011 ‘Emmanuel Levinas’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2011 Edition)), time, in Levinas, consists in two axes: first, the flowing synthesis of 
now moments, which is reminiscent of Husserl’s structure of transcendental consciousness. 
Second, a peculiar kind of interruption that Levinas calls the ‘event’ of transcendence. Bergo 
shows that for Levinas, the encounter with the Other person, merely inflects history or leaves 
a trace in it. This is a history about isolated acts or human ideals such as justice, equity, and 
self-sacrifice). In her ‘Emmanuel Levinas’ entry in the 2019 edition of The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Bergo further clarifies that by time Levinas 
is not referring to clock time or to the time of the Universal in Hegelian history. Time in 
Levinas is phenomenological and it has three levels:1) equivalent to formal historicist time, 
2) comparable to Husserl’s universal flow of immanent consciousness, 3) temporality that is 
episodic and affectively coloured, which he calls interruption or rupture. Further, Bergo 




aligned with the experience of transcendence. For Levinas, the interruption is an 
intersubjective affair.  
 
What is more, Bergo shows that the encounter with the Other is not an ontological event in 
Heidegger’s sense. Neither is it like an occurrence that breaks up the historical status quo, 
modifying the course of history into a before and an after in function of its magnitude. 
Levinas does argue, however, that the encounter with alterity may leave a trace in historical 
time. A trace of the interruption persists in the subject, like a grain of sand in an oyster, 
(‘Emmanuel Levinas’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition). A good 
example of the encounter with the Other and the trace that remains in the subject is biblical 
story of Jacob’s wrestling with God (Genesis 32: 22-32). Jacob was left with a limp. 
Throughout his ethics, Levinas has endeavoured to show that one cannot remain the same 
after an encounter with the Other (see Chapter 2 above, sections 2.2.3. and 2.2.2.3. Also, 
chapter 3, section 3.1.). At this point, it is clear that time in Levinas is not measurable or 
scientific. In fact, measurable time is not the original time (Levinas & Bergo 1993, 2000).  
 
In an article titled ‘Emmanuel Levinas: Time and Responsibility’ (in Philosophical 
Dimensions of Time and Memory), Maria Dimirtova (no date) presents three ways of thinking 
time inLevinas. First is existential time: time in which the life of a finite being is lived. The 
significance of existential time is inked to the meaning and purpose of one’s life (p. 15). 
Second is historical time: the time man was alive, what he has done and the heritage left 
behind.  Third, and most important is eschatological time: the overcoming of the direction of 
one’s existential time, which leads to death and towards the time of the Other (p. 28). 
Eschatological time is diachronical and not synchronical. It is the very relationship with the 




Other as well as the Third. Dimirtova also raises an important issue that time itself must not 
be mixed with what is not time, but is only temporal (p. 28). She gives the example of 
historical becoming, which is represented through the change and preservation of creatures, 
their union and separation, their life and death. Nothing enduring remains after their death, 
only a short-term trace remains, which disappears quickly, melted in the vector of history (p. 
29).  
 
Dimirtova shows that according to Levinas, however, there is a genuine and ineffaceable 
trace, which appears in one’s obligation to the Other.  This is why the trace is defined as the 
inclusion of the immensity of the Other in to time. Take for instance Justice as the other. It is 
through the face of the Other person that the demand for Justice is necessary.  
 
Yael Lin, in Another Time: Levinas and Responsibility, has undertaken a detailed analysis of 
time in Levinas (pp. 194ff). However, his approach distinguishes between diachronic time 
(which occurs in my responsibility to the Other person) and egological time (which involves 
a community of people). In this analysis, Lin tries to bring the two perspectives of time 
together; that it is possible to view Levinas’s understanding if time as constituted by one’s 
relationship to the Other but also at the same time by the community. Lin argues that 
although Levinas's view of time is innovative and promotes the discussion of time by pushing 
it beyond the egological views, he does not develop a view of collective time that considers 
our communal human existence as providing the meaning for our temporal existence (p. 198). 
While I agree with Lin, my understanding is that Levinas’s presentation of ethics as infinite 
responsibility for the Other—from egology to the encounter with the Other, to ethical 






4.3 Defence of Thesis statement  
In this section, I argue that the idea of the door in Levinas is key to unlocking the movement 
of desire from ethics to politics and beyond. In particular I show that the door is the time 
between times, and that the door is the time of justice. 
 
4.3.1 La Porte as the Time Between Times  
In this section, I show that the door of the at-home stands between the present and the future 
of the welcome of the Other. In other words, the door is the in-between, the threshold of the 
present and future times. The in-between is indeterminate; former modes of doing things are 
interrupted and suspended because they are insufficient to handle what is coming through the 
door. 
 
There are no definite and direct passages, to my knowledge, in Levinas that discuss the idea 
of the door in the way I put it above, as the time between past and future,64 but I see a 
relationship among scattered thoughts on time, the idea of interruption or calling into 
question, and the idea of the welcome. 
 
 Severson (2013) has observed that ‘Levinas’s conception of time is inextricably linked to his 
development of alterity. To fail to think of time adequately, is, for Levinas, to open the door 
to violence, oppression, and evil,’ (p. 743). Hence, alterity and time go hand in hand in 
Levinas. One has a bearing on another. In Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas states that 
‘time is constituted by the relationship with the Other (p. 93). Subsequently, in Time and the 
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Other (1947, 1987), Levinas states that ‘time is not the achievement of an isolated subject, 
but the very relationship which that subject has with the Other (Hand 1989: 37). In the 
Introductory Chapter, I showed how Levinas’s principal thesis in these early texts is that ‘the 
human breaks with pure being, which is always a persistence in being’ (Bernasconi and 
Wood 1988:172). To break with pure being is to break or disconnect with the past; and it is 
the approach of the what is to come, the Other, that delineates the past (Baumgartner 2005: 
160). But the future is not yet time. Levinas argues that for it to be time it must enter into a 
relationship with the present. The presence of the future in the present is accomplished in the 
face to face relationship with the Other (Hand 1989: 45). It follows therefore that the 
beginning of the future is in the present. But it can be argued that the Other is not in the 
present. For instance, Derrida states that the other is always coming, or about to come 
(Anderson 2012: 75). In other words, he argues that the other is always future time; but my 
idea is that the approach itself is in the present, or it is the present, and it offers a new 
beginning (see Baumgartner 2005: 168). This is in keeping with Levinas’s argument that ‘the 
Other encountered face to face is not the subject’s contemporary –they do not meet one 
another ‘at the same time’ (Levinas 1947, 1987: p. 6ff). Only in the community of comrades 
are the two contemporaries (Levinas 1947: 94, 95).  
 
In the Introduction to Time and the Other (1987 edition), Richard Cohen asks a relevant 
question: ‘how does Levinas see a past and a future in this disruption and election of the ego? 
How is the structure of ethics, the structure of time?’ (Levinas 1947, 1987: 18). Cohen’s 
questions are at the centre of my argument that one cannot divorce the question of time from 
Levinas’s ethics, without missing Levinas’s point. In this text, Cohen describes the future as 
‘the future of he who is always yet to come; he who will never and can never fully present 




moral demands on the ego,’ (ibid, p. 18). In this way, Cohen agrees with Derrida’s claim that 
the other, in Levinas’s sense, is impossible (unknowable). On the other hand, the empirical 
possibility of the other reduces both the other and the future to the horizon of the same. But 
the impossible cannot be known nor foreseen. It is in this sense that Levinas understands the 
otherness of the Other – the Other never arrives, it is always yet to come.  
 
Following from the above, there are two sense of otherness (alterity) that should always be 
kept in mind when reading Levinas. In the first sense, otherness refers to the human person. 
In this case, it is l’Autrui, which means the Other person. In the second sense, otherness refers 
to something that is other than what can be known and comprehended by the human (see 
Levinas’s Preface to Time and the Other p. 30). Justice, for example: instances of justice are 
possible, they can be achieved and measured, but this is not so with justice in itself. Justice in 
itself is desirable, but it can neither be achieved nor measured. It is always in future, always 
yet to come. It is better that the present instances of justice, hence the desire is always 
towards it. Like Cohen (in the Introduction to Time and the Other 1987) puts it, the other 
exerts moral demands on us. Thus, the relationship between the two alterities is that the other 
that is yet to come exerts its moral demand via the Other person.  
 
In Time and the Other (1947, 1987), Levinas focuses on the future time to the exclusion of 
the past (p. 6). It is with this in mind that I suggest that the idea of present time is important 
for the determination of political responsibility. The door represents the time-less non-space 
which determines the future. In other words, the door is the present, between past and future, 
in which lies the opportunity to determine the future, As the beginning, or the initium, the 
door is the site for mapping out how the community of comrades, which is the political 





4.3.2 La Porte as the Time of Justice  
In Another Time, Yael Lin has shown that there is a gap in Levinas between diachronic time 
and ‘public’ time. In this book, he presents a way of reconciling the two, seeing that both are 
significant. Lin uses Levinas’s term, illeity, to present a new relation that opens up a way to 
the political, social situation of reciprocity that is different than the political realm of justice 
created by the third party, le tiers (p. 201). Lin wonders whether the symmetrical, reciprocal 
relation of a political life engendered by illeity entail the reduction of alterity?  Is political 
time synchronic? Does political time unite the individuals under a totalizing structure that 
expunges alterity, or does it open up a unique view of collective time that preserves alterity?  
With the help of Caygill and others, Lin shows that Levinas's view of prophetic politics is 
grounded in disruption; the justice of prophetic politics is not reconciliation but interruption, 
which even interrupts the relation of proximity with the Other (p. 203).  
 
I agree with Lin, to argue that justice is grounded in the interruption, that justice interrupts the 
relation of proximity. In the same vein, I would add that the time of the political interrupts the 
time of the ethical; or, to use Lin’s terminology, public time interrupts diachronic time. It 
appears that there will always be an aporia as far as Levinas’s ethics is concerned. This is 
why Derrida maintains that there is a hiatus between ethics and politics in Levinas (see 
chapter above). Diane Perpich (1998) has also wondered how the demand for justice (justice 
as an impossibility, ungraspable in itself) originates necessarily from within ethical 
responsibility (see chapter 2, section 2.4.1). The dualism that seem to exist at the heart of 
Levinas ethical and political thinking is also the thrust of Sarah Roberts argument in 
‘Rethinking Justice: Levinas and Asymmetrical Responsibility’ (2000). She argues that ‘if 




justice, then one must also reject Levinas’s suggestion that justice involves viewing persons 
and responsibilities as comparable and symmetrical.’ She shows that ‘insofar as justice is 
constructed by and for the ethical relationship, it must also be deconstructed by that 
relationship.  
 
Asymmetrical justice is synonymous with ethical justice. It is in this vein that in Totality and 
Infinity (1961) Levinas equates ethics to justice. But this is not yet political justice, which 
Roberts seems to be hinting at (justice as symmetrical). Political justice comes into being as a 
breach of ethical justice. Political justice (as a responsibility to all others including oneself) is 
more desirable than ethical justice (as infinite dedication and obligation to only the other). 
What is more, ethical responsibility names the ethical subject, it is personal. The call of the 
Other defines one’s uniqueness and irreplaceability in responding to the other. Asymmetry is 
therefore said of the ethical relationship. Responsibility in Levinas is not something that one 
does, but it is the subject, the person, himself or herself. As I explained in Chapter Two 
above, the goal of ethical responsibility is that the subject ‘cedes her place’, or ‘position in 
being’ for the other. In words, the intention of the ethical is to depose the I from its position 
of self-sufficiency in being. The new positionless, or homeless, subject is the one who is a 
proper candidate to welcome the other and all the others at the same time. All the others, the 
third party, are present with the other as it approaches the subject. Hence, the unique subject 
realises the uniqueness of the other, and that of all the others. That by virtue of their 
uniqueness, every other is the other to another. This is the origin of equality. Ethical subjects 
are equal in responsibility. 
 
Going back to Roberts’s argument, first, there is a lot that happens at the door where the 




asymmetry and symmetry are not opposed in Levinas, but relational. Persons are asymmetric 
by virtue of their faces (uniqueness) yet at the same time, and because every person has a 
face, every person is a candidate for responsibility – every person is equal to any other 
because they can ‘cede their place’ and be a responsibility for the other. While every face is 
unique and incomparable to another face, yet it is the very possession of a face that makes 
one the guest and the host of responsibility. So, to argue that Levinas’s claim that 
asymmetrical ethical responsibility is the origin of justice is opposed to his suggestion that 
justice involves viewing persons and responsibilities as comparable and symmetrical, is to 
fail to appreciate that Levinas’s ethics of responsibility as an ethic of relationality. Both 
asymmetry and symmetry define the human being in Levinas. Vertical asymmetry in so far as 
the person is unique and incomparable in himself or herself, and horizontal symmetry in 
relation to other unique and incomparable persons. The symmetry that defines justice is 
founded on asymmetry. In other words, uniqueness or incomparability is not the same as 
inequality in Levinas. 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have shown that Levinas’s allusion to the door of the at-home is not 
insignificant. I have argued that the door is the space of interruption, it is the threshold that 
decides what is outside and what is inside. The door is also the place of revelation, where 
reason takes over and begins to compare others and calculate justice. For the Israelites, the 
place of the interruption was Sinai; for Moses it was Mount Moriah. As Derrida (1999) puts 
it, for the moderns, our Sinai are the national borders, the foreigners in our midst, and so on.  
I have demonstrated that the door is not just Sinai, nor the front and the frontier, but it is the 




and make judgements. It is in this regard that I have argued that the door of the at home is the 





         
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 A LEVINASIAN THEORY OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY  
 
“If there were only two of us in the world, I and one other, there would be no problem. The 
other would be completely my responsibility. But in the real world there are many others. 
When others enter … problems arise. Who is closest to me? Who is the other? Perhaps 
something has already occurred between them. We must investigate carefully… Legal justice 
is required. There is need for a state” – Levinas in Hand (1989: 247, my emphasis).  
 
“If proximity ordered to me only the Other alone, there would have not been any problem. 
Proximity, which is responsibility for the Other, becomes a problem when a third party 
enters….” – Levinas (1974: 157). 
“… along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for 
a defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’, but of those close to me, who are 
also my neighbours.”  – Levinas in Hand (1989: 291-292). 
 
5.1 Introductory Remarks and Thesis Statement 
In subsection 6 of Totality and Infinity (1961), ‘The Other and the Others’, Levinas addresses 
the question whether the ego is absolved from infinite responsibility in the face of all the 
Others. Levinas argues that one is never absolved from responsibility (see Hand 1989: 291); 
and that “it is impossible to free [oneself] by saying, ‘It’s not my concern.’… for it is always 
and inescapably my concern,” (Hand 1989: 247). He argues that the face to face relation of 
the ego and the Other takes place ‘in full light of the public order’ – it concerns everyone 




of the face arouses an irreducible movement of a discourse…. (Levinas 1961: 213, my 
emphasis).  
The presence of the third party at the event of the ethical welcome is a problem in Levinas’s 
ethics (see Wolff 2012; Fagan 2009). It is the beginning of questions which would not arise 
were there only the Other and ‘me’ – questions that lead to the movement of responsibility 
from the Other to all Others, and hence to the ethical purpose of the political order. 
 
In Chapter Four above I have proposed that la porte (or door), which is the threshold that 
opens the at-home to which the Other is welcomed, is key to unlocking the movement of 
responsibility from ethics to politics.65 La porte locates the moment, or the time, of 
questioning. It is the interstice, or the interruption – the time between times, separating the 
ethical and the political. What happens ‘hereafter’ (as opposed to what happens ‘herein’) has 
a distinct nature, which is determinable and distinguishable.  
 
I have also shown that a proper analysis of the event of the welcome challenges the claim that 
‘there is no assured passage from ethics to politics in Levinas’. To my mind, Levinas’s 
allusion to the metaphor of the open door and what happens there is a call for an urgent 
turning towards not just one’s Other, but all the Others. In the opening paragraph above, I 
have shown above the epiphany of the face arouses an irreducible movement…. By all 
means, infinite responsibility to the Other cannot terminate in the at-home of the self, neither 
can the third party halt this movement (see Chapter Three above).  
 
The present chapter uses ‘the open-door hypothesis’ to define political responsibility. The 
chapter focusses on an overlooked dimension in the secondary literature of Levinas’s political 
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theory, which is the epistemology of time and the calculation of political responsibility (or 
responsibility in action). My argument is that political responsibility is: i) the knowledge of 
the time of justice and ii) doing justice. It is a knowledge of the time when to suspend the 
ethical relation with the Other, what to do during the suspension, and when to restore the 
ethical relation.66 I argue that ethical responsibility, though non-epistemic, uncovers the 
epistemic dimension of responsibility, one of whose derivatives is political responsibility. 
Political responsibility operates within the perimeters of epistemology, and not outside of it. 
Questions such as ‘who is right and wrong’, ‘what have some Other already done to the 
Other’, ‘what do I have to do with justice?’ are all epistemic questions. They are all seeking 
for calculable responses. Hence, my claim in this chapter is that political responsibility is, 
precisely, an epistemology of time, and a judgement about what time it is.  
 
Equally, political responsibility is knowledge of the time between times. My view is that one 
does not always decide based on knowledge – this is impossible, and this is why taking any 
particular action at all is a risk. In the same way, Derrida argues that “there would be no such 
thing as political responsibility if a political action and decision were merely the application 
of some theory, knowledge, program or principle: since nothing would be risked. For Derrida 
(1995), the absence of a foundation for politics makes possible political responsibility” 
(Winkler 2017, Lecture notes; Derrida’s The Gift of Death 1995). Derrida seems to define 
political responsibility in terms of risk, which is fine. But, the risk of political responsibility 
does not come about because of the lack of a foundational principle; but, as Levinas says, it 
comes about because of the fact that there are many Others. In particular, the risk of political 
                                                          
66 Not necessarily a knowledge of knowing exactly what to do in each particular case, even though this is very 
important. If one knows exactly what to do in each situation, then ‘responsibility in action’ loses its risk factor. 
More importantly, the risk of political responsibility is not in the ignorance of what to do as such, but in the 
ignorance of the fecundity of the decision and action that what chooses to undertake. I am reminded by a 
presentation Lubomira Radoilska of Kent University made at the University of Johannesburg Philosophy 




responsibility comes because of the fecundity of the ethical welcome in relation to time and 
also the fecundity of action over time.67 For instance, the political decision to welcome 
foreigners and to offer them hospitality is a risk; that is why there is a lot of calculation and 
judgement to help determine entry at the borders.  
 
Hannah Arendt’s (1958) theory of action is my classic example of the fecundity and 
indeterminacy of action. Arendt argues that ‘each actor in his spontaneity and uniqueness is 
capable of doing the unexpected. In doing so he begins a series of actions and reactions all 
along the web of relationships with consequences such as none can predict. Action is not 
fully under the control of the actor. It has a tragic dimension in that one cannot tell in advance 
how it will unfold….’ (Arendt 1958).68  “Nevertheless, Arendt did not disregard the moral 
dimension of political action. Knowing that the trajectory of action is unpredictable, Arendt 
relied on the human capacity to forgive, the power to make and keep promises, the ability to 
think, and the capacity to judge. These were, in her view, the moral resources available to 
political actors in their public capacity, the faculties through which they could set some limit 
to action (d’Entreves 1994).69 
 
It is in view of the fecundity and indeterminacy of action that I propose a calculus of 
responsibility as a tool for making necessary comparisons, calculations, and in general, for 
making judgements and strategies for implementing responsibility-in-action. My submission 
is that since Levinas’s theory of political responsibility is premised on calculation, the 
utilitarian calculus is best suited to try and calculate, as far into the future as possible, the 
                                                          
67 Man’s capacity to postulate and predict future state of affairs based on a present situation is at most guess 
work, hence it is a risk. 
68 Adapted from my unpublished Master of Arts dissertation on ‘The Relevance of Hannah Arendt’s Concept of 
Freedom for African Political Thought, 2011), page 99 
69 Adapted from my unpublished Master of Arts dissertation on ‘The Relevance of Hannah Arendt’s Concept of 




fecundity of responsibility in action, its extent, its purity, its propinquity, and so on. For 
instance, some Levinas scholars have expressed disappointment with Levinas’s permission of 
violence and killing as political means of responding to the demand of the ethical relation 
(see Caygill 2002 and Wolff 2011). What is at stake in calculation responsibility in action in 
this particular scenario is the fecundity (or the power to reproduce) of the evil, or action, done 
to the Other, how many Others are affected (extent), how long is its effect (duration), and so 
on. Thus, one can appreciate a temporary disregard of the primordial relation of responsibility 
with the offender if that is the only means possible to bring about justice for the offended and 
for humanity. It is permissible to do injustice to one Other (who is the definite cause of harm 
and injustice to many Others), in order to restore the values of humanity that Levinas’s 
community of fraternity stands for. Failure to punish injustice is a failure to uphold the values 
of humanity. It collapses the whole edifice of what it means to be human, and the meaning of 
ethics in general.  
 
This is not to say, however, as Wolff (2011)70 suggests, that ‘the means of ethical conduct 
interferes with the original ethical meaning and as such is part of it’ (p. 155). The means, or 
the execution, of ethical responsibility is not part and parcel of ethical responsibility. In this 
case, actually killing someone is not part and parcel of what Levinas means by the ethical 
demand: ‘thou shall not kill.’ The actual killing of someone seems to go against the demand 
‘thou shall not kill.’ Yet, in certain circumstances justice (political justice as opposed to 
ethical justice) demands that someone be killed indeed. Killing is not part of the meaning of 
the ethical. In fact, killing has come about because someone has violated the meaning of the 
ethical, and there is nothing in the realm of the ethical that can repair that violation. This is 
                                                          
70 This is also Fagan’s (1999) argument that for Levinas, the ethical includes the unethical. Just as with Wolff 
(2011), this argument comes from the failure to separate the ethical welcome from political welcome. For 




why Levinas argues that the political order (with its systems punishment and reward) exists 
not necessarily because man is a beast to his neighbour but in order to nurture and defend the 
relation of responsibility that exists between one person and another (Hand 1989: 247). 
 
In the next section, I present a literature review followed by a defence of my argument for 
this chapter, its objections, and my replies. 
 
5.2 Literature Review and Context 
 
5.2.1 Levinas on Politics and Justice 
The most obvious discussion of politics in Levinas’s work is the preface to Totality and 
Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1961:21). Levinas suspects that the Western tradition of 
morality, or ethics, has duped mankind (p. 21). Indeed, how can one trust the eternal 
institutions and obligations, and the unconditional imperatives, when the very thing (the 
human) that gives them justification is stripped off its authority? In Chapter Two above, I 
stated that it is the face of the human being that justifies ethics. Ethical principles and 
imperatives exist because man is proximally related to another in responsibility. It is this 
relatedness that comes before language and institutions that define and justify the ethicality of 
any ethical or political principle. If, for instance, killing is wrong according to Kant’s 
categorical imperative or Bentham’s hedonistic calculus, the wrongness of the killing has 
meaning not because of the motives or consequences of the action as Kant or Bentham would 
say, but only because man is related to another through the primordial relation of 





There seems to be an unspoken and an unwritten obligation to regard and protect the Other 
person by reason of their frailty and vulnerability. Consequently, the ethicality of an action 
(that is, its rightness and wrongness) is defined by its adherence or non-adherence to that 
obligation. ‘Ethical’, hence, describes an action that tends to recognise and protect the Other 
person’s vulnerability, and conversely unethical would describe an action that does not 
recognise and does not protect the Other person’s vulnerability. The human person is first and 
foremost frail, vulnerable and helpless, and not rational as it has been supposed. Rationality 
does not define humanity. In my study, and as I endeavour to show in this chapter, rationality 
is a tool at the hands of man, to enable man calculate and discharge responsibility for the 
Other. While a tool can say much about its user, it does not define what the user is.  
 
Frailty also defines human dignity (See Chapter Two above). To dignify someone is to 
respect the fact of their frailty and vulnerability. In Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas 
argues that destitution, which comes forward as face, is an authority and a command. It is my 
view that the destitution that Levinas talks about is the fact of frailty and helplessness of 
human beings. This is what I have in mind when Levinas says the face speaks, or the face is a 
saying. What does it command or what does it say? It is in itself and of itself the command 
‘thou shalt not kill’. In other words, frailty or destitution begs for recognition and protection. 
Hence, thou shalt not kill does not only mean physically killing someone, but the failure to 
recognise someone’s destitution and to protect it, to further expose it and leave it even more 
vulnerable. Killing is, essentially, the failure to recognise someone’s humanity. 
 
Levinas is fully aware of the practical realm of human interaction. So, whether people are 
fighting each other or not, whether they use each other as means or not, whether they are at 




obtains between one man and another. It ‘stands behind practical morality, …and continues 
to exist even when it is severely damaged.’ A state of war, for instance, suspends morality 
and renders it derisory (p. 21). It appears that no amount of ethics and ethical principles can 
stop war. This is why Levinas would say that ‘the ethical emerges as a fragile response to 
political horror (Caygill 2002: 2).  
 
By reference to the permanent possibility of war, Levinas offers an unusual definition of 
politics: ‘the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means’ (1961: 21). The context 
of this statement appears to be his reflection on the political climate of his time. War and 
politics are perfectly identical, and reason is their handmaid. For Levinas, there cannot be 
peace without war. Actually, ‘it is irresponsible to speak of peace without war, or to imagine 
peace as cessation of war. War is inextricable from peace; violence is inextricable from 
ethics’ (Caygill 2002; 3).  
 
Thus far, ethics contradict politics as war. The two are mutually exclusive. However, there is 
a sense in which politics in the thought of Levinas is necessary. In order to uncover this 
sense, I discuss the concept of politics as justice. To my mind, Levinas distinguishes between 
politics as war and politics as justice, which characterises the political philosophy that 
Levinas envisions. 
 
There are two different meanings of the concept of justice in Levinas’s work, which should 
not be taken for granted. In Totality and Infinity (1961), ‘ethics’ is synonymous with ‘justice’ 
(see Bernasconi and Wood 1988: 171). The word ‘ethical’ and the word ‘just’ are the same 
word, the same question, the same language. When Levinas uses the word ‘justice,’ there it is 




Ben-Pazi:2016). Later on, in the same Totality and Infinity (1961: 212ff), when Levinas 
addresses the question of the third party, he places ethics in opposition to justice (see 
Bernasconi and Wood 1988: 174). Politics contradicts ethics. The contradiction comes with 
the third party who are present in the ethical encounter. It is the third party that gives birth to 
the question of politics as justice. It is because of the contradiction of the third party that the 
asymmetry between the responsible subject and the Other gets evened out, and the subject 
also becomes a bearer of rights.  Again, it is because of this contradiction that the third party 
also gets attention as equally vulnerable subjects, something they could not demand on their 
own (see Chapter Three above). Justice is now inseparable from the politics. 
 
For Levinas, the third party is an important feature of the question of justice. The third party 
introduces a limit to responsibility and allows the birth of the question of justice (Critchley 
1999: 231). I have discussed the third party in detail in Chapter Three above. What is 
important for now is to emphasize that by limiting responsibility and erasing asymmetry 
Levinas is not doing away with asymmetry as such. He is in fact adding something to the 
equation of responsibility. Because of the third party, ‘one is not just dutiful, but can also 
demand rights’ (p. 231). The one who is responsible for Others can also demand 
consideration, this is justice. Where ethical responsibility was the ‘surplus of one’s duties 
over one’s rights’, then the order of justice is one in which rights override duties (p. 231). 
However, my view is that according to Levinas, the dominance of rights over duties does not 
in any way relegate one’s duties to triviality. Levinas insists that justice is not a betrayal of 
ethics. ‘The justified Said, unlike the unjustified said of ontology, maintains within itself the 
trace of the Saying. This is why I talk about a singular intentionality towards the Good, in 
chapter Two above. The relationship between ethics and politics is an unstable relationship, 




continuous process spells hope for human communities, since as Levinas says ‘we seek a 
better justice.’ It is only political arrangements such as totalitarianism that can halt the 
movement of the Saying, at which point it would be said that the saying is reduced to 
ontology. 
 
The passage from ethics to politics in Levinas’s thought is synonymous with the move from 
responsibility to question (Critchley 1999:220). It is not a passage of time (p. 227). Politics is 
therefore a space of questioning. Politics begins as ethics (P. 225). The political space is 
based on the irreducibility of ethical transcendence, where the community takes on meaning 
in difference without reducing difference (p. 225). Hence, asymmetry in symmetry (see 
Chapter Three above, page 36). Levinasian politics is an enactment of plurality – a 
symmetrical community of equals (p. 226). 
 
According to Critchley, ethics and politics in Levinas are simultaneous. The relation to the 
Other (the Saying) is at the same time the setting forth of a common world (p 226). The 
response to the singularity of the Other’s face is at the same time a response to the prophetic 
word that makes the community a communality –which is also known as human fraternity. 
Critchley names this simultaneity of relations as the double bind. The community of 
‘brothers’ is bound around the double bind. It involves individuals whose logical status is not 
reducible to the status of ultimate differences in a genus. In other words, each individual is 
unique. Their uniqueness has nothing to do with the differences in a genus. As I showed in 
Chapter Two above, the call to responsibility is an event that individuates and distinguishes 
an ethical subject. Ethical subjectivity and responsibility cannot therefore be delegated. It also 
involves the commonness of a father, as though the commonness of race would not bring 




monotheism, which signifies human kinship. Individuals who make up the human fraternity 
are in fact ethical subjects born of the ethical encounter with the Other. This is why Levinas 
talks about the commonness of a father, because the commonness of race cannot bind 
individuals together close enough. Herodotus once said that ‘for without some strong bond, 
there is little of security to be found in men’s covenants’ (Chambers 1899:37).71 For Levinas, 
the commonness of race on its own is not strong enough to bind people together. But 
fraternity offers a stronger bond than men’s covenants founded on the fact of race.  
 
Critchley (1999) provides a more convincing account of the relationship between ethics and 
politics in Levinas than Critchley (2004), in which Critchley casts suspicion on Levinas’s 
ideas of monotheism and fraternity among others (see page 174). In this latter work, Critchley 
takes monotheism for belief in the One God of Israel or Christianity. Yet in 1999, Critchley 
argues that Monotheism ‘signifies human kinship –the idea of a human race that refers back 
to the approach of the Other in the face, in a dimension of height, in responsibility for oneself 
and for the Other,’ (1999:227). In this text, monotheism has nothing to do with belief in the 
Christian God. Besides, Levinas argues that his constant reference to God in his writings has 
nothing to do with the Christian God. For him, God refers to illeity, which is the commanding 
authority of the face of the Other (see chapter Three above page 27). Critchley (2004) uses 
Levinas’s phrase, ‘thanks be to God: I am an Other for Others’, in Otherwise Than Being 
(1974:158) as evidence of the presence of the monotheistic God as a mediator for the ethical 
relation. Yet for Levinas, in the context of the quote above, the ‘thanks’ is due to God indeed, 
and not to the third party, that the self can also be cared for as the Other. I have shown in 
Chapter Three above that as the Other in its own right, the self has a face and for this reason 
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it is the trace of God as illeity in its face that can command responsibility, or care for the self 
as the Other. This is the beginning of political justice, which Levinas defines as the ‘incessant 
correction of asymmetry of proximity, where the self becomes the Other’s equal – for 
Levinas, equality in itself is idealistic and unattainable. The only possible equality is the 
equality of responsibility. Every person is responsible for the Other, in as much as some 
Other is responsible for him or her. 
The idea of a community of fraternity in Levinas has been criticised by Critchley 2004 as 
tending towards fundamentalism, even though Critchley does not put it in these words. 
Levinas’s ideal and just political community is Israel (Critchley 2004: 175, 176).  Levinas’s 
own statement that ‘humanity consists of the Bible and the Greeks. All the rest can be 
translated. All the rest is dance’ (p. 176) further complicates Levinas’s political theory. So, 
what happens to that group of people who do not subscribe and convert to Judaism or 
Christianity? Are these the enemies that we find in Otherness? Any mention of religious 
fundamentalism raises the fear of violence and genocides that continue to claim the lives of 
millions of people. And Levinas’s politics permits violence to those outside of the fraternity. 
My understanding of Levinas’s political theory is not in the line of fundamentalism and 
violence against those who reject the political exemplar of Israel. I expound on this in the 
next section. 
 
5.2.2 Caygill on the Violence of Levinas’s Political Theory 
In his book, Levinas and the Political (2002), Howard Caygill discusses the basis of the 
omnipresence of war and violence that underlies Levinas’s political theory. Caygill 
undertakes this discussion after a radio broadcast in which Levinas participated following the 





“In that broadcast, Levinas revealed a coolness of political judgement that verged on the 
chilling, an unsentimental understanding of violence and power almost worthy of 
Machiavelli. The ruthless political clarity that could claim ‘in alterity we can find an enemy’ 
was not what I expected from the philosopher I had been taught to regard as the thinker of 
ethical alterity… (Caygill 2002: 1). 
 
Caygill (2002:3) reiterates Levinas’s words in Totality and Infinity (1961) that peace is not a 
cessation of war –peace issues from war and rests on war (p.22). So, what sort of political 
responsibility can be said of Levinas’s political theory? In the above quotation, Caygill’s 
thought about Levinas’s political theory is clear: Machiavellian. But, is it fair for Caygill in 
this context to compare the ruthlessness of Machiavelli to Levinas? Even to put them side by 
side? What does Levinas mean that by his statement that ‘in alterity we can find an enemy?’ 
Is this enemy to be found in alterity a personal enemy? Whose enemy is it? 
 
 
My preoccupation in this section is to point out that the question of political responsibility in 
Levinas is straightforward, yet is the most misunderstood. Why? For the most part, politics is 
associated with violence. And as Caygill rightly says, Levinas is well known as a philosopher 
of the Other person, putting the Other first before considerations of self. Hence, to think that 
violence against the Other and even killing, can brood in such a self-less person is 
unthinkable. Did Levinas advocate non-violence as others have thought him to have done? 
Not at all. Neither did he advocate violence for its own sake. Regardless of the fact that 
Levinas’s thinking is, as Caygill observes, aligned with political horror, it is not political 
horror as such that motivates his permission of violence in politics. Rather, it is the fact that 
‘in the real world there are many Others. When Others enter problems arise’ (Otherwise Than 




conditions, as Caygill states in Katz, E. et al (2005: 85-100). Levinas argues that it is politics 
that is a response to ethics, and not vice versa. It is true, however, that his ethics was born in a 
specific political climate.  
 
Nazi Socialism provided the atmosphere that brought about Levinas’s thinking about the 
meaning of life and what it means to be human, and whether the politics of the day nurtured 
that meaning. Levinas’s ethics has destitution of human beings as its point of reference. What 
makes an action ethical is, to my mind, its tendency to alleviate destitution, and conversely 
what makes an action unethical is its tendency to augment destitution. In this regard, anything 
that militates against the human and what the human stands for is an enemy of humanity. In 
other words, anything that diminishes the wellbeing of the human is an enemy of the 
wellbeing of the human. Similarly, anything that diminishes the welfare of the human does 
injustice to humanity. It is in this light that I understand Levinas’s reference to enemies. And 
it is this enemy of justice for the human that Levinas is willing to suspend the relation of 
responsibility with in order to mete out justice for humanity.  Levinas is quick to say that the 
suspension is not permanent, but temporary. For the reason that justice demands restoration 
of proximity with offenders. 
 
Levinas also cautions that men are not only the victims of injustice, they are also the 
perpetrators (Meister 2008:223). For this reason, and from Levinas’s point of view, 
responsibility in the realm of politics does not preclude war and violence. Perpetrators of 
injustices should be punished, but always with the awareness that perpetrators of injustices 
are still human, they have an ethical face which forbids killing. I have shown in Chapter Two 
above, that ignoring injustices militates against the foundation and justification of the human 




the pursuit of justice should not be detached from morality. The motivation for justice –for 
punishment by violence and war, should be morality or ethics itself, otherwise such 
unjustified punishment can produce tyranny. Justice indifferent to its own moral motivation 
breeds tyranny, and also morality without justice produces injustice (Huett and Goodman 
2012:86 quoting Cohen 1989). For Levinas, justice remains justice only in a society where 
there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains 
the impossibility of passing by the closest (Huett and Goodman 2012:86).  
 
5.2.3 Wolff on Political Irresponsibility in Levinas  
In a similar wave of disappointment with Levinas’s pronouncements on politics as that of 
Caygill above, Wolff (2011) argues that there is an irresponsibility that is involved in 
Levinas’s idea of responsibility when it takes the form of politics. Wolff centres his argument 
around Levinas’s proposition that ‘there are always at least three people. As soon as there are 
three people the ethical relation to the other becomes political.’ It is because of this statement 
that Wolff argues for the urgency and the primacy of the political relation in Levinas.  
 
In his assessment of the political implications of Levinas’s philosophy, Wolff exposes the 
perilous nature of this undertaking by contrasting Jean-Luc Marion’s and Robert 
Bernasconi’s readings of Levinas’s ethics (p. 143). According to Wolff’s reading, Marion 
argues that the Other is universal, non-particular, humanity behind the particularities of the 
individual person. The Other, after having torn the self from the anonymous flux of being, is 
swallowed up by the anonymity of humanity without qualities. The face of the Other cannot 
say of whom it is the face, since it speaks only in the name of a trans-individual humanity. 
Ethical anonymity translates into neutralising the Other, and that the identity of the ethical 




respond to the Other in the same way as everybody else (p. 148). For Wolff, Marion’s 
reading obscures the possibility of making singularising exceptions in order to call the 
neutrality of the law to greater justice. 
In contrast to Marion, Wolff presents Bernasconi’s argument for a particularistic conception 
of Levinas’s face of the Other. Levinas’s alleged non-specificity of the face of the Other 
actually manifested as a continuity with abstract humanism and its complicity with 
homogenisation. Instead of the Other’s alterity being devoid of any content, Levinas 
sometimes universalised a Western or Jewish cultural identity, in such a way as to make 
either of them the measure of the humanity of the Other, or humanity itself. In other words, 
the alterity of the Other has a content, determined amongst others by that person’s cultural 
and ethnic specificity (p. 149).  Wolff is unsure if, indeed, as Bernasconi says, Levinas allows 
the cultural particularity of the Other and the self as instructive in ethical consideration, and 
in the interaction with the plurality of Others (p. 150). But what is clear is that Levinas’s 
comments about other cultures are questionable in view of his well-known description of the 
Other as ‘context independent’.  
 
Thus, faced with the two readings, Marion’s context-independent alterity on the one hand, 
and Bernasconi’s context-dependent alterity on the other hand, Wolff considers the 
probability that Levinas’s theory of justice opens up the matter to the entire spectrum of 
possibilities between the two extremes. He notes Levinas’s concession that even when the 
context-independent alterity of the singular other is maintained, the identity and specificity of 
the Other come into play once the subject is obliged to compare the plurality of others: as 
soon as there is plurality, the subject’s eyes are opened to the particularity of the suffering of 
the Other (Wolff 2011: p. 150). Yet, ethical responsibility has not been made dependent on 




stage in the execution of one’s responsibilities to others, any single other (whatever that 
person’s identity or condition might be) could and does make an appeal to one’s 
responsibility, i.e., puts into question the manner in which I respond to the multiplicity of 
others and thus calls me either to greater attention to the particularity of some or to the 
greater equality of everybody. For this reason, Levinas’ subject could be an imperialist or 
anarchist, a liberal or a revolutionary – provided that such a conviction is justified with 
reference to the efficiency of serving the others.   
 
Wolff’s conclusion from the two readings is that the plurality of responsibilities of Levinas’s 
subject generates the problem of the indeterminate status of justice. All the others lay their 
claims on the subject – a multitude of contemporaneous and equally valid claims. The 
problem for the subject is now in the distribution of her loyalty, efforts, means beyond the 
one other to all the others, that is anybody else on the planet (I have addressed this 
misconception in Chapter Three below). 
 
To my mind, Marion’s context-independent and Bernasconi’s context-dependent descriptions 
of the face of the Other are problematic in the manner that Wolff reads them. The problem is 
that putting them side by side shows that they are descriptions of the same event of the ethical 
welcome. Yet the two refer to two different events, and it is for this reason that I suggest that 
the readings are complementary. Bernasconi’s context-dependence complements Marion’s 
context-independence. In other words, context-dependence is a way of responding justly to 
the context-independent imperative. Context-dependence names the strategy and the means 
of the administration of justice, which has been necessitated by the face of the Other, which is 




betrayal through which justice or the uprightness of the face, which is context-independent, 
comes to pass. 
 
In a book chapter ‘Who is my neighbour? Who is the Other? Questioning the Generosity of 
Western Thought,’ (Katz 2005), Robert Bernasconi also picks up Levinas’s political 
insensitivity (see Bazzano 2016 below), especially his seeming ‘refusal’ to identify the 
Palestinian as the Other for Israel. Unlike Wolff’s reference, above, to Bernasconi as 
advocating a context-dependent notion of the Other, Bernasconi in this chapter, shows that 
Levinas bluntly refused to apply the discourse of alterity to cultural or ethnic designations (p. 
10). Bernasconi points out that the discourse of alterity, in Levinas, is not confined to any 
particular culture at all, not even to Israel. To my mind, alterity is, so to speak, a universal 
concept. Bernasconi cites Levinas’s reply to the most quoted radio interview with Shlomo 
Malka, in which Levinas clearly said that his definition of Otherness was quite different from 
what Malka was insinuating. Hence, Levinas’s statement that the Palestinian is not the Other 
for Israel. Levinas’s definition of the Other is not culturally determined. His definition of the 
Other transcends cultural specificities. So, there is nothing special for the Palestinian to be 
Other for Israel more than the Chinese or the African. Otherness is not determined by culture 
or geographical proximity. Bernasconi argues that ‘Levinas, one can say initially, attempts to 
look beyond ethnic categories. This is not to deny that a Palestinian might be the Other for a 
Jew, but it excludes the possibility that the Other of the Jew is the Palestinian as such’ (p. 10). 
‘When Levinas wrote that “the Other is what I myself am not,” he did not want that 





5.2.4 Bazzano on Levinas’s Political Insensitivity 
Manu Bazzano (2016), Bernasconi and Wolff above, argues that Levinas was politically 
insensitive, and that his thought tends towards political relativism. Bazzano (2016) shows 
that, for instance, when Levinas was asked about the relation between the West and Islam, he 
replied that ‘I often say, although it’s a dangerous thing to say publicly, that humanity 
consists of the Bible and the Greeks. All the rest can be translated, all the rest – all the exotic 
– is dance, (p. 32). Bazzano interprets this statement to mean that ‘real culture and 
civilization belong to Athens and Jerusalem. The rest is primitive, uncivilized, irrational. 
There is no logos in cultures that do not inherit or endorse the legacy of Hellenic philosophy 
or the religious and ethical insights of the Bible’ (ibid, p. 32). Bazzano’s interpretation puts 
Levinas at par with Eurocentric thinkers like Kant, Hegel, Marx, and others who thought 
Europe and the West is the exemplar of humanity proper (see Tsenay Serequeberhan’s The 
Critique of Eurocentrism and the Practice of African Philosophy).72 Levinas’s Eurocentric 
statement was not an isolated slip of the tongue. Bazzano (2016) further records Levinas’s 
comments on ‘the discussion on Asia and the Russo-Chinese debate at the time of 
Khrushchev’s visits to the West (p. 33). Levinas says of the Chinese: ‘The yellow peril! It is 
not racial, it is spiritual. It does not involve inferior values; it involves a radical strangeness, a 
stranger to the weight of its past, from which there does not filter any familiar voice or 
inflection, a lunar or Martian past, (Bazzano 2016: 33, Caygill 2002:161.184). To add to the 
list, Bazzano adds Levinas’s failure ‘to gaze into the face of the Palestinian and draw from 
their vulnerability and their hopeless, wretched condition’ an appropriate ethical response. It 
is for the same reason that Caygill 2002 is shocked with Levinas’s response to the Palestinian 
question. Levinas, unambiguously retorted that (at that point, or in the context of the 
question) the Palestinian is not the Other for the Israeli (Caygill 2002: 192). 
                                                          





What the foregoing literature survey shows is a deep relativism and in some case 
Eurocentrism at the heart of Levinas’s idea of the real-world, the practical everyday world. It 
appears that his description of the Other as context-independent apparently contradicts his 
application of the same to practical situations. Levinas’s Other seems to be context-
dependent. Levinas’s Otherwise Than Being (1974) gives us an idea of whether the 
Eurocentric charge against him is valid or not. Levinas argues that ‘in language,73 as Said 
(that is, linguistic systems and ontology) everything is translated in front of us at the price of 
treason (Wolff 2011:24). In his description of ethics, and especially the face of the Other, 
Levinas says that the face is not physical. The face that he describes does not have a nose. In 
fact, when one becomes aware of a nose, and the complexion of the Other, then they have 
moved beyond ethics. In the same way, his comments about the yellow peril, the Chinese, 
Africa, and so on are not ethical. Why does Levinas say that translation in the realm of the 
Said happens at the price of treason? In my view, Levinas’s statement is consistent with his 
ethics. In his ethics, he argues that any translation or classification of the Other into 
categories betrays the divinity and infinity of the face. It is unfaithfulness to the face to face 
relation. In Otherwise Than Being (1974), Levinas argues that ‘to subordinate the Saying to 
the Said is to ask for its manifestation,’ (p. 6). Manifestation of the Saying is betrayal of the 
face of the Other. In Totality and Infinity (1961:256-258), Levinas states that the Other is an 
evanescent. It refuses to be known. It is essentially hidden. It throws itself towards the light 
yet refuses to be known or grasped. It appears without appearing (profanation). It is for these 
reasons that Levinas argues that the face of the Other, as Saying, cannot be translated or 
classified, since translation is premised on knowledge. And knowledge depends of 
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manifestation or appearance – to come forward. Therefore, for one to be able to say that this 
Other is yellow or is Chinese, African, they have moved to classification. But, in the spirit of 
Levinas’s ethics, classification for its own sake is unethical. Nevertheless, the administration 
of justice to the Other in her uniqueness, requires classification – putting the Other on the 
spot, exposing her vulnerability and destitution, and this seems to be the only way to 
responds to the Other’s particular needs. Otherwise translation for the sake of translation is, 
as Levinas puts it, treason. 
 
5.3 Defence of Thesis statement 
The above literature review has shown some level of disappointment with Levinas’s political 
theory. My argument however is that the disappointment stems from an incomplete 
understanding of Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. I have shown in Chapter 2 above 
that ethical responsibility is a movement of desire towards the Good, and the passage is 
through the human person. Levinas emphasises the humanity of the human as the basis for 
doing good and upholding the good for the sake of preserving the value of humanity. I have 
also shown in Chapter Two that if for instance someone harms another person, the harm is 
committed against the humanity if the person, hence the victimiser is an enemy of fraternity. 
When such a person is punished, that is violence, but the violence comes in to atone, if at all, 
the crime against humanity, and to restore the humanity in the victimised, to assure them that 
the rest if the fraternity of human beings is against such crimes.  
 
The argument I defend in this section is that ethical responsibility, though non-epistemic, 
uncovers the epistemic dimension of responsibility, one of whose derivatives is political 
responsibility. Political responsibility enables the approximation of justice. It is for this 




in this work, used synonymously with justice. According to Morgan (2007), ‘Levinas leads us 
to believe that [ethical] responsibility is both the ground from which moral principles and 
political institutions are derived and the standard for judging such rules and institutions…. 
[Political] responsibility for others in a social world requires judgment, decision, language, 
thought, and much else’ (p. 246).  
 
The structure of my defence section is four-fold: first, I discuss what I call the Penultimacy of 
(j)ustice; second, is the Problem of Evil; third, is Calculating Responsibility; and fourth and 
last, is Defining Political Responsibility. 
 
5.3.1 The Problem of Evil – Useless Suffering  
The experience of pain and suffering is an inescapable fact of human existence. As soon as a 
human being is separated into existence, pain and suffering become part and parcel of what it 
means to be human. But every human being desires a life that is free from pain and suffering.  
St Augustine (c. 354-430 AD), argued that evil is not something (positive) but the privation 
of goodness. He further believed that existence is a perfection, hence being and goodness are 
identical. Therefore, it follows for Augustine that nothing is wholly evil, otherwise it would 
cease to exist. In other words, there is nothing like evil in itself. Evil can be divided into 
moral and natural evils. Moral evil comes from human will. But humans have no control over 
natural evils such as tsunamis and earthquakes.   
 
The question of man’s capability for moral evil is undeniable. As far back as the biblical 
character of Cain, the history of nations is marred by bloodshed and indescribable political 
horror. Arendt (1954) has observed that ‘whereas the Greek experience of wonder was rooted 




horror at what humans are capable of – speechless horror at what man may do and what the 
world may become,’ (Birmingham 2006: 7).  
 
As far as Emmanuel Levinas is concerned, evil is in the nature of being itself (Moran 2000: 
333-336). In Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas uses the il y a (there is) to describe the 
impersonal nature of being. In experiencing being, man feels glued to existence, without any 
hope of freeing himself. It is this suffocating embrace that names the pain of being (ibid, 
Moran 2000). For Levinas, man longs for an escape from the hold of being. Guided by the 
Platonic formula that situates the Good beyond and outside of Being, Levinas argues that the 
movement which leads an existent toward the Good is not a transcendence but a departure 
from Being and from the categories that describe it (Levinas’s Preface to Existence and 
Existents 1947). Being as such has no room for difference, everything is the same. The 
suffocating embrace that forbids any room for difference and identity is a pain in itself. 
 
According to Levinas, all evil refers to suffering (Levinas, Useless Suffering, p. 157). 
Levinas is aware of the social utility of suffering in the pedagogic function of power in 
education, discipline, and repression (ibid, p. 160).74 But Levinas is wary of the unpleasant 
and gratuitous non-sense of pain, which pierces beneath the reasonable uses of suffering (p. 
160). For instance, he refers to the political evils of the twentieth century – the two world 
wars, totalitarianisms, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, genocides. Among 
these events, the Holocaust, Levinas argues, seems to be the paradigm of gratuitous human 
suffering where evil appears in its diabolical horror (p. 162). The denial of this martyrdom is, 
for Levinas, pain in its undiluted malignity, it is suffering for nothing (p. 163) –useless 
suffering. What else could explain the justification of the suffering of the other person? 
                                                          




Levinas believes that the inhumanity of our time consists in this. The justification of the 
neighbour’s pain is certainly the source of all immorality (p. 163). For Levinas, to keep quiet 
and pretend nothing happened to the other, is to be an accomplice to the evil committed to the 
other (see p. 164). Levinas asks: is humanity going to abandon the world to useless suffering, 
leaving it to the political fatality of the blind forces which inflict misfortune on the weak and 
conquered (p. 164)? Is it not high time that humanity be inspired by the suffering of the other 
person and pledge endless responsibility for non-useless suffering, which is love? When your 
neighbour attacks another neighbour, what do you do? In this situation, Levinas is ready to 
take up arms to defend his neighbour (see Hand 1989:294). Not doing anything is being an 
accomplice. One cannot say it is not my concern. Levinas proclaims that everyone should be 
concerned about the useless or unwarranted suffering of the Other – repression, the arbitrary 
and failure of justice amidst wars, crimes and oppression of the weak by the strong (p. 160) – 
for the reason that it is a cry for justice.  
 
Presently, as Meister (2005) observes the world community still looks on while neighbours 
commit atrocities against their neighbours? Is the world community doing enough to alleviate 
the unwarranted pain and suffering inflicted upon women and girls who are raped in war torn 
Congo, Central Africa Republic, and South Sudan, to name but a few? How about innocent 
children, men and women who lose their lives? Levinas argues that the inhumanity of our 
time consists, essentially, in ‘looking on,’ in ignoring or pretending that ‘nothing is 
happening’ just because it is not happening to the self.  
 
Levinas’s remark ‘in alterity we can find an enemy’ has been criticised a lot for its 
‘unLevinasian’ tone, yet it is not inconsistent with Levinas’s ethics of endless responsibility 




what or of who? It appears to me that, based on the primordial relationship of responsibility, 
there cannot be personal enemies, but only enemies of responsibility; or rather, as we will see 
later on, enemies of justice. This new understanding is consistent with the overall framework 
of Levinas’s ethics as a movement towards the good, or justice. To use one of Levinas’s 
phrases, ‘when the other attacks another,’ what the attacker is attacking refers to, and 
represents, the whole of humanity. When a person is attacked, they are attacked in their 
destitution, or because of their destitution. Their destitution and helplessness are exposed. 
Levinas shows that the destitution of the other is the destitution of all the others. 
 
This is why Levinas talks of the honour of responsibility, that even though one is not directly 
involved or present at the conflict, even though one is not guilty, ‘what gripped us right away 
was the honour of responsibility’ (Hand 1989:290). By attacking another, one is indirectly 
attacking all the others, one is attacking himself also, since he belongs to the category of ‘all 
the others.’ And since destituteness cries out for (and is a demand for) justice, by attacking 
another, one is an enemy of justice. Hence, ‘in otherness we can find an enemy.’  
 
5.3.2 The Penultimacy of (j)ustice  
What I show in this section is that justice with a small j is what can be approximated in 
politics. Justice with a capital J, which is synonymous with the Good, is unattainable. In their 
article, ‘On the Paradox of the Political/Transcendence and Eschatology: Trans-immanence 
and the Promise of Love in Jean-Luc Nancy,’ authors Schalk Hendrik Gerber and Willem 
Lodewikus van der Merwe ask the questions ‘what is to be thought at the end or closure of 
the metaphysical tradition? What is its relation to the political? The authors examine the 
question by focussing on Jean-Luc Nancy and others. Emmanuel Levinas is an important 




Levinas’s idea of ethics as transcendence culminates, and is fulfilled, in the political. But 
unlike Nancy and others for whom the political marks the end of transcendence, Levinas 
thinks otherwise. The fulfilment of transcendence in the political does not denote the end of 
transcendence. By its very nature, transcendence as the saying cannot have a concrete 
terminus.  
 
In Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas states that transcendence is conscience, and 
conscience accomplishes metaphysics (that is if metaphysics consists in transcending) 
(1961:261). In the same work Levinas says that ‘transcendence is time goes unto the Other. 
The Other is not a term, [it] does not stop the movement of Desire’ (1961:269). ‘The Other 
that Desire desires is Desire. Desire is accomplished in transcending itself, in engendering 
Desire’ (ibid, 269). What this means, therefore, is that transcendence continues to interrupt 
the politics as justice. The continual interruption generates the need to go beyond politics 
(and justice). Once the new culmination point is reached, the need for a better one arises. In 
his article, ‘Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity’ (1957), Levinas shows that the movement 
that leads to transcendence in the movement of Desire, and Desire desires the Good (as 
goodness or as justice). For Levinas, this is not a desire to be satiated, for the reason that it is 
not a hunger for food. It does not desire fulfilment or satisfaction. In other words, it cannot be 
satisfied. Hence, transcendence as Desire cannot terminate in the political. I think this is 
where Levinas surpasses the others. The continual search or movement towards the Good – in 
the concrete terms of better justice, better political organisation, better laws, etc, spell hope 
for more peaceful and more just human societies. The progress of human society rest in part, 
at least according to my reading of Levinas, on this unquenchable desire for the Good – the 




In order to appreciate the penultimacy of justice in Levinas, I refer back to question of the 
enemy or enemies that Levinas raises in connection with the problem of the third party – in 
alterity we can find an enemy – (see section 5.2.2. above). My view is that there is no 
possibility of ‘personal’ enemies, in Levinas’s idea of a political community that is 
constituted by the relation of responsibility, for the reason that the political subject, as a 
being-for-the-other (since once the self takes up responsibility, or cedes its being-for-itself for 
other, it does not return to the ‘original position’), lives for the other in the community of 
fraternity. The political subject (who is the ethical subject, traumatised-by-the-infinity-of-the-
face, a hostage and a substitute for the other), is now equal to the other by virtue of the trace 
of illeity that underlies the faces all the others. As Levinas emphasises, the community of 
fraternity is not a community of familial relations; it does not name a specific culture, tribe, 
or race, but refers to a community of human beings joined together by the relationship of 
responsibility, which is a seeking after justice for all human beings. Ideally, by virtue of 
having a face, all human beings – just and unjust, the innocent and those in the wrong, all 
belong to the community of fraternity. But whether one has embraced responsibility for the 
other or not, that is another question. And that is all the more reason we need the political 
order with all its calculations. When each self is a being-for-the-other, the justice that each 
one would seek cannot be for-itself, otherwise it would contradict the for-the-other. So, by 
definition justice cannot be self-interested, but always a disinterest, always exterior, always 
otherwise. By being for the other, it does not mean that the self suffers injustice, or that its 
demand for justice is only secondary to that of the other. Justice for the other is in turn justice 
for the self and for all others. It is my view that justice is neither self-contradictory, nor has 





To use Platonic language, (J)ustice is one, and not many. It is for this reason, therefore, that I 
argue for ‘traces or instances of justice.’ The trace of justice can be approximated in a 
specific situation, since it is impossible to arrive at Justice in itself as long as there remains 
the possibility of injustice (Levinas says that human nature is naturally murderous – see 
Wood 2005:61, and that humans are not just the victims, but also the perpetrators, of 
injustices). 
 
Derrida has been particularly eloquent about the impossibility of justice, even though he does 
not use the word ‘justice’, but hospitality. He argues that ‘the trace’ [or the instance, my 
interpretation] is not simply the ‘appearing’ of the impossible [justice] as such, but the 
experience of what is to come but will never come (Anderson 2012:76). In other words, 
justice, in itself, which is justice with a capital J, is impossible, yet it is present in the traces 
or instances of justice. To use Levinas’s language: as desirable (and as wholly other), justice 
draws the self to itself. It is justice through the demand of the face of the other (the desirable) 
that sets in motion the movement of responsibility … the motion is towards justice itself, but 
one cannot empirically arrive at it. In order to clarify the impossibility of arriving at justice in 
itself, let us consider Aristotle’s theory of causality. 
 
Using Aristotle’s theory of causality, justice would be the end or the final cause, which is 
ironically the cause of the other causes. In Otherwise Than Being (1974), Levinas says that 
‘the relationship with exteriority (which is also known as the ethical relation, or obsession, or 
substitution, or transcendence in Totality and Infinity) is ‘prior’ to the act that would effect it 
(1974:101). The anteriority of the relation of proximity is ‘older’ than the a priori, for the 
reason that the obligation, or obsession, is prior to any commitment (ibid). As it were, the 




other that faces the self, is not posterior to the encounter with the other, nor to the 
commitment of the self.  In Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas says that the other that 
Desire desires is Desire, which is accomplished in transcending itself, that is in engendering 
itself (1961:269). Hence, justice is anterior to the encounter with the other, and it is what 
moves the ethical relation towards itself. The movement towards itself, does not grow old, 
nor does it move by addition or multiplication to arrive at itself, but it is forever youthful, it 
renews itself. The movement is a continuation of history, without the production of old age. 
With this idea, Levinas powerfully argues for the possibility of beginning anew, a possibility 
which is inscribed in the encounter with the face of the other (see Arendt 1958 for a 
comparative analysis). Every encounter, and likewise every demand of justice, is a new 
beginning rooted in the gift of giving and the goodness of goodness. The movement towards 
justice is inexhaustible. This is why Levinas uses the term feminine to represent the 
inexhaustible capacity to produce.75 It is without doubt that Levinas uses explicit descriptions 
of the female sex, which have been offensive to both female and male scholars alike. My 
argument, on the contrary, is that, and as Levinas defends himself, the feminine of Levinas’s 
ethics is an analogy. For lack of better terminology, Levinas wants to graphically and 
forcefully describe the inexhaustible potential of the primordial relation of responsibility for 
the Other in the search and actualisation of justice in an unjust world, by the analogy of 
femininity. For instance, he says in Totality and Infinity (1961:258) that ‘the beloved, at once 
graspable but intact in her nudity, beyond object and face and thus beyond the existent, 
abides in virginity. The feminine is essentially violable and non-violable (he says elsewhere 
about the other that it is the only ‘thing’ one would want to kill, yet in which resides the 
impossibility of killing, hence violable and non-violable at the same time); the ‘Eternal 
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Feminine’ is the virgin or an incessant recommencement of virginity, the untouchable in the 
very contact of voluptuosity, future in the present’ (p.258). In his description on ‘the 
dwelling’, Levinas says that ‘the feminine has been encountered in this analysis as one of the 
cardinal points of the horizon in which the inner life takes place – and the empirical absence 
of the human being of the feminine sex in a dwelling nowise affects the dimension of 
femininity which remains open there, as the very welcome of the dwelling’ (1961:158, my 
emphasis). It is clear from this statement that Levinas’s usage of the term ‘feminine’ in his 
description of the ethical encounter with the other does not refer to the feminine sex. As it 
were, the presence or absence of the feminine sex in a dwelling does not affect the femininity 
of the dwelling and its mode of being as the ‘welcome of the dwelling, or the home.’ 
 
Thus far, what it means is that Justice is wholly Other. We cannot arrive at Justice. Arriving 
at Justice in itself would mean arriving at the terminus of the movement of responsibility, 
beyond which movement is no longer possible – out of question, or impossible (not in the 
Derridean sense) and meaningless. That would probably be the city of David that Levinas 
describes, which is the consummation of the good and the just.  
 
Hence, my proposition that justice is forever penultimate – there is always room for better 
justice, better ways of administering justice. This line of thought supports a number of 
theories: firstly, the infinity of justice, or of responsibility as justice. This is why I have 
argued above in response to Wolff (2011) and Fagan (2009) that the thesis of conflicting 
responsibilities for Others is at odds with the thesis of responsibility for justice. The ethical 
subject-cum-political subject does not have plural or infinite responsibilities. There is only 





Secondly, it allows us to respond to Diane Perpich’s question about singular justice (in her 
paper, ‘A Singular Justice: Ethics and Politics Between Levinas and Derrida): ‘can there be 
an abstract principle or law that does justice to the absolute singularity of the Other who faces 
me?’ (1998: 59). There is an abstract principle or law, and because that principle can only be 
experienced in the trace of its withdrawal, it is possible to talk about particular cases. It can 
also be argued that the manner in which the demand for justice shows up is unique (to each 
individual). The face is a unique expression of the demand for justice; hence it calls for a 
particularist application of the abstract principle of justice. Even the laws that enable us 
administer justice are not absolutes, but can be interpreted to mitigate a particular situation.  
 
Thirdly, it allows for progressive thinking about justice in opposition to rigid and inflexible 
laws. Law as a tool for the administration of justice should be progressive in intention, one 
that can be improved upon to best meet the demands of justice. This allows for better justice, 
and this is faithful to Levinas’s idea of ‘responsibility as a movement towards….’ It is not 
surprising therefore that Levinas favoured liberal constitutions of political administration. 
Liberal institutions exemplify the progressivist spirit of laws, which is at the heart of 
Levinas’s movement towards justice. The question whether liberal constitutions really bring 
about justice according to the spirit and the letter of the law it represents, that is debatable, 
and the debate cannot be unpacked in the present work. 
 
5.3.3 Redefining Political Responsibility 
I am of the view that the question that bugged Levinas is: what do we do with such humans 
who refuse to recognise their responsibility for the Other, humans who inflict unwarranted 
suffering on innocent persons? This a critical question for the political community, and it is, 





In response to the question of Israel’s responsibility in view of the massacre at Sabra and 
Chatila, Levinas talks about the honour of responsibility, which constitutes every man’s 
responsibility towards all others. “It is a responsibility which has nothing to do with any act 
that one may really have committed. Prior to any act, I am concerned with the Other, and I 
can never be absolved from this responsibility. To use an expression close to my heart, ‘even 
when he does not regard me, he regards me’” (Hand 1989:290). So, even when two people 
are fighting, they are responsible for each other, that is the relationship of responsibility for 
the other subsists between them. And it does not require them to acknowledge that this 
relation exists. It is for this reason that I think that Levinas’s ethics is not a response to 
politics. Moreover, politics conceived as war is also not a response to Levinas’s ethics. But 
there is a way in which we can think about war in politics, from the vantage point of 
Levinas’s ethics. There is a kind of politics that Levinas desires, a politics that would be a 
direct response to his ethics - a politics that is ethically necessary.  
 
To say that Levinas’s ethics is a response to the political, implies that his ethics is 
necessitated by the political. While it is undeniable that the political happened first (in the 
order of chronology), and then Levinas ‘thought’ about ethics, it is not true that the ethics that 
he thinks about and describes was meant to solve political problems. After all, he says that 
‘his [ethics] is not meant to raise the standard of morals’ (see Hand 1989). Levinas goes 
behind the political events, and wants to understand how human beings are related prior to, 
and even while engaged in, conflict and war. His ethics describes the bond between one 





I now propose a political theory for Levinas, which would be the basis for political 
responsibility.76 I look at: i) Levinas’s views about human nature; ii) his views about social 
and political organisation; iii) his views about right and wrong, punishment and justice; and 
lastly, iv) his views about human rights? 
 
5.3.3.1 Human Nature 
According to Wood (2005), Levinas views human nature as naturally murderous (Wood 
2005: 61). Of course, Levinas, like other political theorists before him, is not oblivious to 
man’s capability of evil, as I have shown above (section 5.3.2). He knows that men are the 
perpetrators of injustices (Meister 2008:223). Levinas also states that ‘man is an unreasonable 
animal (Bernasconi and Wood 1988:172).  Levinas also agrees with Hobbes that man is 
selfish. The selfishness of man is well documented in Western philosophy, according to 
Levinas. The identity of the self consists in identifying itself from within’ (1961: 289). It 
‘refers to itself and maintains itself of itself’ by means of enjoyment (1961: 299). It is in this 
light that Levinas agrees with Heidegger that the self (or Dasein for Heidegger) cares for its 
own being, hence it is chained to its existence (Levinas 1974: xxx).  
 
But Levinas wants to move away from this conception of human nature. In Chapter Two 
above, I have shown that for Levinas, human being is a vulnerability, a pure and passive 
exposure (see section 2.2.3 above). It is sensibility, which presupposes flesh and blood and 
the ability of the human being to feel hungry. What makes the human being human, for 
Levinas, is not, in the final analysis, rationality, nor action (as Arendt would have it), but 
vulnerability. What is existentially true for all humans is that they are all vulnerable and 
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destitute by virtue of being creatures of flesh and blood. The ability to suffer is at the core of 
the definition of what it means to be human.  
 
In her paper, ‘The Primacy of Ethics: Hobbes and Levinas,’ Cheryl Hughes compares 
Hobbes’s view of human nature and human relations with Levinas’s radical description of 
human subjectivity. In contrast to Hobbes, Levinas claims that the ethical relation is prior to 
and takes priority over self-interest, self-preservation, and relations of conflict and 
competition. For Levinas, the human community is built up by the face to face relation and 
the unbounded responsibility of one for another (p. 79). Hughes compares Hobbes’s account 
that moral laws can only be instituted under the security of a political order with Levinas’s 
insistence that ethics cannot be reduced to politics –that infinite responsibility of one for the 
Other is prior to any considerations of prudential reason and does not depend on any social 
conventions or political institutions (p. 80). 
 
5.3.3.2 Social and Political Organisation 
Levinas argues that no one can detangle themselves from society with the Other.  By the fact 
of vulnerability and destitution, the human being needs others. By interacting with others, a 
common world is created. The self has a two-fold relationship with others in this common 
world: i) the self is in an ethical relation with the Other, which is an unequal relation where 
the self is endlessly obligated to ensure the wellbeing of the Other. At the same time, all the 
others are entailed in the destitution of the Other that is in an ethical relation with the self. For 
this reason, and because of the presence of the third party, the self gains the right to be cared 
for just like any Other (see Chapter Three for details). So, there are two contradictory yet 
complementary relations that are at work in the common world: the asymmetrical relation 




The asymmetrical relation of responsibility to the Other takes place in full light of the public 
order. I have argued in Chapter Three above that this places the burden of consistency and 
singularity of purpose on the subject. In other words, it is a call to the subject to be even more 
dedicated to the cause of the Other’s welfare, which is a call to justice for the Other. 
 
Likewise, in Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas states that human beings live as a 
collectivity, in which the self and the Other do not face each Other, but are alongside each 
other (1947:94). Being alongside one another is the reciprocity of civilisation, which implies 
the kingdom of ends where each one is both end and means (ibid, p. 96). What this means is 
that, according to Levinas’s idea of social and political community, the subject is both a 
lawmaker and a law-abiding citizen. The subject is both a lawmaker and subject to the same 
law. This almost like the Kantian idea of the categorical imperative, especially the formula of 
autonomy. It is in this light that I think Levinas’s political idea is that the political condition 
of modern states requires responsible subjects –not responsible in the sense of being 
accountable for their actions, but responsible in the sense of being legislator of just laws and 
at the same time being subject to the same laws. This burden of responsibility calls for 
singularity of intention and dedication to justice for humanity. 
 
I have also shown already that Levinas is aware that in the real world there are many others, 
hence problems arise. This is not a call to a social contract, as it is the case with Hobbes, 
Rousseau, Kant, and others. But a call to respond to the ethical demand of vulnerability and 
destitution. Levinas argues that ‘the political order is not meant to restrict man’s bestiality, 





5.3.3.3. Punishment and Justice 
The permission of punishment has earned Levinas so much criticism that his ethics and his 
idea of politics seem to be incompatible. But, for the reason that in the real world are many 
others, and also for the fact that men are not just the victims but also the perpetrators of 
injustices, Levinas ‘argues that universal pardon is out of the question, and he derides those 
who pine for justice as though they were innocent,’ (Schiff 2008: p. 223). For Levinas, we 
cannot speak of redemption in an unjust world; but the spirit (which is the object of 
redemption) is the proper concern only for the just society (ibid, p. 223).  
 
Accordingly, there is no need to be naïve in the political community and think that all are 
innocent. There is need to be alert to the fact that man can sometimes be unreasonable and 
cause harm to another. For this reason, there is need for a place of defence within the 
framework of unbounded responsibility, and such a defence is politics. But it is a politics that 
is ethically necessary. On this one Levinas sees it fit to qualify ‘politics.’ It is a new politics 
that he is proposing. It is very different from traditional totalitarian politics that he is arguing 
against in his entire scholarly work. Totalitarian politics is not for the sake of responsibility 
for the Other. It is a tyranny since it is not oriented by the ethical relation. Its punishment and 
justice systems do not seek to restore the ethical relation, and more often than not it passes 
the Other by (does not regard the face of the Other). But in Levinas’s mind, ‘justice detached 
from morality, and indifferent to its own moral motivation produces tyranny instead; morality 
without justice produces injustice (Huett and Goodman 2012:86). For Levinas, justice 
remains justice only in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those 
far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest (Huett and 





The state, society, the Law, and power are all necessary for Levinas’s political community. 
Even though the political order negates responsibility for the Other, yet it is responsibility 
that calls it into being (Robbins 2001: 230). Levinas believes that it is in democracy that we 
can find the charitable roots of the political order (ibid, p. 230). While limiting responsibility, 
yet grounded in it, the state can review its laws and its justice systems, which is an effort to 
achieving better laws and even better justice (ibid, p. 230). In Levinas’s sense of the word, 
‘judging justly means to handle the dimension of the objective without forgetting that the 
visible gets calculated only for the purpose to serve the invisible, the unobjectifiable,’ 
(Loidolt 2006). Even though the invisible face has to be objectified and put in classes 
(through the visible body of the Other), Levinas urges that it is for the sake of administering 
justice to the particular Other. And while at it, it is not possible to forget that it is because of 
the face (the vulnerability and destitution that speaks through the face) that justice is being 
sought. Even when justice demands punishment of the Other, it also worthy of note that 
according to Levinas the offender still has a face and is also vulnerable in his body. But a 
temporary disregard of his face enables and empowers the state and the justice system to 
correct the injustice that he caused. This is included in what Levinas means by his statement 
that ‘the third party temporarily suspends the ethical relation with the Other,’ (Levinas 1961: 
212ff). 
5.3.3.4. Human Rights 
The question of human rights has not been discussed extensively in Levinas literature, but it 
is, to my mind, part and parcel of Levinas’s ethics and his vision of political community. 
From the point of view of Levinas’s view of human nature it is clear that human rights, for 
Levinas, is not a mere political instrument. In fact, human rights are founded in the idea of 
respect for the Other: thou shall not kill. This ethical demand underlies humanity itself: that 





In ‘The Good and Its Shadow: The View of Levinas on Human Rights as the Surpassing of 
Political Rationality’, Roger Burggraeve (2005) argues that the appeal of the face (the thou 
shall not kill) forms the first fundamental and minimal demand in terms of rights –the right to 
life, which also implies the right to respect one’s alterity and individuality, (p. 95). For 
Burggraeve, to see a face is to hear the thou shall not kill; and hearing this command means 
doing justice to one’s neighbour and letting them live (ibid, 95). As far as Levinas’s ethics is 
concerned, rights do not begin from the strong ‘I’, but from the weak Other (p. 95). The 
person whose rights are at stake, and we must defend, is first and foremost the Other person. 
Hence, Levinas’s statement that human rights are originally and absolutely the rights of the 
Other (ibid, p. 95). 
 
In my reading of Levinas’s ethics, there is only one human right – the right to recognition, 
which is the same as respect of persons as persons. This right is the foundational, it points to 
the dignity of persons. Levinas says that the face of the Other is frailty and a demand that 
says ‘do not kill!’ ‘Do not kill’ is, an expression of vulnerability (I have shown already that 
vulnerability is the basic human condition). This command is at the same time an entitlement 
to life, which no one has the right to take. Because of this vulnerability, Levinas says that the 
Other is the sole being that one would want to kill. At the same time, it is vulnerability which 
forbids murder. How does one kill someone who is weak and vulnerable, someone who is 
already at a disadvantage? That act is an injustice in itself for the reason that two unequal 
persons are involved (see section 5.3.4. above). The face of the Other authors the demand to 
recognise and respect the Other person. This is the first right, and hence the first act of justice 





From this foundational right, I draw the first derivative, which is the right not to harm the 
Other person in anyway, to let them be human and enjoy their humanity. This particular right 
is relational and reciprocal. While one enjoys their dignity and their corresponding privileges 
and rights, they should likewise respect others. 
 
What is more, my view is that vulnerability of the Other (their body and their entirety) founds 
the celebrated but less understood notion of human dignity. To respect the person of the 
Other is to dignify the Other as human. It is to respect their uniqueness as a human person, 
their alterity as Other, before looking at the shape of their nose or the colour of their hair – 
before assembling them into classes and categories.  
 
The right to recognise and respect the uniqueness of the Other person is the foundational right 
upon which all the human rights codified so far are found.  
 
5.3.4 Calculating Justice 
In this section, my position is that Levinas’s idea of political responsibility is calculable. My 
reference is Levinas’s own admission that when the third ‘comes onto the scene,’ the 
question of calculation is inevitable. There is need to assess and determine who came first. 
Who passes before the Other? More importantly, there is need to ascertain what these have 
already done to each Other? And then, who is wrong? How do we atone for the wrong? In 
Otherwise Than Being (1974), Levinas argues that: 
 
‘Justice is necessary, that is comparison, coexistence, contemporaneous, assembling, order, 
thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in 
intentionality the intelligibility of a system and the intellect and thence also a copresence on 





It is clear to me that Levinas is proposing a method of calculating justice. This calculus of 
justice is premised on comparison (of the incomparable, which is in itself a breach), and 
assembling of faces into classes. What justifies this comparison is the fact of equality, which 
I have already alluded to above – that, thanks to God the self also becomes the Other at the 
presence of the third party. In my reading of Levinas, every human being is equal to every 
Other, by virtue of i) having a face; and ii) by virtue of the uniqueness which calls the self to 
responsibility for the Other. Otherwise, two unequal persons cannot be compared. For 
instance, a minor and an adult cannot be put in the boxing ring to fight each other. Most 
likely the adult will win the fight. Such a fight is an injustice in itself because two unequal 
persons were involved. According to Levinas, justice demands equality of persons to stand 
before a court of justice. Levinas is well aware that equality plays a central role in the 
calculation of justice. At the same time, he wants to maintain the fact that each person is 
unique – both their person and their circumstances are unique, hence his paradoxical, yet 
necessary, statement of comparing the incomparable. 
 
When it comes to administration of justice for the Other, in view of the problem of evil in the 
political community, Levinas’s stance is resolute. He clearly states that: ‘when I speak of 
justice, I introduce the idea of the struggle with evil; I separate myself from the idea of non-
resistance to evil.’77 For Levinas, the demand of justice is a struggle with evil. It is for this 
reason that Levinas is vocal about violence and the need for counter-violence. And, this is the 
reason why there seems to be a gap, or an incompatibility, between his ethics of infinite 
responsibility and his political agitation towards violence (see the critiques of Caygill 2002 
and Wolff 2011, among many others). Nevertheless, Levinas is silent about the practical 
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methodology or tool(s) for determining justice. It is for this reason that very little has been 
said about the idea of a calculus of justice that I propose.  
 
It is also worth noting that Levinas dissociated himself from the burden of concrete rules and 
regulations. In response to a question about whether his ethics is deficient in concern with 
concrete reality, and whether his metaphysics of can actually solve actual ethical problems, 
Levinas underscored the primary importance of the ethical relation over and above politics 
(see Hand 1989: 235). Wolff (2011) adds that ‘[for Levinas], it is hopeless to start 
contemplating the political if the essence of the ethical has not been determined’ (Wolff 
2011:18).  
 
Nevertheless, Levinas argues against a complacent attitude of ‘it doesn’t concern me.’ In 
other words, that the destitution of the Other is not my concern (see the introductory chapter 
above). He is aware that “in the real world there are many others. When others enter, each of 
them external to myself, problems arise. Who is closest to me? Who is the Other? Perhaps 
something has already occurred between them. We must investigate carefully....” (Levinas in 
Hand 1989:247-248). In everyday interactions, regardless of the relation of proximity that 
binds them, people wrong others: they perjure the ‘thou shalt not kill’ by killing other 
people’s initiatives to be who or what they are (recall that to be is an effort), they kill them by 
dominating over them, by actually harming their vulnerable bodies. But in order for 
recognition and protection of vulnerability to come into effect (that is, in order for ethical 
responsibility to translate to reality, to bring it from behind practical morality into the ‘full 
light of the public order’ of the everyday interactions), Levinas agrees with other social and 
political theorists before him that we need political order – that is the state and the 




But it is very important to know whether the state, society, law, and power are required 
because man is a beast to his neighbour or because I am responsible for my fellow. It is very 
important to know whether the political order defines man’s responsibility or merely restricts 
his bestiality. It is very important, even if the conclusion is that all of us exist for the sake of 
the state, the society, the law.” His idea is that the political order will control and punish 
human action that goes against the relation of proximity that binds human beings. The 
political order will ensure that justice is done. Hence, Levinas’s idea is that if the relation of 
proximity would be the structure upon which human society, politics, judicial institutions, 
and so on, are built, our societies would be just and peaceful societies.  
 
But in reality, our institutions and the everyday interactions do not respond to the relationship 
of proximity as Levinas anticipated. And it is specifically for this reason that these 
institutions must be constantly questioned. Levinas’s argument is that politics that is not 
oriented by the relation of proximity is tyrannical, it breeds injustice. It has its own agenda, 
which may have something to do with the welfare of human beings, but that the motivation of 
such an agenda and the means to such an agenda is not oriented by the relation of proximity. 
For instance, punishment of murderers is welcome and desirable to bring justice to victims 
and their families, to deter others from committing similar crimes, but above all murdering 
other people contradicts the statement of vulnerability which underwrites both the victimiser 
and the victim. This strange asymmetry that is created – victimiser versus victim, is at odds 
with the asymmetry that underscores the relation of responsibility. In responsibility, 
asymmetry is due to the fact that one’s duties exceeds their rights in relation to the 
vulnerability of the Other; one is irreplaceable in terms of ‘witnessing’ the speech of the face 
of the other, and for that reason they cannot harm the other in any way even though the other 




to another, which means that everyone is equal in responsibility to any Other. Thus, we find 
the first hint of symmetry within asymmetry.  
 
The presence of the third party corrects the asymmetry of the ethical relation of one to 
another, by insisting that all the others including the one who is approached by the other are 
destitute. Yet as we have seen in the previous chapter, that is not an erasure of the 
asymmetrical relation. Human beings relate with one another asymmetrically and 
symmetrically. The introduction of symmetry by the third party does not annul asymmetry. 
Human interactions on a day to day basis produce more asymmetries, or inequalities. Some of 
which are justified (ethical) yet others are unjustified (unethical). Yet these inequalities are 
unethical, they do not define the relationship of responsibility of one person to another. For 
instance, the asymmetry of victimiser versus victim creates a power relation, which is foreign 
to Levinas’s idea of responsibility. The necessity of the political order comes in to correct the 
strange asymmetries that arise as human beings interact. So, punishment comes in view as the 
correction of asymmetry. But Levinas wants to go beyond punishment and justice to restore 
the relation of proximity that was damaged by the strange asymmetries.  
Calculating justice is not an easy task, neither is it a game of chance. In my reading of 
Levinas, to arrive at justice one has to take a deliberate step: it appears to me that there is a 
way that leads to justice – a way which requires the human faculty of thinking and judging.78  
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freedom today is thoughtlessness. It is precisely when citizens cease to think and thus abdicate their 
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think. Further, Arendt ‘insists that we are free to resist the rationalized injustices of bureaucratic institutions. 
To do so, however, requires that we think. Thinking, the activity of freedom, is the quintessential political 







Critchley (2004), while criticising Levinas’s view of politics, observes that ‘politics is the 
task of invention in relation to the other’s decision in me…every time I decide I have to 
invent a new rule, a new norm, which must be absolutely singular in relation to both the 
other’s infinite demand and the finite context within which this demand arises’ (p. 179, my 
emphasis). Further, Critchley (2004) finds similar sentiments in Derrida (1992) when he 
argues that ‘each decision is like a leap of faith made in relation to the singularity of a 
context’ (Critchley 2004:180). Each political decision, for Critchley, is made experientially 
ex nihilo, and is not deduced procedurally from a pregiven moral content (p. 180). It is the 
demand provoked by the Other that calls for political invention.  
 
Critchley’s idea of political invention is in tune with Levinas’s emphasis on the 
incomparability of faces. Every single case of injustice should be dealt with as an exception. 
No prior knowledge or rules can with certainty determine particular cases. In agreement with 
Critchley, Derrida, and others, my observation is that one does not always make a decision 
based on knowledge. It is impossible that one can know with certitude all the variables and 
parameters involved in any singular case. Yet, decisions must be made, and actions executed. 
What this means is that decision making and taking any particular action at all are risky 
endeavours. Since the future does not always turn out as we plan it, my view is that political 
responsibility, which necessitates the calculation of justice, is a risky, but worthwhile, 
endeavour.  
 
Leithart says of Derrida that ‘saying that a responsible decision must be taken on the basis of 
knowledge seems to define the condition of possibility of responsibility (one can’t make a 




what reasons, in view of what and under what conditions), at the same time as it defines the 
condition of impossibility of this same responsibility (if decision-making is relegated to a 
knowledge that is content to follow or to develop, then it is no more a responsible decision, it 
is the technical deployment of a cognitive apparatus, the simple mechanistic deployment of a 
theorem. Responsible action is always an act of faith,’ (2006). 
 
Tied to the concept of risk, is the idea of fecundity. To my mind, decisions and actions are 
fecund. Hence, taking any particular action is even riskier because one is unaware of the 
fecundity of that action over time. The political subject is politically responsible for the 
consequences of actions, regardless of how long ago they were made, and also regardless of 
whether they are alive to witness the consequences. It is for this reason that Levinas argues 
that one continues to be responsible even in death. Sean Hand (1989) shows that in Otherwise 
than Being ‘responsibility … extends beyond my death in its implications’ (p. 88). 
 
In view of the foregoing, it is difficult but imperative to determine justice as the means to 
fulfilling political responsibility. There are a number of pointers in Levinas’s thought that are 
indicative of a method of calculating justice: the indeterminacy of action and fecundity of an 
action (I have referred to the fecundity of the embrace in Chapters One and Two above). 
Levinas has also emphasised two important experiences of human beings: evil and useless 
suffering on the one hand, and peace and wellbeing on the other (my own classification).  
 
According to Levinas’s view of human nature, human beings are by nature frail, destitute and 
in need of help to promote their peace and wellbeing. Subjecting the already destitute beings 
to undue suffering and violence is contrary their desire for peace and well-being. In seems to 




suffering on the one hand, and the longing for peace and wellbeing on the other. Reading 
Levinas in this way perfectly fits his thought on calculating justice into Jeremy Bentham’s 
framework of calculation and cost-benefit analysis. In particular, I refer to Bentham’s 
calculus of felicity, which is also generally known as utilitarian calculus (for a detailed 
reading of Utilitarianism and Bentham’s calculus see M Timmons 2002, WT Jones 1952, ED 
Miller, among many others).  
 
The central idea of utilitarianism is that ethically right actions are the ones that promote the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people affected by it. Like other Utilitarians, 
Bentham believed in the principle of utility – ‘the principle which approves or disapproves of 
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or 
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question’ Actions are good when the 
result is happiness.  
 
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory; it focuses on the results of actions as a test for 
their rightness or wrongness. To my mind, the focus on what the consequences of present 
actions will be in the near or remote future is not foreign to Levinas’s thought. The 
consequences of the Nazi Socialism, even long after it had ended, continue to be subject of 
scholarly debate until this day. The consequences, and the fecundity of the actions, of 
colonialism and apartheid in Africa, continue to affect and upset the present generation. It is 
for this reason that I find a modified version of utilitarianism, and the principle of utility, to 
be a proper tool for the administration of justice in Levinas’s political theory.    
 
For Bentham in particular, the decision-making process involves the following steps (Miller): 




ii) Consider all the persons affected 
iii) Calculate the [instances of justice and possible suffering] involved 
iv) Choose that course of action which result in the greatest balance of [justice over 
suffering]. 
 
The utilitarian principle of utility subjects everything to two motives: pleasure and pain 
(Jones 1952, Miller, Wilkens S 1995)). Pleasure and pain are evaluated according to four 
circumstances:  
i) intensity, how intense is the happiness 
ii) duration, how long will it last 
iii) certainty or probability of obtaining the desired results,  
iv) propinquity, how soon or near at hand is the happiness 
 
Moreover, pleasure and pain may have other pains and pleasures as consequences. For this 
reason, Bentham suggests two more circumstances to take into consideration when making 
decisions: 
v) fecundity, ability to produce further pleasures 
vi) purity, freedom from ensuing pains 
vii) extent, number of people affected 
 
The problem with Bentham and other utilitarians is the belief that happiness or pleasure is an 
end in itself; and that happiness is the only true standard of goodness (Wilkens 1995). Placing 
happiness side by side with pain is another problem, for the reason that happiness is not really 
the opposite of pain. One can be happy and in pain at the same time, or unhappy but not in 




an instance of the Good. Justice with a small j is not an end in itself, otherwise the movement 
of responsibility would stop when justice is executed. For the sake of calculating justice in 
Levinas’s thought, I suggest that pain or suffering be opposed by justice (which include 
peace,79 wellbeing, or soundness of body and mind): 
 
Levinas’s calculus of justice 
suffering      justice 
 
For Levinas, suffering and justice are two opposite poles of the pendulum. Actions would be 
right or wrong, just or unjust, depending on their likelihood or tendency to augment or 
diminish justice of the Other, or Others, in question. (J)ustice is an end in itself, and (j)ustice 
is a means to Justice. 
 
Let us consider the decision to increase the intake, and graduation, of black students in 
African universities that have a history of white students’ dominance. The action in itself 
appears good and a responsible response to the inequalities in access to education, which was 
widespread during colonialism and apartheid. It is a question of addressing the injustices of 
colonialism and apartheid. For Levinas, it is a question of administering justice for the Other, 
whose face was disregarded for a long time. Using the variables provided in the calculus 
above, the judgement about the rightness or wrongness of the present action depends on the 
foreseeable consequences of the action. I subject the action to questioning using the following 
select categories of the calculus:  
i) certainty or probability of obtaining the desired results: what is the certainty of 
achieving the equality, the numbers, and the quality of black graduates? 
                                                          





ii) propinquity: how soon can that be achieved? 
iii) fecundity: what is the ability of this action to produce further instances of 
justice? 
iv) purity: is this action free from ensuing pains? What pains come with it? 
v) extent:  how many people are affected? 
 
Analysis  
The decision is first of all a risk, since no one knows for certain how the action will unfold. 
The focus and the drive are the numbers that we hope to achieve at the end of the day, yet the 
trajectory of the action is unknown. But Levinasian responsibility demands endless concern 
with (everything that concerns) the Other (even as a particular action is unfolding). Decision 
makers have no control over the manner in which their decision will unfold. As much as one 
can take into account the foreseeable consequences of the decisions, but the fecundity over 
time of such decisions cannot be known at all to the limited human mind.80  
 
Back to the example above. 
i) what is the certainty of achieving the equality, the numbers, and the quality of black 
graduates? It is certain that the students will go through university and graduate. But it 
cannot be known that equality with their white counterparts is achievable, since their 
counterparts are not looking on idly. They are progressing even without the help of 
government support. The numbers of graduates are guaranteed, but not the quality of 
education. Other factors come into play the moment intake is increased, for instance 
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trajectory of the actions they initiate. So, should we hold them accountable for the consequences of their 
actions? Even if no man can foresee the future with certainty? Of course, yes! Arendt supported the idea to 




student-teacher ratio, which would in turn affect teacher performance and output, and 
in turn this has a bearing on quality of education and quality of graduates. 
ii) How soon can that be achieved? The desired results would happen soon, but  the 
above problem comes into the picture. 
iii) fecundity: what is the ability of this action to produce further instances of justice or 
injustice? Further instances of justice are guaranteed. More black students will be 
employed, which is a step towards alleviating poverty.  
iv) purity: is this action pure as to not cause pains? What pains come with it? It is in itself 
an injustice to side line a group of students with regard to educational benefits, just 
because their grandparents worked for, and accumulated a lot of wealth, during 
colonialism. It is a tricky situation. One can argue that they can afford to pay for their 
university education. But how about those who cannot afford? More importantly, how 
long should this selective justice go on until we arrive at the equality and justice that 
we are looking for? How long will the action go on?  
v) how many people are affected? Of course, as many black students and their families 
as possible will benefit. But how about the non-blacks? How will they be affected 
by this decision? 
 
What I want to underscore is that the decision-making process is not an easy task. Some have 
criticised utilitarianism based on the unknowability of the results (Wilkens 1995). If rightness 
of actions is based on consequences then decisions about the goodness of actions are 
dependent on knowing something that is still in the future, yet the future is unknowable (ibid, 
Wilkens 1995). The problem with this argument, however, is the erroneous belief that 
decision is based on consequences that are yet to happen. The utilitarian does not wait until 




different scenarios of the same action and how it would unfold over time. It may happen that 
the foresight is good and indeed comes to pass as anticipated, or that it was wrong after all. 
 
Another problem concerns the comparability of results (Wilkens 1995). The argument here is 
how can the utilitarian know that she has chosen the action with the greatest good when it is 
impossible to know whether the available actions would have brought about less good? 
Again, like with the above, for the utilitarian, all possible scenarios are compared on the 
drawing board, but only one that promises the greatest good will be executed. 
 
Lastly, but equally important, is how can we know the extent of the consequences? Can we 
foresee them, and avert them to avoid the most pain? The human mind is certainly limited 
when it comes to the issue of looking into the future. For the utilitarian, decision making is 
not dependent on one rational mind only, but where the action involved a number of people, 
even whole populations, then more people need to be involved at calculation, so that we have 
in the end a wide range of possible alternatives, and their possible trajectories. There could be 
other variants, external from the current issue being considered, that can come up to affect the 
current issue in future, something that no human mind would have made a connection, or 
think about at the time of making a particular decision. 
 
This has been the problem of the limitedness of rationality. Yet as far as it is possible, reason 
helps us see the future and plan accordingly. Otherwise it is not possible for policy makers to 
make any decisions about the future at all. 
 
As far as Levinas is concerned, justice is a calculation, there is no other way. The 




order that justice for particular individuals be administered. For instance, in order to address 
the injustices of colonialism and apartheid, classification of people into classes has to happen, 
otherwise how can the victims be helped in anonymity. Yet objectification of the Other is 
wrong in itself, it brings to light what is supposed to be hidden. But in this case, 
objectification would be right because of its intended consequences. It is not objectification 
for its own sake, but for the sale of addressing an injustice. 
 
Levinas’s permission of violence can also be looked at from the same utilitarian lenses. 
Violence is bad in itself, yet the intended result –which is to rectify the inequality victim-
victimiser imbalance –is good. Punishment of crimes against humanity, for instance, will 
bring about the satisfaction, peace, and well-being to the greatest number of people because, 
as I put it in Chapter Two above, most crimes done to the Other militate against humanity as 
a whole, hence punishing such crimes brings out the good for humanity. 
 
Some have argued against utilitarianism for the reason that most of the variables involved are 
scientifically incalculable. Is it possible to quantify or measure the other’s satisfaction with a 
just ruling, for instance?  How about to quantify the dissatisfaction from those who have lost 
the case? It is for this reason that it is not possible to lay down a fixed calculus that applies to 
all situations equally. Levinas, more than any social and political thinker probably, is well 
aware that that demand is in itself an injustice for the reason that the administration of justice 
should be tailored to an individual’s unique circumstances.  
 
Levinas’s political theory is utilitarian to the extent that calculation and weighing, or cost-
benefit-analysis is involved. Even when the decision is to suspend the ethical relation with 




is to be chosen for the benefit that it is expected to produce, which is to equalise the offender 
and the victim, or rather to restore the victim to the same level of humanity as the offender. 
Besides, punishment can deter others from committing similar offenses, hence it results in the 
greatest welfare for the greatest number of people. 
 
5.4 Objections and Replies 
Wolff (2011) argues that Levinas’s humanism does not give direction concerning what 
should practically be done. Accordingly, the question of the competence of Levinas’s subject 
to establish what justice entails in a particular context and realise it seems of no concern to 
Levinas. He sends away his subjects to responsibility towards the others, but without posing 
the question of means. Wolff charges Levinas with neglecting the primary importance of the 
question of competence of ethical subject and the means deployed by the subject in her effort 
to obey the imperative of unlimited responsibility to serve justice. And because the discretion 
is on the subject, which is a difficult calculation of justice, someone might be sacrificed; 
someone might be treated as not emitting the imperative ‘thou shalt not kill’, and eventually 
get killed. Under certain circumstances, resisting evil and even killing evil doers might thus 
be a valid way of obeying the original ethical imperative (154). 
 
What Wolff observes about Levinas’s application of responsibility for the other to practical 
situations is very correct. There seems to be an inherent contradiction in the means to 
discharging ethical responsibility and the meaning of ethical responsibility itself. Wolff states 
that ‘the means of ethical conduct interferes with the original ethical meaning and as such is 
part of it. In other words, if killing someone is one of the valid responses to the imperative 





On the contrary it doesn’t have to be that way. Wolff includes the means or the how-to-go-
about-it in the definition of the ethical imperative. What this implies is that ‘killing’ as means 
is part and parcel of what it means to ‘not kill’, which lands us in a contradiction. This way of 
coupling the means to discharge the ethical imperative and the meaning of the imperative 
itself is also what informs Madeleine Fagan’s argument about the inseparability of the ethics 
and politics in Emmanuel Levinas. Fagan (2009) argues that the unethical is always already 
part of the ethical, and that by implication responsibility cannot be separated from 
irresponsibility (2009:11,21). Hence, the possibility to kill is included in what it means not to 
kill. I am not certain if this is how Levinas wants to describe the ethical imperative. I see two 
issues that complicate Wolff’s and Fagan’s arguments: First is the questionable belief that the 
ethical subject has to act on the ethical imperative. In a central passage in Otherwise Than 
Being (1974), Levinas shows that the ethical subject is passive, traumatised, hostage. What 
can such a subject to? To even think of the ethical subject’s possibility to kill is contrary to 
the description of the constitution of ethical subjectivity. Second is a similar belief to the 
above that the ethical subject actually discharges responsibility for all the others. Both Wolff 
and Fagan talk about a plurality of responsibilities – the idea that the ethical subject is faced 
with ethical demands from all the others, and she must now compare them, find out who 
came first, whose claim is urgent, etc. But does the ethical subject even get to that point? 
Seeing that, at the absent presence of the third party through the eyes of the other, she 
immediately becomes the Other like all others, ‘thanks to God!’? 
 
So how should we interpret Levinas’s acquiescence to kill that can happen in the face of the 
ethical imperative ‘thou shalt not kill’? Can we on Levinas’s terms qualify killing: as 
ethically or politically acceptable, or ethically and politically unacceptable? In the following 




place without contradiction. I propose a reading of the ethical imperative ‘thou shalt not kill’ 
that does not primarily refer to actually killing someone, but to a recognition of vulnerability 
and helplessness. To this effect, if one takes advantage of the other and deprives them of 
initiative and action for instance, she has killed the Other. To let the Other be, to not kill 
them, is to let their vulnerability speak forth and generate the necessary measures to ensure 
justice. In this way, one can actually kill somebody, deprive them of their right to life, 
assuming that that somebody committed the injustice of repressing vulnerability, and hence 
justice for the other. 
 
My observation, however, is that the distinction between the ethical welcome and the 
political welcome is not clear in Derrida’s presentation (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4. 
above). When Derrida, for instance argues that the welcome is rational (1999), he seems to be 
referring to the ethical welcome. Yet in Levinas’s view, the ethical welcome precedes 
rationality. Nevertheless, Derrida is right about the idea that reason comes through the door, 
but my view is that the need for separation between the ethical welcome (which is prior to 
reason) and the political welcome (which is founded on reason) is critical. 
 
Gauthier (2014:190) argues that Levinas’s description of the home and of the welcoming of 
the other makes no mention of politics. The political potential of Levinas’s hospitality 
becomes evident with the event of the third party. Hence for Gauthier, deduction of the 
political from the ethical is impossible. Further to this, Gauthier argues that ‘although ethics 
permeates Levinas’s discussion of the home, politics is conspicuously absent because the 
self’s relationship to the other occurs on an anarchical, non-political plane (2004:201). In my 
view, it is not ethics that permeates Levinas’s discussion of the home, but his discussion of 




ethical welcome of the other. The door of the home is a political space, where the inhabitant 
consciously decides to welcome the visitor or to turn them away.   
 
Gauthier’s argument for the impossibility of deducing politics from ethics is the same as 
Derrida’s. Gauthier claims that ‘in Derrida’s view ... ethics is not coterminous with politics. 
Ethics is the realm of the face to face interaction, and politics is characterised by warlike 
aggression and anonymous uniformity’ (Gauthier 2004: 219). While the characterisation of 
Levinas’s ethics and his idea of politics is correct, I argue that the type of politics that follows 
from Levinas’s ethics is justified politics – a politics that comes into being by the demand of 
ethics. In Otherwise Than Being (1974), Levinas refers to this politics by the term justified 
Said. The politics that is in opposition with Levinas’s ethics is the unjustified politics of 
totalitarianism, which is characterised by unjust wars and violence; that does not arise as a 
response to the destitution and moral nudity of the face of the other (the Saying). Just war and 
justified violence is also to be found in Levinas’s vision of politics but it is ethically 
necessary. So, even though Levinas ends up with politics, it is not the same politics that he 
displaced at the beginning of Totality and Infinity (1961).  
 
5.5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter was a bit different from the previous two, in that I was proposing a theory of 
political responsibility in Emmanuel Levinas, which involved delineating Levinas’s political 
theory and then suggesting a method of calculating justice. This chapter set out to propose a 
method for the calculation of political responsibility in Levinas, based on the epistemology of 
time. I have argued that political responsibility is i) the knowledge of the time of justice and 




do and doing it, 81 and for this reason we cannot leave the determination of responsibility to 
chance – not necessarily a knowledge of knowing exactly what to do in each particular case, 
even though this is very important. If one knows exactly what to do in each situation, then 
‘responsibility in action’ loses its risk factor. More importantly, the risk of political 
responsibility is not in the ignorance of what to do as such, but in the ignorance of the 
fecundity of the decision and action that what chooses to undertake.  
 
A politically responsible person is one who knows the time of justice, and what to do during 
this time. I argue that ethical responsibility, though non-epistemic, uncovers the epistemic 
dimension of responsibility. Political responsibility operates within the perimeters of 
epistemology, and not outside of it. Questions such as ‘who is right and wrong’, ‘what have 
some Other already done to another’, ‘what do I have to do with justice?’ are all epistemic 
questions. They are all seeking for calculable responses. Hence, I have proposed a Levinasian 
calculus of justice following of Jeremy Bentham’s calculus of felicity.  
 
                                                          
81 I am reminded of a presentation Lubomira Radoilska of Kent University made at the University of 








In this thesis, I have argued for a theory of political responsibility that is coextensive with 
Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility. I have defined Levinas’s idea of ethical responsibility 
as a movement, in the self, towards the absolutely Other. According to Levinas this 
movement is contrary to the self’s perseverance in being, but the intention is to produce an 
ethical subject who is wholly divested of self. It is this type of subject that can endlessly be 
concerned with the wellbeing of the Other.  
 
The biblical story of Abraham’s test to sacrifice his only son Isaac best exemplifies what 
Levinas means by being divested of self. Mount Moriah, which is the place of sacrifice, 
teaches Abraham about his immediate relation with the Other person – Isaac in this case. In 
his encounter with the face (that is, the helplessness and destitution) of Isaac, Abraham 
encounters God and he hears the command: Let live! I have argued that Mount Moriah is the 
place of sacrifice of the self – the place where one comes face to face with helplessness in its 
nudity. Moriah is the place of interruption, where self complacency is challenged, and put in 
question by the helplessness of the Other. Abraham ended up sacrificing his self at Moriah, 
and in this posture, he was able to hear the command of God through the face of Isaac. 
Furthermore, the Moriah experience opened Abraham’s eyes to destitution and helplessness 
that defined his son, one that he would have never experienced were it not for Moriah. In the 
encounter with the face of the Other, one encounters the destitution and helplessness of 
humanity (the third party). It is for this reason that one’s responsibility to the Other opens up 
responsibility to humanity. I have used Levinas’s notion of la porte in Totality and Infinity 




The question of la porte (the door) is, central to understanding the relationship between ethics 
and politics in Levinas, yet it has not been given due attention. In this thesis, I have shown 
that the supposed hiatus between ethics and politics in Levinas disappears once we consider 
the role of the door as the place where the ethical and the political become indistinguishable. 
Also, to argue that Levinas’s ethics is incompatible with his idea of politics is to ignore the 
role that the door plays in Levinas’s ethics. By locating the ethical welcome at the door, I set 
free the intentionality of desire which would otherwise be caught up and lost in the ethical. 
Thanks to the open door, it is possible to talk of the transcendent intention, which is the 
movement of responsibility itself towards the Good.  
 
La porte would stand for all manner of interruptions in modernity – interruptions that call 
into question established norms and systems of administration and justice. I have shown that 
the African political sphere, with its growing disregard of the Other is the place of 
interruption where the ethical and the political continually contradict each other, in order to 
birth better responses to the vulnerability of the Other in need. 
 
By defining human nature in terms of vulnerability, I have found a new justification for 
human rights. The right to recognition and respect, is the first and foundational right that 
gives birth to the ever-expanding lists of human rights. I have noted that the question of 
human rights has not been debated extensively in Levinas’s scholarship; even my reference to 
human rights in this thesis has been marginal. It is usually taken for granted that human 
beings have rights. But how these rights and privileges become part and parcel of the human 
is not clear. I would like to see Levinas in dialogue with Hannah Arendt and Immanuel Kant, 




has been left out in leading human rights discourses, yet his understanding of human nature, 
provides the missing link that human rights theorists need to complete the dignity-rights gap. 
  
The question of the third party is another interesting area of research. Most of the debates in 
Levinas’s scholarship revolve around the notion of the third party. It cannot be emphasised 
enough, and I do not claim to have exhausted the question of the third party – its absent 
presence in the face to face encounter, its interruption of the face to face, its announcement of 
justice, and so on. But what I have done is to question the moral authority of the third party, 
given the manner of its presentation in the ethical encounter. I have not found this question in 
Levinas’s literature, but it is an important one and it should be researched further. By arguing 
that the third party has no moral authority to place the demand of ethical responsibility on the 
self, let alone halt the movement of responsibility, I have shown the exigency of political 
responsibility in a new way. Granted this new perspective, the question of possibility and 
impossibility of ethical responsibility (especially in Derrida 1997, 1999 and Fagan 2009) 
becomes less troublesome. 
 
This new way of looking at the third party has facilitated my redefinition of political 
responsibility as the knowledge of the time of justice –when to suspend the ethical relation 
with the Other, what to do during the suspension, and when to restore the ethical relation. I 
have shown that political responsibility, which is justice, operates within the parameters of 
epistemology. Since decision making is a risky endeavour, and also for the reason that action 
is fecund, I have proposed a methodology of calculating justice – after Bentham’s calculus of 
felicity. The variables that are more pronounced in Levinas’s calculation of justice are the 
fecundity of the decision, its extent, and its purity. The utilitarian connotations of Levinas’s 




There is more to Levinas than what has been partially uncovered in this work. Contrary to 
Caygill (2002:3), my view is that Levinas is concerned with the present (and how it 
determines the future). In Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas says that his principal 
theme in that work is ‘the present,’ and also ‘position’ (p. 18, 19). It is in view of this that the 
position that we undertake today, by reason of its fecundity, has a bearing on the future state 
of affairs. The locale for decision-making is the open door, which is forever present – now 
that we are here, present in this interruption, what do we do?  
 
In summary, one can never claim to have uncovered Levinas’s thought in its entirety.  To my 
mind, his thought resembles what he says of the Other, that ‘it refuses to be known. It is an 
evanescent. It is essentially hidden, throws itself toward the light, without becoming 
signification. It appears without appearing.’ One should expect surprises; how did I miss 
that? How did I not see that? There is always room for new perspectives and dimensions. 
This also confirms what Derrida said about Levinas’s work: that it ‘proceeds with the infinite 
insistence of waves on a beach: return and repetition, always, of the same wave against the 
same shore, in which, however, as each return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews and 
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